Hallman v. Summit County

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0853
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0853 Hallman v Summitt County 03-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0853 Board of Assessment Appeals No. 24BAA762

Howard E. Hallman, Jr.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Summit County Board of Equalization,

Respondent-Appellee,

and

Board of Assessment Appeals,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Lum and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026

Howard E. Hallman, Jr., Pro Se

Jeffrey Huntley, County Attorney, Andrew Armstrong, Assistant County Attorney, Breckenridge, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee

Phillip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Krista Maher, Assistant Attorney General, Lindsey Schwartz, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, for Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, Howard E. Hallman, Jr., appeals an order of the

Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) denying his petition

challenging the classification by the Summit County Board of

Equalization (the County Board) of Hallman’s land as vacant. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Hallman’s limited liability company, Shed, LLC, owns two

contiguous parcels of land in Summit County.1 Hallman’s

residence is on one parcel (residential parcel), which is classified

and taxed as residential land. The other parcel (subject parcel) is

vacant.

1 We will refer to Hallman as the owner for clarity’s sake.

1 Aerial photo of residential and subject parcels

¶3 The subject parcel was classified and taxed as residential land

from the 1990s, when Hallman bought it, until 2024. In 2021, the

General Assembly passed House Bill 21-1061, which changed the

definition of residential land for tax purposes. See Ch. 63, sec. 1,

§ 39-1-102, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 252-53. Specifically, the statute

provides that land without residential improvements can only be

considered residential if it is contiguous to a parcel of residential

land owned by the same owner and contains an essential

improvement related to the residential improvement on the

contiguous land. § 39-1-102(14.4)(a)(I)(C), C.R.S. 2025.

2 ¶4 The County Assessor classified the subject parcel as vacant for

the 2024 tax year.2 Hallman appealed the reclassification for the

2024 tax year, and the County Board upheld the County Assessor’s

classification. Hallman then filed a petition with the BAA

challenging the County Board’s decision.

¶5 At the hearing before the BAA, Hallman and the County Board

agreed that the parcels are contiguous and under common

ownership. The sole contested issue was whether the subject parcel

contains any residential improvements or related essential

improvements. Hallman argued that wildfire mitigation and scenic

mountain views are amenities of the subject parcel that fall within

the statutory definition of residential improvements. He also

argued that the subject parcel contains essential related

improvements because the open space is defensible space against

wildfire and protects his scenic mountain views.

¶6 The BAA denied Hallman’s petition. It ruled that “the

amenities as described by Mr. Hallman do not bring the parcel

within the definition of a residential improvement” and “ineffective

2 Vacant land is taxed at a higher rate than residential land.

3 wildfire mitigation and scenic mountain views are not essential

related improvements.”

II. Discussion

¶7 Hallman contends that the BAA erred by finding that (1) the

subject parcel doesn’t contain amenities that qualify as residential

improvements; (2) wildfire mitigation and scenic mountain views

aren’t essential related improvements; and (3) the County Board

properly reclassified the subject parcel from residential to vacant.

We reject these contentions.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 A BAA property classification “involves mixed questions of law

and fact.” O’Neil v. Conejos Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2017 COA 30,

¶ 11.

¶9 We will uphold the BAA’s classification if it “(1) has a

reasonable basis in law and (2) is supported by substantial evidence

in the record.” Id. (citing Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo Cnty. Bd.

of Comm’rs, 50 P.3d 916, 920 (Colo. App. 2002)). It is the “BAA’s

function, and not that of a reviewing court, to weigh the evidence

and to resolve conflicts therein.” Lodge Props., Inc. v. Eagle Cnty.

Bd. of Equalization, 2022 CO 9, ¶ 26. Thus, we will overturn the

4 BAA’s decision only if we conclude that there was “an abuse of

discretion, or that the order was arbitrary and capricious, based

upon clearly erroneous factual findings, unsupported by

substantial evidence in the record, or otherwise contrary to law.”

Id. (quoting Hinsdale Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. HDH P’ship, 2019

CO 22, ¶ 19). In applying these principles, we keep in mind that

the taxpayer has the burden of establishing that a classification is

incorrect. Home Depot, 50 P.3d at 920.3

¶ 10 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.

Hinsdale, ¶ 19 (citing Boulder Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. HealthSouth

Corp., 246 P.3d 948, 951 (Colo. 2011)). “When interpreting a

statute, ‘[o]ur primary objective is to effectuate the intent of the

General Assembly by looking to the plain meaning of the language

used, considered within the context of the statute as a whole.’”

Hogan v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2018 COA 86, ¶ 11 (quoting Fifield

3 Hallman argues that the BAA and the County Board have the

burden to prove that the subject parcel doesn’t contain any residential improvements or essential related improvements. However, the statute that he cites, § 39-1-103(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025, doesn’t say that and case law holds otherwise. See Bringle Fam. Tr. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2018 COA 64, ¶ 10; Gyurman v. Weld Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 851 P.2d 307, 310 (Colo. App. 1993).

5 v. Pitkin Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2012 COA 197, ¶ 5), aff’d sub nom.,

Mook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2020 CO 12.

B. Hallman’s Contentions on Appeal

1. The Subject Parcel’s “Amenities”

¶ 11 Hallman argues that the BAA abused its discretion because

the subject parcel contains “amenities” that are “residential

improvements” — wildfire mitigation and access to scenic mountain

views for his residential property. We disagree.

a. Applicable Law

¶ 12 “‘Residential real property’ means residential land and

residential improvements . . . .” § 39-1-102(14.5). A residential

improvement is “a building, or that portion of a building, designed

for use predominantly as a place of residency by a person, a family,

or families. The term includes buildings, structures, fixtures,

fences, amenities, and water rights that are an integral part of the

residential use.” § 39-1-102(14.3). Under these definitions,

residential improvements alone are insufficient to obtain a

residential classification, as “there must be a residential dwelling

unit on the property.” Sullivan v. Bd. of Equalization, 971 P.2d 675,

676-77 (Colo. App. 1998). So the existence of amenities alone

6 doesn’t justify classifying an adjacent parcel as residential. Id.; see

also Ziegler v. Park Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2020 CO 13, ¶ 15

(“[W]ithout a house, there exists no accompanying residential use.

Thus, to classify a single parcel as residential land, it must contain

a residential dwelling unit.”).

b. Analysis

¶ 13 Hallman argues that the subject parcel should be classified as

residential because wildfire mitigation and scenic mountain views

are “amenities” as that term is used in the statutory definition of

residential improvements. We disagree.

¶ 14 As noted, “site improvements and amenities alone are

insufficient” to classify a parcel as residential. Sullivan, 971 P.2d at

676. There must be a residential dwelling unit on the land for

amenities to support a residential classification. Id. Even

assuming that wildfire mitigation and scenic mountain views are

amenities, there isn’t any evidence in the record that there is a

7 residential dwelling unit on the subject parcel. Thus, Hallman’s

argument fails.4

2. Essential Related Improvements to the Subject Parcel

¶ 15 Hallman next argues that the BAA abused its discretion

because wildfire mitigation and scenic mountain views are essential

related improvements. We disagree.

¶ 16 The statutory definition of residential land includes land

without a residential improvement “if the parcel is contiguous to a

parcel of residential land that has identical ownership based on the

record title and contains a related improvement that is essential to

the use of the residential improvement located on the identically

owned contiguous residential land.” § 39-1-102(14.4)(a)(I)(C). The

term “related improvement” includes “a driveway, parking space, or

improvement other than a building.” § 39-1-102(14.4)(a)(III)(B).

The statute further defines improvements as “structures, buildings,

4 In their briefs, the parties argue about whether the wildfire

defensible space is ineffective and thus not an amenity. Because we conclude that the wildfire defensible space isn’t an amenity because there isn’t a residential unit on the subject parcel, we decline to discuss whether it is effective.

8 fixtures, fences, and water rights erected upon or affixed to land.”

§ 39-1-102(6.3). The commonly understood meaning of an

“improvement” is something that increases the land’s value or

enhances its appearance. Black’s Law Dictionary 904 (12th ed.

2024).

¶ 17 Importantly, the related improvement must be “essential” to

the residential parcel. § 39-1-102(14.4)(a)(I)(C). “Essential” means

“[o]f the utmost importance; basic and necessary.” Black’s Law

Dictionary at 686; see also Mook, ¶ 52 (“essential means ‘of the

utmost importance’” (quoting Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

https://perma.cc/5LKP-CD7A)).

¶ 18 In contrast, vacant land is a parcel on “which no buildings or

fixtures, other than minor structures, are located.”

§ 39-1-103(14)(c)(I). Minor structures are improvements “that do

not add value to the land on which they are located and that are not

suitable to be used for and are not actually used for any . . .

residential . . . purpose.” § 39-1-103(14)(c)(II)(A).

¶ 19 Hallman conceded at the BAA hearing, and does so again in

his opening brief, that he never made any changes to the subject

9 parcel: All he does is mow and water it regularly. He also testified

at the hearing that he never added any fixtures, fences, or

structures that would increase the subject parcel’s value or

enhance its appearance. Hallman instead said that he has

intentionally left the subject parcel empty. But, as the BAA

correctly points out, “[e]mpty space for wildfire mitigation and

scenic views is not a structure, building, fixture, [or] fence.” Thus,

wildfire mitigation isn’t considered a related improvement.

¶ 20 Hallman also argues that using the subject parcel to protect

scenic mountain views is an improvement. But, again, he didn’t

add any structures or fixtures to enhance his scenic mountain

views. And without adding such structures and fixtures, the

subject parcel received no residential improvements as defined by

the statute.

¶ 21 Even if we were to regard Hallman’s wildfire mitigation and

scenic mountain views as improvements, they wouldn’t suffice to

classify the subject parcel as residential because they aren’t

“essential.” Hallman asserts that improvements don’t need to be

essential to qualify. But the statute expressly says they do. § 39-1-

102(14.4)(a)(I)(C) (“contains a related improvement that is essential”

10 (emphasis added)); see also H.B. 21-1061, 73d Gen. Assemb., 1st

Reg. Sess., Bill Summary (Colo. 2021), https://perma.cc/2CNT-

SW2L (The purpose of the bill is to require “the parcel to have a

related improvement that is essential to the use of a residential

improvement located on the identically owned contiguous

residential land.” (emphasis added)).

¶ 22 Hallman didn’t show that wildfire mitigation on the subject

parcel is essential for his use of the residential parcel. He conceded

at the BAA hearing that he could sell the parcels separately and still

use his residential parcel. And although Hallman asserts that he

would lose his scenic mountain views if he sold the subject parcel,

losing scenic mountain views wouldn’t affect his ability to use the

residential parcel. The residential parcel would still provide a

usable residence even without the scenic mountain views. Thus,

the record supports the BAA’s finding that the subject parcel

doesn’t contain any essential related improvements.

3. Illegal Reclassification of the Subject Parcel

¶ 23 Lastly, Hallman argues that, because he hasn’t made any

changes to the subject parcel, the BAA abused its discretion by

11 concluding that the County Board had the right to reclassify it. We

disagree.

¶ 24 “[O]nce any property is classified for property tax purposes, it

shall remain so classified until such a time as its actual use

changes or the assessor discovers that the classification is

erroneous.” § 39-1-103(5)(c) (emphasis added). A statutory change

can render a classification erroneous. See Douglas Cnty. Bd. of

Equalization v. Fid. Castle Pines, Ltd., 890 P.2d 119, 125 (Colo.

1995) (“There is a presumption that when the legislature amends a

statute it intends to change the law.”). Thus, if a classification no

longer conforms to the law, the assessor must reclassify the

property to reflect that legislative change.

¶ 25 The statutory amendment changed the definition of residential

classification to require essential improvements to the parcel. See

§ 39-1-102(14.4)(a)(I)(C). Hallman made none, as he concedes.

This made the previous classification of the subject parcel presently

erroneous; thus the County Board properly reclassified the subject

parcel to comply with the amendment. The County Assessor

12 testified at the BAA hearing that she was “following the State law

that had a change in the requirements of residential land.”

Because the amendment changed the classification requirements,

the County Board correctly reclassified the subject parcel.5

III. Disposition

¶ 26 We affirm the order.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

5 In his opening and reply briefs, Hallman raises several

constitutional challenges for the first time. A claimant doesn’t need to raise constitutional challenges during administrative proceedings to preserve them for appeal. See Pepper v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 131 P.3d 1137, 1139 (Colo. App. 2005), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d 654 (Colo. 2006). However, Hallman either fails to develop these arguments in his opening brief, or he asserts them for the first time in his reply brief. We don’t address undeveloped arguments, see Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007), and we don’t address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, Holley v. Huang, 284 P.3d 81, 87 (Colo. App. 2011). We therefore won’t address those challenges.