Hall v. Leavitt

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 25, 2009
DocketCivil Action No. 2008-1715
StatusPublished

This text of Hall v. Leavitt (Hall v. Leavitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hall v. Leavitt, (D.D.C. 2009).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) BRIAN HALL, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-1715 (RMC) ) CHARLES E. JOHNSON, Acting ) Secretary, ) Department of Health & Human Servs., et) al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Brian Hall, a retiree from the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development

(“HUD”), sues the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to avoid being forced to

accept Medicare Part A, and forego the private health insurance that he now enjoys. Most

immediately, Mr. Hall moves for a temporary restraining order to prevent HHS and its constituent

agency, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), from enrolling him in Medicare Part A now that

he has turned age 65. Mr. Hall complains that if he refuses to accept Medicare Part A, he will not

only lose all of his future, monthly Social Security benefits, according to HHS policies, but he will

be required to repay to the Social Security Administration all of the monthly Social Security benefits

he has received over the past three years (since he retired at age 62).

I. FACTS

Brian Hall was formerly an employee of, and is now retired from, HUD. Am. Compl.

¶ 13. He retired at age 62. Pursuant to the Federal Employee Health Benefits program, he chose to

participate in the Mail Handlers Benefit Plan - Consumer Option upon retirement, a plan that includes a Health Savings Account (“HSA”) and a high-deductible health insurance policy. Pl.’s

Mem. in Support of Mot. for TRO (Pl.’s Mem.), Attach. 1 (Decl. of Brian Hall (“Hall Decl.”) ¶ 3).

Mr. Hall alleges that this insurance policy will be available for the balance of his life and will cover

his future health care expenses unless he is compelled to enroll in Medicare Part A. Id. ¶¶ 3-8.

Mr. Hall applied for retirement benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on

October 20, 2005. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for TRO, Ex. B (Decl. of Craig A. Street (“Street

Decl.”) ¶ 4). That application stated on the first page, in all capital letters, “I APPLY FOR ALL

INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR WHICH I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER TITLE II (FEDERAL OLD-

AGE, SURVIVORS, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE) AND PART A OF TITLE XVIII

(HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY

ACT, AS PRESENTLY AMENDED.” Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Hall began to receive Social Security retirement

benefits in February 2006. Id. ¶ 6.

According to certain policies of HHS,1 Mr. Hall complains that he will be

automatically enrolled in Medicare Part A in January 2009 because he turned 65 years of age on

January 3, 2009. Believing that the medical care available to Medicare patients is inferior to that

provided under private health insurance, Mr. Hall has notified HHS that he is unwilling to enroll in

Medicare Part B, which provides coverage for physician care, but he cannot similarly decline

Medicare Part A, which provides coverage for hospital costs. As a result, he will be forced to

discontinue his FEHB benefits, 5 U.S.C. § 891 et seq., as he will no longer be able to contribute to

1 See Program Operations Manual System/Hospital Insurance (“POMS HI”) 00801.002, Waiver of HI Entitlement by Monthly Beneficiary; POMS HI 00801.034, Withdrawal Considerations; and POMS GN 00206.020, Withdrawal Considerations When Hospital Insurance is Involved.

-2- his HSA, and his insurance carrier will cease covering his health care costs and expenses as the

primary insurer. 26 U.S.C. § 223(b)(7); IRS Publication 969 at www.irs.gov; Am. Compl. ¶ 13; Hall

Decl. ¶ 21.

Mr. Hall contends that upon reaching age 65, he automatically became “. . . an

individual who is entitled to benefits under Part A of this subchapter or enrolled under Part B of this

subchapter;” 42 U.S.C. § 1395a(5), and thereby became a “Medicare beneficiary.” Id. And, while

Medicare beneficiaries can enter in private contracts with physicians for medical care, 42 U.S.C. §

1395a(b)(2)(B), Mr. Hall believes that a contracting physician would thereby be barred from

submitting any claim to Medicare for a period of two years, even for other patients. 42 U.S.C. §

1395a(b)(3)(B)(ii) (two-year bar); United Seniors Ass’n v. Shalala, 182 F.3d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (“This means that a doctor who enters into a private contract with even a single patient is

barred from submitting a claim to Medicare on behalf of any patient for a two-year period.”). Mr.

Hall fears that his physicians and providers will not provide health care services and be paid

privately by him so long as he is a “Medicare beneficiary.”

Further, as a “Medicare eligible individual,” Mr. Hall will no longer be able to

contribute to his HSA and use pre-tax dollars for his health care costs. According to 26 U.S.C. §

223(b)(7):

Medicare eligible individuals

The limitation under this subsection for any month with respect to an individual shall be zero for the first month such individual is entitled to benefits under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act and for each month thereafter.

See also IRS Publication 969 at www.irs.gov.

-3- Mr. Hall alleges that the policies reflected in the POMS cited above are not reflected

in any statutory language. These policies would require him to withdraw from receiving Social

Security benefits and repay all such benefits already received in order to avoid Medicare Part A. He

complains that the effect of the challenged POMS is to force him and all citizens to enroll in

Medicare Part A whether they want to or not. He wishes to receive monthly Social Security benefits

without any Medicare coverage. See Pl.’s Mem. at 38 (“[A]s stated above, BRIAN HALL [sic] is

entitled to Social Security and Medicare already, but he does not want any Medicare benefits.”).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must consider four factors in deciding whether to issue a temporary

restraining order:2

1. whether the movant has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;

2. whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted;

3. whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to other interested parties; and

4. whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an injunction.

Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The foregoing factors should

be balanced on a “sliding scale,” i.e., a lesser showing on one factor can be surmounted by a greater

showing on another factor. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Even so,

in order to justify intruding into the ordinary litigation process by issuing a preliminary injunction,

2 The same standard applies to both temporary restraining orders and to preliminary injunctions. Experience Works, Inc. v. Chao, 267 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (D.D.C. 2003).

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Related

Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians
476 U.S. 667 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala
140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Circuit, 1998)
United Sr Assn Inc v. Shalala, Donna
182 F.3d 965 (D.C. Circuit, 1999)
Cobell, Elouise v. Norton, Gale
391 F.3d 251 (D.C. Circuit, 2004)
CSX Trans, Inc. v. Williams, Anthony A.
406 F.3d 667 (D.C. Circuit, 2005)
American Bankers Ass'n v. National Credit Union Administration
38 F. Supp. 2d 114 (District of Columbia, 1999)
Experience Works, Inc. v. Chao
267 F. Supp. 2d 93 (District of Columbia, 2003)

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