Hall v. Ughwanogho

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedNovember 26, 2024
Docket4:24-cv-04556
StatusUnknown

This text of Hall v. Ughwanogho (Hall v. Ughwanogho) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hall v. Ughwanogho, (S.D. Tex. 2024).

Opinion

Southern District of Texas ENTERED . November 26, 2024 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsnef, Clerk SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS -HOUSTON DIVISION DARRELL LEE HALL, § (TDCJ # 01330580), § § '- Plaintiff, § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-4556 § UVIEOGHENE O. UGHWANOGHO, § et al., § 8 Defendants. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Darrell Lee Hall, (TDCJ #01330580), is a Texas state inmate currently held at the Wallace Pack Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional

_ Institutions Division. Proceeding pro se, he filed a civil rights complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Uvieoghene O. Ughwanogho and TDCI; alleging that Ughwanogho is interfering with his prescribed medical treatment. (Dkt. 1). He also filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which is supported by a certified copy of his inmate trust fund account statement. (Dkts. 2,4). Because Hall | is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in this Court, his action is dismissed as explained below. '

I, DISCUSSION . Hall is incarcerated, so his action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA), which was enacted, in part, to prevent prisoners from abusing the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. See Coleman v. T ollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 535 (2015) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 US. 199, 204 (2007)). Under the “three- strikes rule” established in the PLRA, a prisoner may not bring a civil action in forma pauperis if, while he has been incarcerated, three or more of his civil actions or appeals have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, unless he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Court records reflect that, since Hall has been incarcerated, he has filed at least

four civil actions and appeals that the courts have dismissed as frivolous or for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See, e.g., Hall v. Johnson, et al., Civil No. 2:96-cv-280 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 1999); Hall v. Sanchez, et al., Civil No. | 4:13-cv-1993 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2013); Hall v. Sanchez, et al., Appeal No. 13-20450 (5th Cir. July 11, 2014); Hall v. Lumpkins, et al., Civil No. 3:11-cev-515 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 2015). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has twice sanctioned Hall because of his repeated frivolous filings in habeas corpus proceedings. See In re Darrell Lee Hall, Appeal No. 14-20677 (Sth Cir. Jan. 21, 2015); In re Darrell Lee Hall, Appeal No. 16-20117 (5th Cir. July 20, 2016). As a result of these prior filings, Hall may not □ proceed with this civil action in forma pauperis unless his pleadings show that he □□ □ in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Bafios v. 2/6 .

O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (Sth Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Hall contends that he satisfies the requirements of the imminent-danger exception to the three-strikes rule. This exception “operates as a safety valve to

ensure that, despite the filing of frivolous lawsuits in the past, an abusive inmate facing future imminent serious physical injury by prison officials will still be able to

pursue a judicial remedy to prevent such injury.” Castillo v. Bickham, No. 14-2917, 2015 WL 251708, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2015). To fall within the exception, the inmate must be in imminent danger of serious physical injury when he files his complaint in the district court. See Bafios, 144 F.3d at 884-85. The threat of injury must be “real and proximate,” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003), and the inmate must be facing “a genuine emergency” in which “time is pressing.” Heimermann v. Litscher, 337 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (“‘Imminent’ dangers are those dangers which are about to occur at any moment or are impending[, and] [s]Jomeone whose danger has passed cannot reasonably be described as

someone who ‘is’ in danger, nor can that past danger reasonably be described as ‘imminent.’”). Allegations of past harm are not sufficient to trigger the exception.

See Choyce v. Dominguez, 160 F.3d 1068, 1070 (Sth Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Stine

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons Designation & Sentence Computation Unit, No. 3:13-cv- 4253-B, 2013 WL 6640391, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2013). Neither are allegations . .

based on speculation about a future potential injury. See Davis v. Stephens, 589 F. App’x 295, 296 (Sth Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Neither are allegations of the denial of routine medical care for conditions that are not immediately life-threatening. See, e.g., McCoy v. Murray, 600 F. App’x 250, 251 (Sth Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (a □

prisoner’s complaints of pain from a prior injury and alleged. delays in receiving medication did not establish that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury when he filed his complaint); Jackson v. United States, Civ. No. 4:15-cv-696, 2016 WL 1375591, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2016) (a prisoner’s general complaints about the ongoing nature of an alleged lack of medical care do not meet imminent danger exception); Gallagher v. McGinnis, Civ. No. A00-1468, 2000 WL 739285 (E.D. La. June 5, 2000) (allegations that the prisoner was not receiving the kind and amount of medical care he believed was appropriate were not sufficient to show imminent danger). And neither are complaints that prison medical providers have implemented treatment protocols different from those recommended by outside medical specialists. See Estes v. Eastridge, No. 20-10964, 2023 WL 2525054 (Sth Cir. Mar. 15, 2023). In support of his claim of imminent danger, Hall alleges that he suffers from chronic neurological and musculoskeletal impairments. (Dkt. 1, pp. 4-5). Because of these impairments, he was previously provided with medical passes for a cervical contour pillow, a ripper shirt, a back brace, a long-handled sponge, and a “geomat” 4/6 .

mattress. (/d.). However, during a move from one TDCJ unit to another in May 2023, his geomat was lost or misplaced. (Ud. at 5). Hall has repeatedly requested that the geomat be replaced, but Ughwanogho has denied these requests. (/d.). In addition, during a clinic visit on July 19, 2023, Ughwanogho confiscated a back brace that Hall alleges was prescribed to help with his lower back pain. (/d.). Ughwanogho also “declined to follow” the medical orders from UTMB specialists and discontinued all the passes for his medically prescribed “accessories.” (/d. at 5- 6). Hall alleges that it has been “over one year” since Ughwanogho discontinued his

passes for these medical accessories, and he alleges that his conditions are worsening because of her actions. (/d. at 7). He alleges that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury because he is not being properly treated for his chronic conditions, and he is now facing back surgery, cervical spine surgery, and elbow surgery as a result. (/d. at 8). While the Court is not unsympathetic to Hall’s allegations of pain, he does not satisfy the imminent-danger exception.

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Related

Choyce v. Dominguez
160 F.3d 1068 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)
Scott A. Heimermann v. Jon E. Litscher
337 F.3d 781 (Seventh Circuit, 2003)
Robert Davis v. William Stephens, Director
589 F. App'x 295 (Fifth Circuit, 2015)
James McCoy v. Owen Murray
600 F. App'x 250 (Fifth Circuit, 2015)
Coleman v. Tollefson
575 U.S. 532 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie
239 F.3d 307 (Third Circuit, 2001)

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Hall v. Ughwanogho, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hall-v-ughwanogho-txsd-2024.