25CA0316 Hallam v ICAO 06-05-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0316 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 29454-2024
Diana Hallam,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Lower Valley Hospital Association,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Román, C.J., and Berger*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025
Diana Hallam, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Michael C. Santo, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Respondent Lower Valley Hospital Association
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of the Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3) and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this unemployment compensation benefits case, Diana
Hallam appeals an order disqualifying her from receiving benefits
based on her job separation from Lower Valley Hospital Association
(Lower Valley). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Hallam worked for Lower Valley as an IT technician. In July
2024, she went to one of Lower Valley’s clinics to address some
computer issues. While she was working on the front desk
computer, she became inappropriately loud with the front desk
staff. Hallam later admitted that she had “lost it” and emailed an
apology to the staff. Lower Valley terminated Hallam’s employment,
citing her violation of a company policy on unacceptable conduct,
which included “agitation against other employees that is or may be
harmful to morale or work performance.”
¶3 Hallam applied for unemployment benefits. A deputy for the
Division of Unemployment Insurance initially determined that
Hallam qualified for benefits based on the information that Hallam
provided. Lower Valley appealed that decision and requested a
hearing. The hearing officer determined that under section
8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV), C.R.S. 2024, Hallam was disqualified from
1 receiving benefits because she engaged in rude, insolent, or
offensive behavior. Hallam appealed to the Industrial Claim
Appeals Office (the Panel), which affirmed.
II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶4 We will uphold the Panel’s decision unless the findings of fact
do not support the decision or the decision is erroneous as a matter
of law. § 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d), C.R.S. 2024; see Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr.
Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17. We review de
novo ultimate conclusions of fact and ultimate legal conclusions.
Harbert v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 23, ¶¶ 8-9.
Determining whether a claimant is at fault for the separation
requires a case-specific consideration of the totality of the
circumstances. Morris v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 843 P.2d 76, 79
(Colo. App. 1992).
¶5 A worker can receive benefits only if she is unemployed
through no fault of her own. See Debalco Enters., Inc. v. Indus.
Claim Appeals Off., 32 P.3d 621, 623 (Colo. App. 2001). “Fault”
includes “a volitional act or the exercise of some control or choice in
the circumstances leading to the discharge from employment such
that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the termination.”
2 Richards v. Winter Park Recreational Ass’n, 919 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo.
App. 1996).
¶6 An individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits if the separation from employment occurred based on the
“[r]udeness, insolence, or offensive behavior of the worker not
reasonably to be countenanced by a customer, supervisor, or fellow
worker.” § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV). In determining whether this
subsection applies, we consider whether a reasonable person in the
position of the fellow worker and others “would have found [the]
claimant’s action to be so rude, insolent, or offensive as not to be
countenanced.” Davis v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 903 P.2d 1243,
1245 (Colo. App. 1995).
III. Evidence Below
¶7 The hearing officer heard testimony from a medical assistant
(MA) who was at the clinic during the incident. The MA testified
that she was in her back office when she heard Hallam being loud
with the front desk staff. The MA testified that one of the front desk
staff members then asked her to come up front. When the MA went
to the front, she observed Hallam being “very loud and very rude.”
She testified that each time somebody tried to speak to Hallam, she
3 would “cut them off” and “speak over them.” The MA testified that
she then went back to her office and contacted a supervisor
because “it was a very intense situation.”
¶8 Hallam testified that she did “lose it” with the staff but it was
because she felt overwhelmed from working overtime. She also
testified that the staff “got frustrated” with her explanations about
some voicemail system changes. She admitted that she was aware
of the employee handbook, because she signed it. She also
admitted that the handbook included a policy concerning rude and
unprofessional conduct, and she was aware she could be
terminated for such conduct.
¶9 The Vice President of Human Resources, Kimber Barnes,
testified about prior incidents where Hallam was warned about her
need to improve interactions with other employees. On one
occasion, after Hallam decided to reprimand a coworker when she
had no authority to do so, Barnes documented a warning with an
email. In the email, which is part of the record, Barnes advised that
going forward, Hallam should adhere to the employer’s expectations
for professional conduct, which “means being proactive in our
communications, not reactive.” Barnes also testified that there had
4 been similar incidents in late 2023 where Hallam had to be coached
about her behavior.
IV. Analysis
¶ 10 Representing herself in this appeal, Hallam acknowledges that
she “became loud,” but claims that she “did not yell.” She asserts
that the witnesses against her were biased, and contends that her
apology “should not be used against her.” She argues that she was
actually fired for engaging in protected activity. For the following
reasons, we reject those arguments.
¶ 11 It is the hearing officer’s responsibility to assess the credibility
of witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and determine
the weight to be accorded the evidence. See Tilley v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). The hearing
officer found credible the testimony that Hallam was yelling and
rude. We have no basis to set aside that credibility determination,
which is supported by other evidence in the record, such as the
email from a front desk staff member stating that Hallam had yelled
at her.
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25CA0316 Hallam v ICAO 06-05-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0316 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 29454-2024
Diana Hallam,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Lower Valley Hospital Association,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Román, C.J., and Berger*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025
Diana Hallam, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Michael C. Santo, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Respondent Lower Valley Hospital Association
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of the Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3) and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this unemployment compensation benefits case, Diana
Hallam appeals an order disqualifying her from receiving benefits
based on her job separation from Lower Valley Hospital Association
(Lower Valley). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Hallam worked for Lower Valley as an IT technician. In July
2024, she went to one of Lower Valley’s clinics to address some
computer issues. While she was working on the front desk
computer, she became inappropriately loud with the front desk
staff. Hallam later admitted that she had “lost it” and emailed an
apology to the staff. Lower Valley terminated Hallam’s employment,
citing her violation of a company policy on unacceptable conduct,
which included “agitation against other employees that is or may be
harmful to morale or work performance.”
¶3 Hallam applied for unemployment benefits. A deputy for the
Division of Unemployment Insurance initially determined that
Hallam qualified for benefits based on the information that Hallam
provided. Lower Valley appealed that decision and requested a
hearing. The hearing officer determined that under section
8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV), C.R.S. 2024, Hallam was disqualified from
1 receiving benefits because she engaged in rude, insolent, or
offensive behavior. Hallam appealed to the Industrial Claim
Appeals Office (the Panel), which affirmed.
II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶4 We will uphold the Panel’s decision unless the findings of fact
do not support the decision or the decision is erroneous as a matter
of law. § 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d), C.R.S. 2024; see Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr.
Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17. We review de
novo ultimate conclusions of fact and ultimate legal conclusions.
Harbert v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 23, ¶¶ 8-9.
Determining whether a claimant is at fault for the separation
requires a case-specific consideration of the totality of the
circumstances. Morris v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 843 P.2d 76, 79
(Colo. App. 1992).
¶5 A worker can receive benefits only if she is unemployed
through no fault of her own. See Debalco Enters., Inc. v. Indus.
Claim Appeals Off., 32 P.3d 621, 623 (Colo. App. 2001). “Fault”
includes “a volitional act or the exercise of some control or choice in
the circumstances leading to the discharge from employment such
that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the termination.”
2 Richards v. Winter Park Recreational Ass’n, 919 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo.
App. 1996).
¶6 An individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits if the separation from employment occurred based on the
“[r]udeness, insolence, or offensive behavior of the worker not
reasonably to be countenanced by a customer, supervisor, or fellow
worker.” § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV). In determining whether this
subsection applies, we consider whether a reasonable person in the
position of the fellow worker and others “would have found [the]
claimant’s action to be so rude, insolent, or offensive as not to be
countenanced.” Davis v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 903 P.2d 1243,
1245 (Colo. App. 1995).
III. Evidence Below
¶7 The hearing officer heard testimony from a medical assistant
(MA) who was at the clinic during the incident. The MA testified
that she was in her back office when she heard Hallam being loud
with the front desk staff. The MA testified that one of the front desk
staff members then asked her to come up front. When the MA went
to the front, she observed Hallam being “very loud and very rude.”
She testified that each time somebody tried to speak to Hallam, she
3 would “cut them off” and “speak over them.” The MA testified that
she then went back to her office and contacted a supervisor
because “it was a very intense situation.”
¶8 Hallam testified that she did “lose it” with the staff but it was
because she felt overwhelmed from working overtime. She also
testified that the staff “got frustrated” with her explanations about
some voicemail system changes. She admitted that she was aware
of the employee handbook, because she signed it. She also
admitted that the handbook included a policy concerning rude and
unprofessional conduct, and she was aware she could be
terminated for such conduct.
¶9 The Vice President of Human Resources, Kimber Barnes,
testified about prior incidents where Hallam was warned about her
need to improve interactions with other employees. On one
occasion, after Hallam decided to reprimand a coworker when she
had no authority to do so, Barnes documented a warning with an
email. In the email, which is part of the record, Barnes advised that
going forward, Hallam should adhere to the employer’s expectations
for professional conduct, which “means being proactive in our
communications, not reactive.” Barnes also testified that there had
4 been similar incidents in late 2023 where Hallam had to be coached
about her behavior.
IV. Analysis
¶ 10 Representing herself in this appeal, Hallam acknowledges that
she “became loud,” but claims that she “did not yell.” She asserts
that the witnesses against her were biased, and contends that her
apology “should not be used against her.” She argues that she was
actually fired for engaging in protected activity. For the following
reasons, we reject those arguments.
¶ 11 It is the hearing officer’s responsibility to assess the credibility
of witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and determine
the weight to be accorded the evidence. See Tilley v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). The hearing
officer found credible the testimony that Hallam was yelling and
rude. We have no basis to set aside that credibility determination,
which is supported by other evidence in the record, such as the
email from a front desk staff member stating that Hallam had yelled
at her. Record evidence also shows that Hallam was previously
coached about similar behavior. See Goodwill Indus. of Colo.
Springs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 862 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Colo.
5 App. 1993) (hearing officer correctly considered and made findings
concerning the various factors leading up to the separation from
employment, including prior disciplinary actions).
¶ 12 We also agree with the Panel’s determination that a reasonable
person would not have countenanced Hallam’s behavior. See Davis,
903 P.2d at 1244-45 (noting that the Panel must exercise
independent judgment to determine whether a reasonable person
would have considered the behavior to be rude or insolent). Lower
Valley’s policy specifically prohibited behavior that agitated fellow
employees or contributed to low morale or work performance.
Record evidence showed that the staff felt uncomfortable enough
with Hallam’s behavior to seek assistance from another employee.
This is sufficiently objectionable under the applicable statute.
There is no requirement of intent to offend. See id. at 1245.
¶ 13 Hallam cites no legal authority for the proposition that her
apology should not be “used against her,” and we have located
none. To the contrary, the fact that Hallam knew her behavior
violated a policy is consistent with the general principle that an
employee is disqualified from receiving benefits if she knew what
was expected and failed to “satisfactorily perform the job
6 thereafter.” Pabst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65
(Colo. App. 1992). The record amply supports the conclusion that
Hallam was aware she needed to be more professional in her
behavior and failed to do so.
¶ 14 Finally, Hallam’s arguments about alleged protected activity
were presented, and rejected, by the Panel. We agree with the Panel
that Hallam’s citation to federal discrimination laws are not relevant
to whether she is entitled to receive benefits. Further, she did not
raise the alleged issue of protected activity at the hearing, and
neither we nor the Panel may consider it. See Alfaro v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 78 P.3d 1147, 1149 (Colo. App. 2003) (appellate review
is limited to the evidence in the record previously submitted in the
case).
¶ 15 In conclusion, after reviewing the record evidence and applying
our applicable standard of review, we cannot disturb the
determination that Hallam was at fault for her job termination and
therefore disqualified from benefits under section 8-73-
108(5)(e)(XIV).
V. Disposition
¶ 16 The Panel’s order is affirmed.
7 CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERGER concur.