Hallgren v. Walsh
This text of Hallgren v. Walsh (Hallgren v. Walsh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.
JENNY HALLGREN,
Plaintiffs
v. DECISION AND ORDER
SUSAN M. WALSH and TINA LORD,
Defendants
In front of the court is defendant Susan M. Walsh's (Walsh) M.R. Civ. P. 56
motion for summary judgment.
Walsh owns property in Gardiner, Maine consisting of a building with two
apartments. Walsh occupies the apartment on the first floor. Defendant's Statement of
Material Facts (DSMF) 3-4. On October 30, 2005, Defendant Tina Lord (Lord) lived in the second floor apartment with her two children. (DSMF of a puppy (Oscar) in 2000. (DSMF details of the event are disputed, Oscar bit plaintiff. (DSMF details are disputed, but the parties essentially agree that Walsh provided Lord permission to have Oscar on the premises and was unaware that Oscar was a pit-bull. (DSMF Standard of Review: [A]lthough summary judgment is no longer an extreme remedy, it is not a substitute for trial. It is, at base, "simply a procedural device for obtaining judicial resolution of those matters that may be decided without 2 fact-finding." If facts material to the resolution of the matter have been properly placed in dispute, summary judgment based on those facts is not available except in those instances where the facts properly proffered would be flatly insufficient to support a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party as a matter of law. Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Wrabacon, Inc., 2007 ME 34, Discussion: A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect against the danger. Isaacson v. Husson College, 297 A.2d 98, 104 (Me. 1972) (quoting Section 343 of the Restatement of Torts (1965)). Assuming the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Walsh owned the land where Oscar bit plaintiff and Walsh had earlier seen Oscar attack plaintiff's dog in June of 2005; Oscar had growled, lunged and snarled at plaintiff while on a leash; Oscar had nipped the finger of another person; and had snapped at a veterinarian. (PSAMF propensity, Walsh should have taken corrective action to protect plaintiff from Oscar. See Murray v. Eastern Maine Medical Center, 447 A.2d 465, 466. Further plaintiff argues that defendant owed her a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the land in reasonably safe condition. Plaintiff claims that this duty was breached based on similar facts as above, in essence that Walsh controlled the land and failed to do something to rectify the risk posed by the presence of Oscar knowing his propensity for dangerousness, particularly where Walsh provided permission for Lord to keep Oscar on the premises but retained the ability to revoke that permission. 3 In support of her position, plaintiff cites three cases from other jurisdictions. Matthws v. Ambenuood Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 719 A.2d 119 (Md. Ct. App. 1998) ("Under the present circumstances...where a landlord retained control over the matter of animals in the tenants apartment, coupled with the knowledge of past vicious behavior by the animal, the extremely dangerous nature of pit bull dogs, and the foreseeability of harm to persons and property in the apartment complex, the jury was justified in finding that the landlord had a duty to the plaintiffs and that the duty was breached."); Linebaugh v. Hyndman, 516 A.2d 638 (N.}. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1986) (reversing entry of summary judgment in dog bite case, where there was a question of material fact as to dog's violent propensity, because "[t]he fact the risk of injury was created by another, here, a tenant, cannot serve to insulate the tortfeasor from his failure to perform his obligation."); Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Cal. App. Ct. 1975) (holding that a duty of care for a landlord arises when "the landlord has actual knowledge of the animal, coupled with the right to have it removed from the premises ..." and landlord "knew of the vicious propensities" of the dog). These cases are all distinguishable. In all of the above instances liability is reliant on the landlord's knowledge of a violent propensity towards humans. This court cannot find a single case in which a court has applied liability to a landlord on the basis of his/her knowledge of a dog-fight alone. Assuming the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Walsh was aware of Oscar attacking plaintiff's dog. (PASMF Plaintiff alleges that Oscar once growled, lunged and snarled at her while on a leash, nipped another persons finger, and snapped at a veterinarian. 1 (PASMF I Plaintiff also alleges that Oscar "barked a lot." (PASMF lJI 46.) Though the court is aware that the bark is often worse than the bite, it does not believe the instance of a yappy Chihuahua would constitute a circumstance in which a landlord should reasonably foresee that dog's "violent propensity." 4 However, distinct from the dog-fight, Walsh is not alleged to have been aware of these other instances involving humans, nor did she have a duty to be aware of them. As a matter of law, assessing all facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff's common law negligence claims. Strict liability applies only to the possessor of a dog and the possessor "knows or has reason to know" the dog "has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class" and is limited to harm caused by the abnormally dangerous propensity. Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, <[ 16, n. 3 828 A.2d 778, 782-83, n. 3 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 (1977)). Plaintiff argues that Walsh should be deemed a possessor of Oscar because she granted permission for him to remain on the property and retained discretion to determine whether he could remain on the property. Neither Maine case law, nor the Restatement, supports determining Walsh to be Oscar's possessor. See Id. <[ 16, 828 A.2d at 782-83 (holding § 509 of the restatement inapplicable); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 514 (1977) ("possession of the land on which the animal is kept, even when coupled with permission given to a third person to keep it, is not enough to make the possessor of the land liable as a harborer of the animal. Thus a father, on whose land his son lives in a separate residence, does not1. Common Law Negligence
II. Common Law Strict Liability
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Hallgren v. Walsh, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hallgren-v-walsh-mesuperct-2008.