Hall v. WSFS

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: September 12, 2025
• Docket: N25C-03-242 SPL
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RUTH HALL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N25C-03-242 SPL ) WSFS BANK, ) ) Defendant. ) )

ORDER

This 12th day of September 2025, having reviewed and considered the parties’

pleadings in this case, the Court finds:

I. Background

The Complaint Before the Court

1. Ruth Hall (“Hall”) filed a pro se complaint seeking a declaratory

judgment for an alleged breach of contract by WSFS Bank (“WSFS”). D.I. 1. WSFS

responded with a motion to dismiss. D.I. 8. Because the parties presented “matters

outside the pleadings,” the Court, as Rule 12 permits, treated the motion “as one for

summary judgment,” and, in accordance with Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6),

the Court directed the parties to submit any additional information pertinent to the

motion by May 30, 2025. D.I. 10. 2. Hall then filed a Motion for Default Judgment, (D.I. 11), which the

Court denied on May 27, 2025. D.I. 13. And, on May 30, 2025, Hall filed a series

of motions unrelated to the motion to dismiss. D.I. 14-20. Hall has moved for:

“Summary Judgment” (D.I. 14); “Clerk/Prothonotary Declaration Deman[d]ed”

(D.I. 15); “Judicial Declaration Deman[d]ed” (D.I. 16); “Federal Supremacy Clause

Invoked” (D.I. 17); “Federal Supremacy Clause Invoked” (D.I. 18); “Recusal

Deman[d]ed” (D.I. 19); and “Recusal Clarification.” D.I. 20.

3. On May 30, 2025, WSFS provided additional information pertinent to

the Court’s consideration of its pending motion to dismiss (D.I. 24), Hall did not.

4. By Order dated June 4, 2025, the Court scheduled a hearing for July 7,

2025, at 2:00 p.m. to address “WSFS’s motion to dismiss and Hall’s various

motions.” D.I. 22.

5. On June 6, 2025, WSFS responded to Hall’s motions. D.I. 23-29.

6. On June 9, 2025, Hall filed a “Notice to Office of Clerk/Prothonotary”

declaring that this Judge is “deemed recused [sic] by both . . . ‘plaintiff demand’ a

self-executing recusal” (D.I. 30) and a “Reply to Defendants’ Time Barred

Memorandum.” (D.I. 31).

7. On June 25, 2025, Hall filed a “Plaintiffs’ Appearance by Motion” (D.I.

32), a motion for “Proper Recusal Deman[d]ed” (D.I. 33), and a motion for “Recusal

Deman[d]ed.” D.I. 34). Then, on July 3, 2025, Hall filed a “Motion to Redact Sensitive Personal Information from Court Records” (D.I. 35), “Motion; Default

Judgment II” (D.I. 36), “Notice to the Clerk’s Office Pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1343

(Wire Fraud)” (D.I. 37), and a “Motion to Compel Judicial Action Based on Special

Summons Clause and to Show Cause Why Defendant’s Noncompliance Should not

Lead to Dismissal of Defense.” D.I. 38. And prior to the scheduled July 7, 2025,

hearing, Hall mailed a “Notice of Conditional Acceptance” (D.I. 39, 40) where she

demands certain responses from the Court and then details her litigation strategy to

“corner an opponent legally, leaving them with no valid moves and limiting a judge’s

ability to interfere.” D.I. 40 at 25.

8. Despite this flurry of activity and ample notice, Hall failed to appear

for the July 7, 2025, hearing. D.I. 41.

Hall’s Communications with Court Staff and Recent History with the Superior Court

9. Meanwhile, amidst the plethora of filings, Hall, or someone acting on

Hall’s behalf, has peppered Court staff with e-mails and phone calls. On Monday,

May 19, 2025, an individual identifying themself as “Mr. Chancz Prowess” left a

voicemail inquiring about Hall’s case, and Court employees have received several

e-mails from the address “theqqwallsite@gmail.com.” The Court has advised Ms.

Hall, and whoever else may be using the identified email address, that Court staff

will not provide legal advice, and that the court will not docket letters, motions, or

other filings sent by e-mail. Hall persists in sending e-mails to Court staff. 10. In a June 2, 2025 e-mail, purportedly from Hall using the above

referenced email address, she claimed, “I've been treated to Judge adverse judicial

actions by [a Delaware Superior Court Judge] in the past and am not going to allow

Staffers to also be a part of harming my civil attempts at justice,” and “[a]s I have

been threatened by [that Judge] whom essentially said that, should I come into the

court she will seek to summarily attack my claims.”

11. Hall previously litigated a case in this Court against the Casino at

Delaware Park and several individuals. C.A. No. 21C-06-066 MMJ. In its

November 17, 2021, Opinion dismissing Hall’s claims, this Court noted that Hall

“concede[d] that her nephew [Chancz Prowess] prepared the documents relevant to

this litigation” and that “her nephew is acting on her behalf as her ‘Limited Power

of Attorney.’” Hall v. Casino at Delaware Park, 2021 WL 5373357, at *3 (Del.

Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2021). Further, the Court noted, it “may dismiss claims by

parties that are ‘represented’ by someone engaged in the unauthorized practice of

law.” Id. at *2 (internal citation omitted). The Court concluded that “any future

claims brought utilizing the assistance of Chancz Prowess, on behalf of plaintiff, will

be summarily dismissed on the grounds that Chancz Prowess is engaging in the

unauthorized practice of law.” Id. at *3.

12. In the Delaware Park litigation, this Court also noted,

“[n]otwithstanding the Court’s clear ruling, [Hall] and/or Chancz Prowess continue[d] to email staff, file motions, and request vague relief by lengthy and

nearly indecipherable submissions.” Hall v. Casino at Delaware Park, 2022 WL

179331 at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2022). The Court found “[t]hese repeated

failures to adhere to the Court's instructions, and the continued practice of filing

accusatory and hostile e-mails in a closed matter, are inappropriate and abusive to

the Court and its staff. Plaintiff has made no cognizable or legally sufficient claim

for relief from the Court. These repetitive communications are wasteful of scarce

judicial resources.” Id. Hall’s “nearly indecipherable submissions” in the Delaware

Park litigation (C.A. No. 21C-06-066 MMJ) are markedly similar in form and

substance to those filed here.

13. Hall has selected WSFS as the target of her most recent exercise of what

she describes as the “QQcje Justice Approach.” D.I. 40 at 24. Hall posits that this

approach “forces the legal battle onto your chosen ground, establishes the win by

default *before* court, and then presents the judiciary with a simple choice: either

grant the judgment or disqualify themselves through misconduct, triggering a federal

mechanism to grant the judgment anyway.” Id. She further encourages the reader

to “[t]hink of this (cje/#CommandJusticeEnforcement) approach as a strategic, two-

step process designed to corner an opponent legally, leaving them with no valid

moves and limiting a judge’s ability to interfere.” Id. at 25. Hall’s litigation

“strategy” has no place here. 14. Despite admonishments from the Court in the Delaware Park litigation,

Hall has doubled down. She continues to ignore instructions from the Court and its

staff, send accusatory and hostile e-mails, and engage in inappropriate and abusive

communications (through pleadings and email) with the Court and its staff. These

repetitive communications are wasteful of scarce judicial resources, and they must

end. Hall elected to pursue claims in this Court and must comply with extant law

and procedure. The Court will not countenance Hall’s “strategy” of “catch as catch

can” litigation.

II. WSFS’s Motion to Dismiss

Standard of Review

15. Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) governs a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Rule 12, when

“matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the

motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in

Rule 56.” WSFS has offered exhibits for the Court’s consideration. Hall, despite

the Court’s invitation, did not. And Hall chose not to appear at the time scheduled

by the Court to address all outstanding motions.

16. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56, summary judgment will be granted

where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, this Court “(i)

construes the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; (ii) detects,

but does not decide, genuine issues of material fact; and (iii) denies the motion if a

material fact is in dispute.” US Dominion, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2023

WL 2730567, at *17 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2023) (cleaned up)). Summary

judgment will not be granted where there exists a material fact in dispute or if it

“seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the

application of the law to the circumstances.” Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467,

468-69 (Del. 1962).

Analysis

17. In her complaint, Hall seeks declaratory judgment because “the matter

at hand is not one of an ongoing dispute, but rather a breach of an already completed,

preexisting contractual agreement between the parties.” D.I. 1 at 4. She asserts that

because her claim is “affirmed through an affidavit-supported pleading . . . [WSFS]

is precluded from contesting the facts contained within this affidavit without

attaching a sworn affidavit in rebuttal as required by law.” Id. And Hall submits

that this Court lacks “jurisdiction over completed contractual agreements absent

fraud.” Id. at 12. 18. In its motion to dismiss, WSFS asserts Hall “fail[ed] to plead with any

specificity the contract terms WSFS allegedly breached and/or how WSFS allegedly

breached the contract.” D.I. 8 at 3. And Hall “failed to even attach the alleged

contract at issue.” Id. And, having reviewed Hall’s accounts, WSFS submits “no

money is missing from [her] accounts.” Id. at 3-4.

19. “Delaware courts are statutorily authorized to entertain an action for

declaratory judgment, provided that an ‘actual controversy’ exists between the

parties.” XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. WMI Liquidating Trust, 93 A.3d 1208, 1216-17

(Del. 2014) (citing 10 Del. C. § 6501) (cleaned up). An “actual controversy” is a

controversy: (1) “involving the rights or other legal relations of the party seeking

declaratory relief;” (2) “in which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted

against one who has an interest in contesting the claim;” (3) “between parties whose

interests are real and adverse;” and (4) involve an issue “ripe for judicial

determination.” XL Specialty Ins. Co., 93 A.3d at 1217 (cleaned up).

20. Title 10, Section 6501 of the Delaware Code “does not create

substantive rights of any sort; it merely offers a procedural means for securing

judicial relief.” Enzolytics, Inc. v. Empire Stock Transfer Inc., 2023 WL 2543952,

at *3, n.4 (Del. Ct. Ch Mar. 16, 2023) (cleaned up). Here, as in Enzylotics, the relief

sought pertains to an alleged contract. 21. Under Rule 8 of the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,

a complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” To support a declaratory judgment action (to enforce a

contract) or a “standalone” breach of contract claim, “the plaintiff must demonstrate:

first, the existence of the contract, whether express or implied; second, the breach of

an obligation imposed by that contract; and third, the resultant damage to the

plaintiff.” VLIW Technology, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del.

2003) (cleaned up). Hall fails to assert the contract she seeks to enforce, or the

agreement she alleges WSFS breached. Despite ample time to respond to WSFS’s

exhibits demonstrating no money is missing, Hall has offered no information

supporting WSFS’s alleged breach or any damages she sustained.

22. To the extent Hall seeks to invoke provisions of 10 Del. C. § 3901,

requiring allegations contained within her complaint to be answered by affidavits,

“[a] defendant need not file an affidavit to answer any allegation . . . unless the

plaintiff files with the complaint a copy of the instrument of writing.” 10 Del. C. §

3901(c). By failing to include the instrument she claims WSFS breached, the Court

will not, as she proposes, deem the allegations admitted and enter default judgment.

See 10 Del. C. § 3901(d).

23. The pleadings and supplemental material submitted by the parties fail

to reveal a genuine issue as to any material fact. WSFS is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to Hall, her

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For this reason,

Hall’s complaint must be, and is, DISMISSED. III. Hall’s Motions

24. Hall’s pleadings string together principles and conclusions purportedly

drawn from State and Federal cases, statutes, and procedural rules in, what this Court

has previously described as, “nearly indecipherable submissions.” Hall, 2022 WL

179331, at *1. The Court has endeavored to pull from these pleadings the salient

points Hall wishes to advance.

25. Hall contends that her case was won from the start and, if not won from

the start, that WSFS’s failure to contest her “affidavit backed demand” sufficed to

afford her a win. The Court, in granting WSFS’s motion to dismiss, has rejected this

argument.

26. Because this Court declined to immediately adopt her theory, Hall

contends this judicial officer must be removed (or, by operation of law, has already

been removed). D.I. 19, 20, 30, 33, 34. She alleges “improper application of law”

(D.I. 19 at 5) and contends recusal is “self-executing.” D.I. 30 at 6. There is no

basis for this judicial officer to recuse himself from this case. The Delaware

Supreme Court has established a two-part test for addressing recusal on claims of

bias. Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991). First, the judge “must, as a matter

of subjective belief, be satisfied that he can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or

prejudice concerning that party.” Id. at 384-85. Second, “even if the judge believes

that he has no bias, situations may arise where, actual bias aside, there is the appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge’s impartiality.” Id. at

385. Neither exist here. First, this judicial officer has no bias towards Hall; rather,

this judge has been assigned to adjudicate all matters in Hall’s pending case and has

applied, and will continue to apply, Delaware law and procedure in resolving

disputes brought before the Court. Second, there exists no objective appearance of

impropriety to cast doubt on this judges’ impartiality.1 To the contrary, the Court

has considered Hall’s pleadings and scheduled a time to permit Hall to clarify or

expand upon any of the motions before the Court; she chose not to appear. Hall’s

motions to recuse this judicial officer are DENIED.

27. Hall has filed a series of “Motions for Declarations Demanded” seeking

to compel the Court or Court staff to take certain action upon her instruction and has

moved to “Invoke Federal Supremacy Clause.” There is no basis in Delaware law

to grant Hall the requested relief. These motions are DENIED.

1 “The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” Del. Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct R. 1.2(A), cmt. In other words, this judge must ask “whether a ‘reasonable observer’ would conclude that the trial judge was influenced by bias.” State v. Desmond, 2011 WL 91984, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011) (citing Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d 249, 258 (Del. 2001)). Hall and Prowess are Enjoined from Further Litigation in this Court

28. Hall, with the assistance of Prowess, sought to employ a “strategy”

designed to deny a defendant the opportunity to defend itself and, all the while,

purporting to remove the Court from its adjudicative role. Such gamesmanship,

unsupported by extant law, must end. Under 10 Del. C. § 8803(e), “[w]hen a court

finds that a litigant has abused the judicial process by filing frivolous or malicious

litigation, the court may enjoin that litigant from filing future claims without leave

of court.” The Court finds Ruth Hall and Chancz Prowess, through docketed

pleadings, mailings, emails, and telephone calls have engaged in “frivolous or

malicious litigation” and hereby enjoins both from filing future claims without leave

of court. Should Hall or Prowess seek to file future claims, they must seek leave of

court accompanied by an affidavit certifying:

(1) The claims sought to be litigated have never been raised or disposed of before in any court; (2) The facts alleged are true and correct; (3) The affiant has made a diligent and good faith effort to determine what relevant case law controls the legal issues raised; (4) The affiant has no reason to believe the claims are foreclosed by controlled law; and (5) The affiant understands that the affidavit is made under penalty of perjury.

10 Del. C. § 8803(e). Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, WSFS’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED,

and Hall’s Motions are DENIED. Ruth Hall and Chancz Prowess are ENJOINED

from filing any future claims or pleadings in this Court without seeking leave of the

Court as explained above and as set forth under 10 Del. C. § 8803(e).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________ _____ Sean P. Lugg, Judge