Halliday v. Henry

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: February 8, 2016
• Docket: CUMcv-15-257
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, SS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO . CV-15-257

MALCOLM HALLIDAY and ) INGIGERDUR HALLIDAY, ) ) Plaintiffs ) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ) v. ) STATE OF MAINE KATHRYN W. HENRY and ) Cumberland, ss, Clerk's Office ROBERT N. CENTER ) ) FEB oa 2016 ) Defendants ) RECEIVED Before the court is Defendants Kathryn W. Henry ' s and Robert N. Center' s

motion to dismiss . For the following reasons , Defendants ' motion to dismiss is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 27, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants Kathryn Henry

and Robert Center in Cumberland County Superior Court alleging statutory nuisance.

The substance of the Complaint involved a house that was newly built on Defendants'

property in Harpswell. Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the Defendants '

modifications diverted water to Plaintiffs' property, allegedly causing damage over time.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Superior Court

granted on August 12, 2014. Plaintiffs appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court of

Maine ("Law Court") affirmed the Superior Court grant of summary judgment on May

12, 2015. Plaintiffs filed the present Complaint on June 8, 2015 .

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review - Res Judicata

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint as barred by res judicata or more

simply, claim preclusion. Claim preclusion bars the re litigation of a claim if: (1) the

same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final judgment was

entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters presented for decision in the second action

were, or might have been litigated in the first action."' Johnson v. Samson Constr. Corp.,

1997 ME 220, P6, 704 A.2d 866, 868 (citation omitted).

B. Defendants ' Motion to Dismiss

The first two prongs of the analysis can be dispatched easily. The present case

involves precisely the same parties as were involved in the previous case. See Def Exh.

A; Def Exh. C. Moreover, a valid and final judgment was entered in the previous case

involving the same parties in the present action. See Def Exh. B. The Superior Court

granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on August 12, 2014. The Law Court

affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment on May 12, 2015. See Def

Exh. B .

As for the last prong of the analysis, the court is required to determine whether the

matters presented for decision in the instant action were or might have been litigated in

the prior action, by utilizing what has been referred to as a transactional test to define the

cause of action. Id.

the measure of a cause of action is the aggregate of connected operative facts that can be handled together conveniently for purposes of trial. A prior judgment bars a later suit arising out [ofj the same aggregate of operative facts even though the second suit relies on a legal theory not advanced in the first case, seeks

2 different relief than that sought in the first case, and involves evidence different from the evidence relevant to the first case.

Dumont. V Fleet Bank of Me. , 2000 ME 197, P.6, 760 A.2d 1049, 1052.

The effect of the prior decision upon the present action is a question of law." Id.,

citing Currier v. Cyr, 570 A.2d 1205, 1207-08 (Me. 1990).

Plaintiffs advance precisely the same set of facts that formed the predicate to the

previous suit, which was litigated fulsomely, and resulted in a final judgment in

Defendants' favor. The Plaintiffs now express displeasure with the decisions by the

Superior Court and the Law Court. That does not change the ineluctable reality that the

present suit arises out of the same aggregate of connected operative facts as the first case.

This is true, notwithstanding the possibility that when viewed with the most imaginative

interpretation, the present Complaint may raise different legal theories or may involve

evidence different from that in the first case. For example, Plaintiffs claim that the

Superior Court Justice, the Law Court Justices, the Defendants and their attorney have

made false statements and committed perjury. Plaintiffs also allege that in the "summer

of 2012," Defendants placed "impassible impediments" blocking access to their house

and tum around. As to the latter, these claims were or could have been litigated in the

pnor case.

To the extent that Plaintiffs ' claim of false statements by the Defendants in the

prior case could be generously interpreted as a claim for civil perjury, the court's

conclusion remains unchanged.

A claim of civil perjury is construed strictly. 14 M.R.S.A. § 870 (2007) . Bean v.

Cummings, 2008 ME 18, P.1 , 939 A.2d 676, 677. The elements ofa civil perjury claim

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are (1) a judgment obtained against a party, (2) by the perjury of the witness, and (3)

introduced at the trial by the adverse party. Id. The court has imposed a clear and

convincing evidence standard of proof in civil perjury actions. Claims of perjury should

not be submitted to a new factfinder solely on the same record as in the original trial.

Newly discovered evidence has long been required in perjury cases. As such, Maine

courts have long required newly discovered evidence in civil perjury cases and a

heightened pleading requirement in such cases. Id. This is a recognition that while the

"law abhors fraud and perjury, it also abhors interminable litigation." Id.

Plaintiffs proclaim that perjury occurred in the first case but does not plead those

claims with particularity. Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the heightened pleading

standard articulated in Bean and as required by M .R. Civ. P. 9(b). Id. (affirming the

holding that claim of perjury is a type of fraud and therefore subject to the heightened

pleading standard set forth in M.R. Civ. P. 9(b)).

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

The Clerk is directed to enter this Order on the civil docket by reference pursuant

to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).

Date 1./s/10