Hall v. Marriott International, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 12 TODD HALL, individually and on behalf Case No.: 3:19-cv-01715-JO-AHG of all others similarly situated, et al., 13 ORDER RESOLVING JOINT Plaintiffs, MOTION FOR DETERMINATION 14 OF DISCOVERY DISPUTE AND v. 15 DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSE 16 KEVIN BRANCA Defendant. 17 [ECF No. 126] 18 19 20 21 22 23 Before the Court is Plaintiff Todd Hall, former-Plaintiff Kevin Branca, Plaintiff 24 George Abdelsayed (collectively “Plaintiffs”), and Defendant Marriott International, Inc.’s 25 (“Defendant”) Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery Dispute. ECF No. 126. 26 Defendant seeks an order from the Court permitting Defendant to depose Mr. Branca a 27 second time, to which Plaintiff objects. Id. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s 28 motion is DENIED. 2 On September 9, 2019, Plaintiff Todd Hall filed this putative class action alleging 3 unjust enrichment and violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, False 4 Advertising Law, and Unfair Competition Law. See generally ECF No. 1. On 5 November 22, 2019, Plaintiff Hall filed his First Amended Class Action Complaint, adding 6 causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, concealment/non-disclosure, and 7 intentional misrepresentation. See generally ECF No. 15. On January 11, 2021, Plaintiff 8 Hall filed his Second Amended Class Action Complaint, which retained all causes of action 9 and added three Plaintiffs: Julie Drassinower, a California resident who booked her room 10 in New York on the Marriott website; Kevin Branca, a California resident who, according 11 to the Amended Complaint, booked his room in Hawaii on the Costco Travel website; and 12 Jesse Heineken, a Kansas resident who booked his room in California on the Marriott 13 website. ECF No. 54 at ¶¶ 66–95. 14 On May 27, 2021, Plaintiff Hall and Plaintiff Branca filed the operative Third 15 Amended Class Action Complaint, which retained all causes of action, removed Plaintiffs 16 Drassinower and Heineken, and added a third Plaintiff from a related case, 17 George Abdelsayed, a California resident who booked his room in California on the 18 Marriott app. ECF No. 82 at ¶¶ 75–76; see ECF No. 78 at 4 (consolidating Hall and 19 Abdelsayed cases and requiring the filing of a consolidated complaint). The operative Third 20 Amended Class Action Complaint was also filed on behalf of both a “Nationwide Class” 21 and a “California Class,” which included those “who reserved or booked a Marriott owned 22 or franchised hotel room online … and were charged an amount therefore that was higher 23 than the room rate quoted or advertised per day plus government imposed taxes and 24 government imposed fees.” ECF No. 82 at ¶¶ 85–86. The Court incorporates by reference 25 its previous summary of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations set forth in their Third Amended 26 Complaint. See ECF No. 106 at 3–5. 27 Pursuant to the Court’s Chambers Rules, the parties alerted the Court that they had 28 reached an impasse regarding certain discovery disputes. Email to Chambers (Jan. 7, 2022 1 at 11:47 AM); see Chmb.R. at 2. The Court then held a discovery videoconference. ECF 2 No. 122. At the conference, the Court discussed the parties’ disputes, gave the parties 3 guidance, and extended certain deadlines to facilitate the parties’ agreements. Id. 4 Regarding the dispute about a second deposition of Mr. Branca, the Court found it 5 appropriate to issue a briefing schedule. ECF No. 123. The parties timely filed their Joint 6 Motion for Determination of Discovery Dispute. ECF No. 126. This order follows. 8 On May 27, 2021, Mr. Branca alleged in the operative amended complaint that he 9 booked a Marriott hotel room “from the Costco Travel website” and he “purchased the 10 hotel room in reliance on Marriott’s false and misleading online pricing.” ECF No. 82 at 11 ¶¶ 66–69, 120; see id. at ¶ 85–86 (defining nationwide and California classes as including 12 those who booked their hotel room online). On June 2, 2021, Mr. Branca served verified 13 amended interrogatory responses, repeatedly stating that he “complet[ed] the online 14 booking process on the Costco Travel website.” ECF No. 126-1 at 62, 87, 93. Defendant 15 deposed Mr. Branca on September 8, 2021. ECF No. 126-1 at 98. During his deposition, 16 Mr. Branca testified that he booked his reservation “through Costco Travel” and answered 17 questions regarding his “booking process on Costco.com.” Id. at 99–100. On 18 December 3, 2021, Defendant deposed Matt Browning, an Assistant Vice President at 19 Costco Corporation. Id. at 102, 107. Mr. Browning testified that, according to Costco’s 20 documentation, Mr. Branca made his reservation by phone and was informed by email and 21 phone about the resort fee. Id. at 104–05, 108, 110, 114. 22 On December 16, 2021, Defendant sent a “courtesy Rule 11 email to Plaintiffs’ 23 counsel asking that Branca withdraw as plaintiff by December 24.” ECF No. 126 at 2; ECF 24 No. 126-1 at 116–20. When no response was received, “[o]n December 24, Marriott’s 25 counsel sent a follow-up email.” ECF No. 126 at 3; ECF No. 126-1 at 123. When again no 26 response was received, “[o]n January 6, Marriott served a draft Rule 11 motion on 27 Plaintiffs.” ECF No. 126 at 2; ECF No. 126-1 at 125. “Within an hour, Branca said he 28 would withdraw from the case.” ECF No. 126 at 3. On January 25, 2022, Mr. Branca filed 1 a motion for voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice. ECF No. 124. 2 Defendant now seeks to depose Mr. Branca a second time, so Defendant “can 3 determine how to proceed1 [with its] Rule 11 motion.” ECF No. 126 at 2–3, 6. 5 Defendant deposed Mr. Branca on September 8, 2021. ECF No. 126-1 at 98. 6 Defendant now seeks a second deposition of Mr. Branca to bolster a sanctions motion. 7 Defendant has offered to “(i) limit the deposition to 45 minutes; (ii) depose Branca via 8 Zoom; and (iii) restrict the questioning to only any pre-suit inquiry by Branca.” ECF No. 9 126 at 6. Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s request. 10 Defendant contends that it has not had ample opportunity to obtain information about 11 Mr. Branca’s pre-suit inquiry because “‘Rule 11 discovery’ is not permitted until 12 ‘traditional discovery’ reveals a ‘substantial justification’ for a Rule 11 claim.” Id. at 4. 13 Defendant served an interrogatory seeking Mr. Branca’s “phone records … for the date 14 that the reservation for the October 17 Hotel Stay was made.” ECF No. 126-1 at 189; ECF 15 No. 126 at 3. Mr. Branca objected for various reasons, including relevance. ECF No. 126- 16 1 at 189–90. Defendant did not challenge Mr. Branca’s objections “based on his 17 representation that he did not make the reservation by phone.” ECF No. 126 at 4. So, when 18 Defendant first deposed Mr. Branca, “‘traditional discovery’ had not yet shown there 19

20 21 1 Defendant also seeks the second deposition to “‘determine how to proceed with plaintiffs’ requested stipulation of dismissal of Mr. Branca.’” ECF No. 126 at 3 (internal brackets 22 omitted) (quoting ECF No. 126-1 at 127). However, beyond asserting this barebones 23 statement once in the beginning of the joint motion, Defendant does not elaborate or argue this point elsewhere in the papers. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that a second deposition 24 was needed in order to successfully oppose the voluntary dismissal motion. Moreover, any 25 argument to the contrary is moot since the Court dismissed Mr. Branca “without prejudice to Defendant’s right to make such requests [for costs and fees] in a time and manner as 26 required under applicable law and local rules.” ECF No. 139 at 2; see ECF No. 127 at 4 27 (Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss Mr. Branca, arguing that, “[a]s a condition of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), the Court should preserve 28 1 existed any basis for Marriott to question Branca’s unequivocal assertion that he booked 2 his reservation online.” Id. Thus, Defendant argues that it did not have any further 3 opportunities to question him on this topic. Id. 4 Defendant contends that, since it has established that “Branca’s central allegation— 5 that he was deceived when he booked by website—is false,” that extraordinary 6 circumstances warrant Rule 11 discovery. Id. at 5. Defendant argues that, because “Branca 7 performed no inquiry before approving a complaint or verified interrogatory answers 8 averring that he booked by website,” Defendant incurred “tens of thousands of dollars in 9 legal fees to, inter alia, answer his allegations, issue and also answer written discovery, 10 depose Branca and then Costco, and draft Rule 11 emails and a Rule 11 motion, all in an 11 effort to secure the dismissal of a claim that was frivolous from the outset and never should 12 have been brought.” Id. Defendant argues that it “is entitled to learn exactly how this 13 critical error came about and to challenge any claim of ‘mistake.’” Id. at 5. Defendant 14 contends that the discovery cannot be obtained from some other, “more convenient, less 15 burdensome, or less expensive [source,] because only Branca has personal knowledge 16 about any such [pre-suit] inquiry.” Id. at 3. 17 Plaintiff argues that “it was objectively reasonable to rely on Mr. Branca’s first-hand 18 memory as to how he booked his hotel room. Although Mr. Branca’s memory was 19 incorrect, this is not a violation of Rule 11.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff further contends that 20 Defendant is not entitled to Rule 11 discovery or a Rule 11 motion because Mr. Branca 21 complied with the safe harbor provision. Id. at 7 (noting that nineteen days after being 22 served with Defendant’s proposed Rule 11 motion, Mr. Branca filed a motion for voluntary 23 dismissal of his claims). Thus, Plaintiff argues that, since Mr. Branca dismissed the action 24 during the safe harbor period, he “will not be subject to [Rule 11] monetary sanctions,” 25 making Defendant’s “request to take a second deposition of Plaintiff Branca for purposes 26 of Rule 11 [] moot.” Id. at 7, 9. Defendant argues that its position is not mooted if Rule 11 27 sanctions are unavailable because it could still seek sanctions under the Court’s inherent 28 power. Id. at 6 n.1 (“Marriott first should be permitted to obtain the narrow discovery 1 enabling it to argue why [inherent authority] sanctions are appropriate, including, inter alia, 2 by showing that Branca and/or his counsel acted in bad faith”). 3 Plaintiff contends that no extraordinary circumstances exist which would warrant a 4 second deposition, because Defendant had a full opportunity to question Mr. Branca about 5 his pre-suit investigation during his first deposition. Id. at 10. Plaintiff also reiterates that a 6 second deposition of Mr. Branca is “neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of the 7 case because Plaintiff Branca moved to voluntarily dismiss his claims.” Id. at 9. 9 The Court is not persuaded that there are extraordinary circumstances to grant 10 Defendant’s request for a second deposition as Rule 11 discovery. Alternatively, the Court 11 also is not persuaded that there is good cause to permit a second deposition. 12 A. Whether Extraordinary Circumstances exist for Rule 11 Discovery 13 “The advisory committee comments to Rule 11 caution that courts are discouraged 14 from using Rule 11 as a basis for discovery.” Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. IBM, No. C09- 15 05897-RS-HRL, 2011 WL 940263, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011). “To assure that the 16 efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the pleading regimen will not be 17 offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to 18 the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record. Thus, discovery 19 should be conducted only by leave of the court, and then only in extraordinary 20 circumstances.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11, advisory committee notes to 1983 amendments; 21 Vasudevan Software, 2011 WL 940263, at *5–*6 (collecting cases and explaining that 22 “discovery in relation to Rule 11 motions is allowed only in extraordinary circumstances”). 23 On January 6, 2022, Defendant served Plaintiff via email “with a non-filed copy of 24 its proposed [Rule 11] motion, thereby starting the 21-day safe-harbor period.” ECF No. 25 126-1 at 125. Nineteen days later, on January 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to 26 27 28 1 voluntarily dismiss Mr. Branca pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). ECF No. 124. Without 2 expressing an opinion on the merits of whether a Rule 11 motion would be proper, the 3 Court notes that when a party complies with the safe harbor provision, a Rule 11 motion 4 may not be filed. See, e.g., Great Dynasty Int’l Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. Haiting Li, No. C-13- 5 1734-EMC, 2014 WL 3381416, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2014) (“Because the purpose of 6 the safe harbor is ‘to withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions,’ the 7 Ninth Circuit held that a Rule 11 motion cannot be served after a complaint has been 8 [voluntarily] dismissed because it would not give the offending party the opportunity to 9 escape the sanctions”) (internal citation omitted); cf. Gomes v. Am. Century Cos., No. 2:09- 10 cv-02153-FCD-KJM, 2010 WL 1980201, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2010) (“[u]nder Rule 11 11, if a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action during the safe harbor period they will not 12 be subject to monetary sanctions.”). As such, the Court is not persuaded that there are 13 extraordinary circumstances to grant Defendant’s request for Rule 11 discovery. 14 Further, even if Plaintiffs had not voluntarily dismissed Mr. Branca from the case, 15 the Court still finds that Defendant has not met the burden of showing extraordinary 16 circumstances for Rule 11 discovery. It is not unusual for a consumer’s memory of a 17 transaction a few years before to have inaccuracies. Defendant knew at the outset how it 18 could verify whether Mr. Branca’s memory was correct—it could have sought records 19

20 21 2 At the time of filing the instant joint motion for determination of discovery dispute, no ruling had been entered on Plaintiffs’ motion to voluntarily dismiss Mr. Branca as a party 22 from the action. At the time of filing this Order, a ruling has been entered, and Mr. Branca 23 has been voluntarily dismissed from the case. ECF No. 139. The Court construes Mr. Branca’s motion for voluntary dismissal to be adequately “withdrawing the offending 24 pleading” under Rule 11, and therefore the timing of the ruling on the motion does not 25 impact the Court’s analysis. See Sneller v. City of Bainbridge Island, 606 F.3d 636, 640 (9th Cir. 2010) (“the Snellers did all that they were required to do to withdraw the offending 26 claims during the safe harbor period. Because their motion was filed within the 21-day safe 27 harbor period, the Snellers complied with Rule 11’s requirement that the challenged claim be ‘withdrawn or appropriately corrected.’ That was all that was required of them in order 28 1 from Costco, a business partner of Defendant, regarding Mr. Branca’s transaction. 2 Defendant instead made a decision to depose Mr. Branca first and then check with Costco. 3 The exertion of costs due to Defendant’s strategic decision is not enough to meet the burden 4 of showing extraordinary circumstances for Rule 11 discovery. Defendant already likely 5 has the information it needs—i.e., the information provided by Mr. Branca and the 6 information provided by Costco. See Estate of Alvarez v. Johns Hopkins Univ., No. TDC- 7 15-950, 2019 WL 4038562, at *8–*9 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2019) (thoroughly explaining and 8 collecting cases, and denying motion for Rule 11 discovery because Rule 11 motions are 9 often limited to the record, and also noting that defendant set forth its “allegations in great 10 detail. Accordingly, defendants have not established that their goal of uncovering 11 additional evidence of alleged litigation abuse to support an anticipated Rule 11 motion is 12 an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ justifying satellite discovery.”). Defendant also had a full 13 opportunity to ask Mr. Branca about his pre-suit inquiry at his deposition, even if 14 Defendant did not know at that time what Costco’s records would show. 15 The Court also finds that Defendant is not entitled to Rule 11 discovery to pursue 16 inherent authority sanctions, as doing so would render the safe harbor provision 17 meaningless. See cf. Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., 142 F.3d 1041, 1056, 1059 (7th Cir. 18 1998) (“defendants’ suggestion that the sanction was an appropriate exercise of the court’s 19 inherent power, even if a technical violation of the procedural requirements of Rule 11, 20 would have the effect of rendering Rule 11’s separate motion and safe harbor provisions 21 meaningless”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11, advisory committee notes on 1993 amendments 22 (“Chambers cautions, however, against reliance upon inherent powers if appropriate 23 sanctions can be imposed under provisions such as Rule 11, and the procedures specified 24 in Rule 11—notice, opportunity to respond, and findings—should ordinarily be employed 25 when imposing a sanction under the court’s inherent powers.”); accord Regions Bank v. 26 Kaplan, No. 8:12-cv-1837-T-17-MAP, 2018 WL 1833045, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018) 27 (“As a general rule, if a court cannot impose sanctions under Rule 11, it should not exercise 28 its inherent sanctioning authority”), report & recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3105445 1 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2018). 2 As noted above, consumers often inaccurately recall the details of transactions from 3 a few years ago, and Defendant has not persuaded the Court that this instance is different 4 and that there is reason to believe Mr. Branca acted in bad faith. See Corley, 142 F.3d at 5 1056, 1059 (“Although it is true that a district judge is not forbidden from relying on its 6 inherent power to impose a sanction for conduct that also would be sanctionable under 7 Rule 11, the Supreme Court has indicated that a sanction under the inherent power is 8 appropriate only where the party ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 9 oppressive reasons.’ [But] ‘when there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that 10 could be adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the 11 Rules rather than the inherent power.’”) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 12 45–46, 50 (1991)); cf. Attah v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., CV-16-07575-GW PLAx, 2017 13 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135936, at *19–*20 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2017) (denying defendant’s 14 motion for summary judgment, which argued that plaintiff violated the concealment and 15 fraud clause when plaintiff alleged incorrectly that he made no credit card purchases at 16 department stores, explaining that “a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff merely 17 forgot about these small transactions during his initial statements to Defendant, which led 18 to his initial claim that he bought his claimed items with cash” and “a reasonable jury could 19 conclude that it was not his intention to deceive Defendant based on his conflicting 20 testimony, or that it was merely a memory lapse”). 21 B. Whether Good Cause exists for a Second Deposition 22 “A party must obtain leave of court, and the court must grant leave to the extent 23 consistent with Rule 26(b)(2),” if “the deponent has already been deposed.” FED. R. CIV. 24 P. 30(a)(2)(A)(ii). “Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a deposition is 25 limited to 1 day of 7 hours. The court must allow additional time consistent with Rule 26 26(b)(2) if needed to fairly examine the deponent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1); see also FED. 27 R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A) (“By order, the court may alter the limits in these rules on . . . the 28 length of depositions under Rule 30.”). “A party seeking a court order to extend the time 1 of a deposition must show good cause to justify such an order.” Stonebreaker v. Guardian 2 Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13307, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2012); Boston 3 Scientific Corp. v. Cordis Corp., No. 5:02-cv1474-JW-RS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18098, 4 at *8–*9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2004); see FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1), advisory committee notes 5 on 2000 amendments (“The party seeking a court order to extend the examination, or 6 otherwise alter the limitations, is expected to show good cause to justify such an order”). 7 But see Finjan, Inc. v. Eset, LLC, 17CV183 CAB-BGS, 2020 WL 7396551, at *2 (S.D. 8 Cal. Dec. 16, 2020) (collecting out-of-circuit cases, noting that “[m]any courts have applied 9 a good cause standard to the taking of a second deposition,” but some courts require parties 10 to show good cause before they can conduct a second deposition and other courts require 11 a showing of good cause to prevent the second deposition). 12 Rule 30(d)(1)’s reference to Rule 26(b)(2) requires a court to limit the use of any 13 discovery method if (1) the discovery is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (2) the 14 discovery is obtainable from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 15 less expensive; (3) the party has had ample opportunity to obtain the information sought; 16 or (4) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking 17 into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 18 importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed 19 discovery in resolving the issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). “‘In weighing these factors, and 20 applying them to whether a deposition should be longer than seven hours, the court should 21 begin with the presumption that the seven-hour limit was carefully chosen and that 22 extensions of that limit should be the exception, not the rule.’” Evenchik v. Avis Rent a Car 23 Sys., LLC, No. 12cv61-BEN-DHB, 2014 WL 12899139, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) 24 (quoting Roberson v. Bair, 242 F.R.D. 130, 138 (D.D.C. 2007)). 25 Whether to permit a second deposition “lies within the court’s discretion.” 26 Bookhamer v. Sunbeam Products Inc., No. C-09-6027-EMC-DMR, 2012 WL 5188302, at 27 *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012); Couch v. Wan, No. CV-F-08-1621-LJO-DLB, 2012 WL 28 4433470, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2012) (denying reconsideration of magistrate judge’s 1 order which denied request for second deposition, noting that “[t]he propriety of a 2 deponent’s reopened deposition lies in the court’s discretion. [] Without a showing of need 3 or good reason, courts generally will not require a deponent’s reopened deposition”). 4 Here, the Court does not find good cause to permit a second deposition of Mr. 5 Branca. First, Defendant concedes that Mr. Branca’s pre-suit inquiry is not relevant to any 6 claim or defense in this case. ECF No. 126 at 5 (“Branca’s pre-suit inquiry is relevant not 7 to a claim or defense in this action, but a Rule 11 motion.”). Thus, a second deposition may 8 solely be relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Branca should be sanctioned. As such, the 9 request is not proportional to the needs of the case, and the burden would outweigh the 10 benefit. As evidenced by the parties’ prior motion practice in this case, the Court finds that 11 permitting a second deposition of Mr. Branca would not produce relevant information and 12 instead would most likely lead to extensive satellite litigation, which is what the advisory 13 committee’s notes to Rule 11 specifically attempt to curb. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, advisory 14 committee notes to 1983 amendments (“To assure that the efficiencies achieved through 15 more effective operation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite 16 litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent possible limit the 17 scope of sanction proceedings to the record. Thus, discovery should be conducted only by 18 leave of the court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances.”). 19 Further, the Court does not find good cause to grant a second deposition because 20 Defendant had ample opportunity to verify Mr. Branca’s claims, and thereafter ask 21 questions relating to his pre-suit inquiry, before “incur[ring] tens of thousands of dollars in 22 legal fees.” See ECF No. 126 at 5. Defendant made the decision to depose Mr. Branca 23 before confirming the transaction with Costco. See Bookhamer, 2012 WL 5188302, at *3 24 (denying request to take a second deposition, explaining “Defendant made a tactical 25 decision [in deposing the witness early in the case] that resulted in a litigation disadvantage 26 [which] does not warrant the reopening of Mary DiSilvestro’s deposition”). 27 The cases cited by Defendant are not persuasive. In In re Convergent Technologies 28 Securities Litigation, the court denied defendant’s motion to compel written discovery 1 || directed at Rule 11 sanctions because he had not presented sufficient justification, noting 2 a ruling on a pending motion for judgment on the pleadings may moot the need for 3 ||such discovery. 108 F.R.D. 328, 332, 346-47 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Kas v. Mercedes-Benz 4 U.S.A. addressed a motion for written discovery from putative class members, not 5 || depositions. No. 11-1032, 2011 WL 13234106, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). There, the 6 court declined to compel written discovery related to Rule 11 sanctions, but granted the 7 discovery at a later date as relevant to the case. Jd. In Evenchik, although the Court 8 || permitted a second deposition, Rule 11 sanctions were not an issue. 2014 WL 12899139, 9 || at *3—*4. A second deposition was warranted because the nature of the case changed from 10 ||a class action to an individual action, a circumstance that is not present here. /d. at *3. 11 Vv. CONCLUSION 12 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds neither extraordinary circumstances 13 ||nor good cause and, therefore, DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Take a Second Deposition 14 Mr. Branca. ECF No. 126. IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘6 Dated: August 29, 2022 17 AWioevdH. Kovolarsl 18 Honorable Allison H. Goddard United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28