HALL v. SHEPARD

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION ALAN RICHARD HALL, Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. v. 5:23-cv-00205-TES RICK SHEPARD, et al., Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 37] Plaintiff Alan Richard Hall’s Amended Complaint [Doc. 29]. As explained in further detail below, the Court finds that the Gumm v. Jacobs Settlement Agreement (“the Gumm Agreement”) precludes this action, GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with prejudice. No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW (M.D. Ga. May 7, 2019), ECF No. 256-1; [Doc. 37]; [Doc. 29]. BACKGROUND In the case of Gumm v. Jacobs, the Court issued a final order and permanent injunction on May 7, 2019, certifying the Gumm settlement class (“the Gumm Class”), granting final approval of the Gumm Agreement, and adopting the Gumm Agreement as the order of the Court.1 No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW, 2019 WL 2017497, at *1, *3–4, *28 (M.D. Ga. May 7, 2019). In its order, the Court defined the Gumm Class as “all persons

who are or in the future will be assigned to the facility currently known as the Special Management Unit at Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison [(“the SMU”)], or who are or in the future will be assigned to the Tier III Program.” Gumm, 2019 WL 2017497,

at *3. The Gumm Agreement’s terms and conditions provide for various procedures related to the conditions of confinement in the SMU, duration of confinement in the

SMU, assignment of inmates to the SMU, and periodic review of assignments to the SMU. Settlement Agreement at ¶¶ 11–56, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW (M.D. Ga. May 7, 2019), ECF No. 256-1. The Gumm “Agreement is binding upon Plaintiffs and the class” as well as upon the Defendants. Id. at ¶ 75.

The Gumm Agreement’s Implementation and Enforcement section dictates that Gumm Class members with complaints related to the Gumm Agreement must first refer their complaints to class counsel:

[a]ny complaints or concerns by any plaintiff class member relating to this Agreement, or to the injunctive relief claims in the Third Amended Com- plaint in this matter, shall be referred to class counsel who shall determine

1 Under the terms of the Court’s order, the Gumm Agreement was set to expire on May 7, 2022. Gumm v. Jacobs et al., No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW, 2019 WL 2017497, at *29 (M.D. Ga. May 7, 2019). However, the Court has extended the terms of the Gumm Agreement several times, most recently to six months after the appointment of an independent monitor. Revised Order Holding Defendants in Contempt at 100, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW (M.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2024), ECF No. 485. Although the Court cannot ascertain the Gumm Agreement’s exact expiration date because an independent monitor has not yet been appointed, there is no doubt that the Gumm Agreement is still in effect. whether enforcement action is warranted pursuant to paragraphs 65–66. The enforcement provisions of Paragraph 66 are exclusive and only class counsel may seek enforcement of any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Except for motions by class counsel pursuant to Paragraph 66, no person, including any member of the class, may be heard upon any con- tempt motion for alleged non-compliance with this Agreement or bring any separate action or proceeding to enforce this Agreement. Id. at ¶ 64. Gumm Class members may enforce the Gumm Agreement, through class counsel, only after providing notice of, and attempting in good faith to resolve, any alleged breach of the Gumm Agreement: Plaintiffs may request enforcement of the Agreement by seeking an order requiring the Defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt, or by seeking an order for other relief upon noticed motion be- fore the Court. Any such show cause motion will cite the provision(s) at issue and allege that the Defendants have breached said provision(s). Id. at ¶ 66. The Agreement also contains a “Release” that precludes class members from bringing claims that were asserted in the Gumm litigation: All claims for declaratory and injunctive relief asserted in the Third Amended Complaint shall be finally and fully settled and released, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement . . . . The named Plaintiffs and unnamed class members hereby release the Defendants in their official capacities from, and are barred and precluded from prosecuting any claims, causes of action, or requests for any injunctive or declaratory relief that have been asserted in this litigation . . . . Id. at ¶ 76. Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit on June 8, 2023, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1]. He filed his Amended Complaint on March 27, 2024, seeking his immediate removal from the [SMU]” and other injunctive relief. [Doc. 29, pp. 13–14]. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on April 29, 2024, arguing that the Gumm Agreement precludes Plaintiff from bringing this

action. [Doc. 37-1, pp. 2–3]. Before reaching the merits of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court first sets out the law that will guide its analysis. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, district courts must accept the facts set forth in the complaint as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). A complaint

survives a motion to dismiss only if it alleges sufficient factual matter (accepted as true) that states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)). In fact, a well-pled complaint “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of

those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citations omitted). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual

allegations, it does require “more than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation[s].” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). To decide whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, district courts

are instructed to use a two-step framework. Id. The first step is to identify the allegations that are “no more than mere conclusions.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “Conclusory allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. (citation omitted). After disregarding the conclusory allegations, the second step is to “assume

any remaining factual allegations are true and determine whether those factual allegations ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

Furthermore, a complaint attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion is subject to dismissal when it fails to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A plaintiff must plead more than labels

and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (internal quotations omitted); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “To be sure, a plaintiff may use legal conclusions to structure his complaint, but legal conclusions ‘must be supported by factual allegations.’” McCullough, 907 F.3d at

1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). While courts, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true; they are not bound to accept a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts must

“identify conclusory allegations and then discard them—not ‘on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical’ but because their conclusory nature ‘disentitles them to the presumption of truth.’” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The issue to be decided when considering a motion to dismiss is not whether the

claimant will ultimately prevail, but “whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scheuer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). The factual allegations in a complaint

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 555. Finally, complaints that tender “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement’” will not survive against a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original). Stated differently, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery

will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. With the foregoing standard in mind, and taking the facts asserted in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as true, the Court rules on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that the Gumm Agreement bars Plaintiff from bringing this action. [Doc. 37-1, pp. 2–3]. In the alternative, Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). [Id. at pp. 3–4]. In his Response, Plaintiff contends that the Gumm Agreement doesn’t apply to him because he “was not a party to that agreement,” “there is no evidence that Plaintiff

opted in or out of that agreement,” and he “is not seeking relief under that agreement.” [Doc. 42, p. 2]. Plaintiff then argues that his Amended Complaint should survive this Motion to Dismiss under the PLRA. [Id. at p. 3]. Because the Court finds that this action is precluded by the Gumm Agreement, the Court does not reach the issue of dismissal

under the PLRA. The Gumm Agreement precludes this action because Plaintiff is a Gumm Class member seeking relief for complaints that fall directly under the Gumm Agreement’s

terms and conditions. See generally [Doc. 29]; Gumm, 2019 WL 2017497; Settlement Agreement, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW, ECF No. 256-1. First, the Court defined the Gumm Class as “all persons who are or in the future will be assigned to the

facility currently known as the [SMU], or who are or in the future will be assigned to the Tier III Program.” Gumm, 2019 WL 2017497, at *3–4. Plaintiff alleges that he has been assigned to the SMU’s Tier III Program since April 28, 2021, leaving no room for doubt that he is a Gumm Class member. See id.; [Doc. 29, ¶ 1, 26].

Plaintiff claims that he isn’t a Gumm Class member because he “was not a party to that agreement[] and there is no evidence that [he] opted in or out of that agreement.” [Doc. 42, p. 2]. However, the Court certified the Gumm Class under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which contains no opt-out mechanism. See Gumm, 2019 WL 2017497, at *1, *3–4, *28; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(a); Kincade v. Gen. Tire and Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 506–07 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that settlement class members have no right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(2) case). Thus, because the Gumm Class definition

envelopes Plaintiff, he is a member of the Gumm Class and may not escape the Gumm Agreement’s preclusive effects. See Gumm, 2019 WL 2017497, at *1, *3–4, *28; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), (c)(2)(a).

Second, the Gumm Agreement’s terms and conditions squarely cover Plaintiff’s complaints. Plaintiff’s factual basis for seeking injunctive relief consists of allegations related to his assignment to the SMU, the duration and conditions of his confinement in

the SMU, and the periodic review of his confinement in the SMU. [Doc. 29, ¶¶ 1–3, 12– 28, 31, 33–37, 39]. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants arbitrarily assigned him to the SMU’s Tier III Program with no process, have kept him in 23-hour lock-down for

nearly three years, and refuse to release him despite the fact that he was recommended for a stepdown program in August 2022. [Id.]. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring his immediate removal from the SMU and mandating that “Defendants and all parties adhere to and follow S.O.P. 209.09 and all rules and procedures of the [GDC] and make

sure Plaintiff’s procedural due-process rights are protected.” [Id. at pp. 13–14]. As discussed above, these matters relate directly to the Gumm Agreement’s terms and conditions related to the conditions of confinement in the SMU, duration of

confinement in the SMU, assignment of inmates to the SMU, and periodic review of assignments to the SMU. Settlement Agreement at ¶¶ 11–56, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-00041- MTT-CHW, ECF No. 256-1. Thus, Plaintiff must prosecute these complaints, if at all, under the Gumm Agreement’s enforcement provisions. See Settlement Agreement at ¶¶

64–66, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW, ECF No. 256-1. In his Response, Plaintiff argues that he “is not seeking relief under [the Gumm Agreement]; rather, [he] has relied upon and cited GDC policy 209.09, which in

addition to prohibiting more than a 24-months stay in Tier III, affords Plaintiff even more expressed protections than said agreement.” [Doc. 42, pp. 2–3]. Although it’s true that Plaintiff does not request relief under the Gumm Agreement, as discussed above,

that is exactly what he must do. See generally id.; Settlement Agreement at ¶ 64, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW, ECF No. 256-1. Thus, the Gumm Agreement bars Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief.

CONCLUSION Accordingly, because the Gumm Agreement precludes Plaintiff from prosecuting this action, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 37] and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. 29] with prejudice. Plaintiff must

prosecute these claims, if at all, under the Gumm Agreement’s enforcement provisions. See Settlement Agreement at ¶¶ 64–66, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-00041-MTT-CHW, ECF No. 256-1.

SO ORDERED, this 6th day of June, 2024. S/ Tilman E. Self, III TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT