Hall v. N.C. Servs. Corp.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: February 4, 2014
• Docket: 13-781
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-781 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 4 February 2014

THOMAS ADAIR HALL, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. Iredell County No. 11-CVS-2506 NORTH CAROLINA SERVICES CORPORATION, AND MANHEIM REMARKETING, INC., AND MANHEIM CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., All also known as or doing business as MANHEIM STATESVILLE, MANHEIM CONSULTING, TOTAL RESOURCE AUCTIONS, and/or STATESVILLE AUTO AUCTION, Defendants,

PMA INSURANCE GROUP, Carrier,

and

SHELOR CHEVROLET CORPORATION, Employer, Appellants.

Appeal by Appellants from order entered 11 February 2013 by

Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Superior Court, Iredell County.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 January 2014.

No brief for Plaintiff-Appellee. -2- Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by M. Duane Jones, Elizabeth A. Sprenger, and Lindsey L. Smith, for Employer/Carrier-Appellants.

McGEE, Judge.

Thomas Adair Hall (“Plaintiff”) was injured in the course

and scope of his employment with Shelor Chevrolet (“Employer”)

on 26 August 2008, when he was hit by a vehicle operated by

Byrum Holmes (“Mr. Holmes”). The record suggests Mr. Holmes was

an employee of either North Carolina Services Corporation,

Manheim Remarketing, Inc., Manheim Corporate Services, Inc.,

Manheim Statesville, Manheim Consulting, Total Resource

Auctions, or Statesville Auto Auction (together, “Defendants”).

Employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, PMA Insurance

Group (“Carrier”), accepted Plaintiff’s claim for workers’

compensation benefits as compensable and paid $87,170.76 in

medical expenses to Plaintiff. Plaintiff initiated suit on 19

August 2011 against Defendants for negligence. Plaintiff

entered a “compromised settlement of his third party personal

injury claim against Manheim Statesville in the amount of

$200,000.00.”

Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-

10.2(j), asking the trial court “to determine the subrogation

amount, if any, of the workers compensation carrier, PMA

Insurance Group[.]” That statute provides as follows: -3- Notwithstanding any other subsection in this section, in the event that a judgment is obtained by the employee in an action against a third party, or in the event that a settlement has been agreed upon by the employee and the third party, either party may apply to the resident superior court judge of the county in which the cause of action arose or where the injured employee resides, or to a presiding judge of either district, to determine the subrogation amount.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-10.2(j) (2013). “[T]he judge shall

determine, in his discretion, the amount, if any, of the

employer’s lien[.]” Id. The trial court in this case

considered the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j) and

reduced the “workers compensation lien or subrogation right” of

Employer and Carrier to $40,000.00. Employer and Carrier

(together, “Appellants”) appeal.

Appellants argue the trial court “erred in applying North

Carolina law to the determination of the amount of the

Employer/Carrier’s workers’ compensation lien.” Appellants

contend the trial court should have applied Virginia workers’

compensation law because the “parties negotiated to provide

workers’ compensation benefits in accordance with the terms and

provisions” of Virginia law. However, binding precedent from

this Court controls the outcome of this case.

The facts in Cook v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 209 N.C.

App. 364, 704 S.E.2d 567 (2011) are similar to the facts of the -4- present case. In Cook, the plaintiff suffered an injury by

accident in North Carolina and “entered into a lump-sum worker’s

compensation settlement” with his employer “with the approval of

the Chancery Court of Tennessee[.]” Id. at 365, 704 S.E.2d at

569. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the

defendants, alleging the defendants’ negligence caused his

injuries, and reached a settlement with the defendants for

$220,000.00. Id. The plaintiff moved to reduce the workers’

compensation lien on his negligence settlement, and the trial

court reduced the lien to $30,000.00. Id. at 365-66, 704 S.E.2d

at 569.

On appeal, the employer and carrier in Cook argued that

Tennessee law, which did not permit reduction of the lien,

should have been applied. Id. at 366, 704 S.E.2d at 569. This

Court rejected that argument, holding that N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j)

was remedial in nature. Cook, 209 N.C. App. at 368, 704 S.E.2d

at 570-71. As to “the law merely going to the remedy, or

procedural in its nature, the lexi fori——or law of the forum in

which the remedy is sought——will control.” Id. at 366, 704

S.E.2d at 570. “In this case the forum is North Carolina.” Id.

at 368, 704 S.E.2d at 571.

This Court recently applied the rule in Cook in Anglin v.

Dunbar Armored, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 742 S.E.2d 205, -5- 206 (2013), a case in which the plaintiff filed a motion to

“reduce [the] Defendants’ subrogation interest[.]” The trial

court concluded that “North Carolina law should apply because

the [p]laintiff is seeking relief pursuant to North Carolina

law[.]” Id. at ___, 742 S.E.2d at 207. The trial court further

concluded that the defendants were “entitled to the remaining

$21,206.31 of the lien from the $30,000.00 of UIM funds.” Id.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, “because the funds at

issue were paid to [the] plaintiff from a South Carolina

contract——his UIM insurance policy——South Carolina law

controls.” Id. at ___, 742 S.E.2d at 207. However, this Court

rejected the plaintiff’s argument because “the terms of the

insurance contract [were] not at issue in [that] case.” Id.

This Court ultimately concluded that the trial court did not err

in applying N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j). Id. at ___, 742 S.E.2d at

209.

Appellants contend Cook misinterpreted the law and urge

this Court “to reconsider its holding in Cook that the lex fori

governs the determination of the employer’s lien[.]” This we

are without authority to do. Pritchett & Burch, PLLC v. Boyd,

169 N.C. App. 118, 123, 609 S.E.2d 439, 442-43 (2005) (“We are

bound by prior decisions of this Court.”); see also In the

Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 -6- (1989). In accordance with Cook and Anglin, the decision of the

trial court to apply N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2(j) is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judges ELMORE and STROUD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).