Hall v. Shimadzu

59 F.2d 225, 19 C.C.P.A. 1288
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 20, 1932
Docket2982, 2983
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 59 F.2d 225 (Hall v. Shimadzu) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hall v. Shimadzu, 59 F.2d 225, 19 C.C.P.A. 1288 (ccpa 1932).

Opinion

LENROOT, Associate Judge.

These are appeals in two- interference proceedings from decisions of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, awarding priority of invention in each interference to appellee. Interference No. 54,798 is involved in the first appeal, being appeal No. 2982, while interference No. 56,224 is involved in the other appeal, being- appeal N o. 2983. For the purposes of the hearing before us, the records in both interferences were consolidated.

Inasmuch as the principal questions involved in each of these appeals are common to both cases, we shall dispose of both appeals in one opinion.

Interference No. 54,798.

The invention herein involved relates to a product which has as its essential ingredient the substance suboxide of lead, and a process'for making the same. In this interference the issue is stated in eight counts, of which the following are illustrative:

“1. A process of manufacturing a fine powder of lead suboxide intermingled with powder oh' metallic lead, comprising in putting in a rotatable vessel pieces of metallic lead, introducing air thereinto and rotating the vessel maintaining the temperature of the material at not less than 60° C. by the heat generated by friction and chemical reaction.

“2. Comminuted lead — lead suboxide mixture with apparent specific gravity 1 to 3.

“3. As a new composition of matter, a highly chemically reactive powder, comprising a large portion of lead suboxide, said powder being capable of spontaneous reaction on contact with moisture.”

“5. A process of manufacturing a fine powder of lead suboxide intermingled with a powder of metallic load, comprising in putting in a rotatable vessel pieces of metallic lead in a dry state, introducing into the said vessel while rotating blasts of a gas containing oxygen, such as air, causing such blast to blow the powder produced out of the vessel.”

*226 The issue involves patent No. 1,584,150, of May 11, 1926, issued to appellee upon an application therefor filed July 14, 1923, and appellant’s application was filed March 29, 1924, which application was allowed, forfeited, and renewed on December 24, 1926. While the record is very indefinite with respect to any added claims included in the application of appellant when renewed on December 24, 1926, it seems to be conceded by the parties that, at the time of such renewal, appellant copied claims 6,14, 16, and 17 from appellee’s said patent, and added them to his renewed application. These claims became counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the interference before us, which was declared on January 20, 1927.

Thereafter appellee moved to dissolve the interference upon the ground that appellant had no right to make claims corresponding to said counts. At the same time appellant moved to amend his application by adding thereto certain other claims taken from the said patent to Shimadzu, included among which were claims corresponding to Shimadzu claims 2, 3, 4, and 15. Appellee’s motion to dissolve was denied, and appellant’s motion to amend was allowed with respect to the claims corresponding to said Shimadzu claims 2, 3, 4, and 15. Thereafter the interference was amended by adding thereto counts 5, 6, 7, and 8, corresponding to said Shimadzu claims 2, 3, 4, and 15. Thus it appears that all of the counts of the interference were copied from the Shimadzu patent.

In his decision denying appellee’s motion to dissolve the interference, the Law Examiner said: “The motion to dissolve attacks Hall’s disclosure largely for the reason that he does not disclose lead suboxide, Pb20. He does not refer to lead suboxide by name and it must be determined if he has sufficiently identified a material which would be recognized by chemists as lead suboxide so that he would be allowed to give his material that name. * * * ”

The Law Examiner thereupon entered upon a detailed discussion of appellant’s disclosure, and came to the conclusion that the process disclosed by him would result in the production of lead suboxide, and that therefore appellant was entitled to make the claims.

Thereafter both parties took testimony.

In his preliminary statement, appellant alleged conception of the invention set forth in the counts on or about July, 1920, and reduction to practice in January, 1921.

While the preliminary statement of appel-lee alleged conception and reduction to practice prior to his filing date of July 14, 1923, both the Examiner of Interferences and the Boárd of Appeals held him to said filing date for both conception and reduction to practice. In view of the conclusions we have reached, it is unnecessary to examine the action of the Patent Office tribunals on this point..

The testimony shows that appellee set up a Harding mill at Depew, N. Y. for experimentation; it-appearing from appellant’s disclosure that he used a Hardinge mill in carrying out his process. Testimony on behalf of appellee, including that of witnesses who were chemical experts, is to the effect that the process described by appellant in his disclosure was carefully carried out at Depew, as a result of which about 77 pounds of olive gray powder was secured, which is the color of the powder described in appellant’s disclosure, but that none of such powder contained an appreciable amount of lead suboxide, it being mainly composed of lead monoxide or litharge.

The tribunals of the Patent Office apparently found such testimony to- be of sufficient weight to cause them to come to a different conclusion than that reached by the Law Examiner in his decision, and both tribunals held that appellant’s specification, as orig-nally filed, does not warrant claims corresponding to the counts here in issue; that appellant has no right to make the claims; that the process disclosed by appellant does not produce a substantial amount of sub-oxide and powdered lead as required by the counts, and both tribunals further found that appellant was not sufficiently corroborated as to conception and reduction to practice, which appellant attempted to establish as prior to appellee’s filing date. Accordingly, the Board of Appeals concurred with the Examiner in awarding priority of invention to appellee.

Appellant here makes three principal contentions. The first is that, as to- counts 1, 5, 6, and 7, the language first appearing in said counts — “a process of manufacturing a fine powder of lead suboxide intermingled with powder of metallic lead” — should be construed as an introductory phrase merely, and that it cannot be considered in construing said counts. In this contention appellant relies upon our decision in the case of Braren v. Horner, 47 F.(2d) 358, 364, 18 C. C. P. A. 971, in which case we held that the introductory phrase in the counts there involved, reading, “In an engraving machine and the *227 like/’ eould not be considered as a part oí the subject-matter of the counts.

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59 F.2d 225, 19 C.C.P.A. 1288, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hall-v-shimadzu-ccpa-1932.