Hall v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Hall v. State

37 S.E.2d 549, 73 Ga. App. 616, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 368

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 7, 1946

Docket31006.

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 37 S.E.2d 549 (Hall v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hall v. State, 37 S.E.2d 549, 73 Ga. App. 616, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946).

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Opinions

Broyles, C. J.

As we view the ease, we may assume that the defendant is correct in his contention and that the proceedings in Gwinnett County are sufficient in law upon which to base a conviction in Gwinnett County, still we are of the opinion that the court did not err in striking the plea of former jeopardy. The statute, with reference to operating an automobile upon the public highways of this State, was enacted for the protection of the users of the highway throughout the State, with the county as a unit. Quoting from 22 C. J. S. 266, § 175: “It is a general rule that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, a criminal offense must be prosecuted in the county or district in which the offense was committed, unless *619 the venue is changed.” See also § 176 of the same authority. It is contended by the defendant that the offense charged in the indictment in Gwinnett County and the offense charged in the accusation of the city court of Decatur, DeKalb County, “covered the same continued uninterrupted act of speeding which was begun in Gwinnett County and extended into DeKalb and was thus a single offense.” To this we can not agree. When the defendant voluntarily and criminally began operating his automobile in excess of fifty-five miles per hour and voluntarily and continuously and uninterruptedly extended his said criminal act into DeKalb County (an adjoining county) he violated the statute in each county of Gwinnett and DeKalb. A conviction for violating the statute in Gwinnett County under such circumstances would be no bar to a prosecution in DeKalb County, an adjoining county. We specifically requested counsel to file an additional brief discussing this principle. No authority has been submitted to us contrary to what we have herein decided, and from our own research we have been unable to find any decision in any jurisdiction to the contrary. In principle and by analogy this court has passed on the question in the case of Lunsford v. State, 60 Ga. App. 537 (2), and division 2. Judge MacIntyre, speaking for the court, clearly, exhaustively and convincingly discussed this principle; We feel that we can add nothing here to what was said there. Judgment affirmed.

Gardner, J., concurs.

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Broyles, C. J.

As we view the ease, we may assume that the defendant is correct in his contention and that the proceedings in Gwinnett County are sufficient in law upon which to base a conviction in Gwinnett County, still we are of the opinion that the court did not err in striking the plea of former jeopardy. The statute, with reference to operating an automobile upon the public highways of this State, was enacted for the protection of the users of the highway throughout the State, with the county as a unit. Quoting from 22 C. J. S. 266, § 175: “It is a general rule that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, a criminal offense must be prosecuted in the county or district in which the offense was committed, unless *619 the venue is changed.” See also § 176 of the same authority. It is contended by the defendant that the offense charged in the indictment in Gwinnett County and the offense charged in the accusation of the city court of Decatur, DeKalb County, “covered the same continued uninterrupted act of speeding which was begun in Gwinnett County and extended into DeKalb and was thus a single offense.” To this we can not agree. When the defendant voluntarily and criminally began operating his automobile in excess of fifty-five miles per hour and voluntarily and continuously and uninterruptedly extended his said criminal act into DeKalb County (an adjoining county) he violated the statute in each county of Gwinnett and DeKalb. A conviction for violating the statute in Gwinnett County under such circumstances would be no bar to a prosecution in DeKalb County, an adjoining county. We specifically requested counsel to file an additional brief discussing this principle. No authority has been submitted to us contrary to what we have herein decided, and from our own research we have been unable to find any decision in any jurisdiction to the contrary. In principle and by analogy this court has passed on the question in the case of Lunsford v. State, 60 Ga. App. 537 (2), and division 2. Judge MacIntyre, speaking for the court, clearly, exhaustively and convincingly discussed this principle; We feel that we can add nothing here to what was said there. Judgment affirmed.

Gardner, J., concurs.

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37 S.E.2d 549, 73 Ga. App. 616, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hall-v-state-gactapp-1946.

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