Hall v. Springleaf Financial Services, Inc.

144 F. Supp. 3d 890, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154139, 2015 WL 7175789
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedNovember 13, 2015
DocketCivil Action No. 2:14-cv-143-FKB
StatusPublished

This text of 144 F. Supp. 3d 890 (Hall v. Springleaf Financial Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hall v. Springleaf Financial Services, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 890, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154139, 2015 WL 7175789 (S.D. Miss. 2015).

Opinion

ORDER

F. KEITH BALL, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Springleaf Financial Services, Inc. (“Springleaf’) [13] and the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Henry Hall [16]. Having considered the motions, supporting memoranda, responses, and supplemental memoranda and having held a hearing on the motions, the Court finds that Springleaf s summary judgment motion should be granted, and Plaintiffs summary judgment motion should be denied.

FACTS

The parties do not dispute the facts of this matter. Plaintiff Henry Hall serves as a captain in the Mississippi Army National Guard. Pursuant to ORDERS A-08-213933, dated August 8, 2012, the' United States Army ordered Capt. Hall, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d),1 into federal active duty for a period of 365 days, beginning on October 10, 2012, and ending on October 9, 2013. [32-1] at 2. By ORDERS A-08-213933A01, dated July 26, 2013, the Army amended its previous order and changed Capt. Hall’s “END DATE” to September 30, 2013, with a “TOUR LENGTH” of 356 days. Id. at 3. Capt. Hall having volunteered for more active duty, the Army issued ORDERS 269-061, dated September 26, 2013, continuing him on Title 10 active duty for a period “[n]ot to exceed 365 days,” beginning on October 1, 2013.[1] at 2, ¶ 9; [32-1] at 4. On March 24, 2014, the Army issued ORDERS 083-0006 by which Capt. Hall was “released from active duty” with an “effective date of release from active duty” of July 6, 2014 (“REFRAD2 order”). [32-1] at 6.

On June 24, 2013, Capt. Hall obtained a consumer loan in the amount of $5,600.24' from Springleaf, bearing an annual percentage rate of 34.37%. Subsequently, Capt. Hall requested that Springleaf reduce the interest rate on his loan to 6% pursuant to the Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”), 50 U.S.C. Appx. § 527(a)(1). [13-1] at 24, 29. Springleaf responded to Capt. Hall’s request, stating that he was not eligible for the interest rate reduction because the SCRA applies [892]*892to “obligations made before entry onto active duty” and he was “on active duty on the date the debt was incurred.” [13-1] at 21, 25. Capt. Hall filed this action on September 4, 2014, seeking damages and other relief for Springleafs alleged violation of the SCRA by refusing to reduce the interest rate on his loan to 6%.

ANALYSIS

50 U.S.C. Appx. § 527 states in pertinent part:

§ 527. Maximum rate of interest on debts incurred before military service
(a) Interest rate limitation
(1) Limitation to 6 percent An obligation or liability bearing interest at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year that is incurred by a service-member, ... before the servicemem-ber enters military service shall not bear interest at a rate in excess of 6 percent — ...
(B) during the period of military service, ....

50 U.S.C. Appx. § 527(a)(1)(B).

50 U.S.C. Appx. § 511(3) defines “period of military service,” as follows:

The term “period of military service” means the period beginning on the date on which a servicemember enters military service and ending on the date on which the servicemember is released from military service or dies while in military service.

50 U.S.C. § 511(3) (emphasis added).

The undisputed facts establish that Capt. Hall obtained the Springleaf loan on June 23, 2bl3, when he was on Title 10 active duty. As quoted above, Section 527 of the SCRA requires that the debt be “incurred by a servicemember, ... before the servicemember enters military service.” Capt. Hall, however, points to Section 511(3) and the following language in his ORDERS A-08-213933: “Upon completion of this duty, unless sooner released, you will return to your home and upon arrival be released from active duty.” [31] at 1; [32-1] at 2. Capt. Hall then postulates that the amended orders, ORDERS A-98-213933A01, released him from active duty when he returned home on September 3b, 2013, thereby resulting in two, separate periods of Title 10 military service: one from October 10, 2012 to September 30, 2013, under ORDERS A08-213933A01, and a second from October 1, 2013 to July 6, 2014, under ORDERS 269-061.3 Capt. Hall argues that since he ob[893]*893tained the loan befóte beginning the alleged second Title 10 service period on October 1, 2013, he is entitled to the interest rate reduction under Section 527.

In statutory construction cases, the court must “begin with the language of the statute.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 122 S.Ct. 941, 950, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). “The first step ‘is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.’ ” Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)). “The inquiry ceases ‘if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’ ” Id.

Applying these principles of statutory construction, the court finds no merit to Capt. Hall’s argument. Capt. Hall bases his argument on Section 511(3), which plainly and unambiguously defines the end of a “period of milita'ry service ” by the “date” on which the servicemember is “released from military service.” Although ORDERS A-08-213933A01 released Capt. Hall from active duty under those orders on September 30, 2013, they did not release him from Title 10 military service. By September 30, 2013, ORDERS 269-061 had already been issued, and they immediately continued Capt. Hall on Title 10 service ' on the next date, October 1, 2013. The undisputed facts show that there was no date from October 10, 2012, to July 6, 2014, on which Capt. Hall was not on Title 10 military service, and Capt. Hall was not released from Title 10 military service until the date of July 6, 2014, the effective release date in his REFRAD order.4 See [32-1] at 6. Accordingly, Capt. Hall is not entitled to a Section 527 interest rate reduction on his June 24, 2013, loan for his period of military service from October 10, 2012, to July 6, 2014, since he incurred the debt during (and not before) that military service period.5

The court’s holding also comports with the purpose behind Section 527 of the SCRA. Section 527 is intended to afford servicemembers an opportunity to reduce the interest rate on a loan, when leaving their civilian job and entering military service affects then ability to pay it. Section 527(c) makes this purpose clear, as it allows a creditor relief from the Section 527 rate reduction if the servicemember’s “ability ... to pay interest upon the [loan] ...

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Related

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.
519 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.
534 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
144 F. Supp. 3d 890, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154139, 2015 WL 7175789, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hall-v-springleaf-financial-services-inc-mssd-2015.