Hall v. JW Marriott Phoenix Desert Ridge

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02164
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Makayla Hall, No. CV-24-02164-PHX-SHD

10 Plaintiff, AMENDED ORDER

11 v.

12 JW Marriott Phoenix Desert Ridge,

13 Defendant. 14 15 On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff Makayla Hall, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by 16 filing a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 1-1 at 15.) On August 23, 17 2024, Defendant JW Marriott Phoenix Desert Ridge timely removed this action to federal 18 court. (Doc. 1.) On October 15, 2024, the parties attended a virtual Scheduling 19 Conference, and a Scheduling Order was issued setting deadlines in this matter. (Doc. 13.) 20 On February 28, 2025, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff’s Failure 21 to Prosecute. (Doc. 16.) Defendant states that Plaintiff has not produced her initial 22 disclosures, despite Defendant’s repeated requests that she do so. (Id.) Plaintiff has not 23 filed a response to Defendant’s Motion. 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure 25 to prosecute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 26 629–30 (1962) (a court’s authority to dismiss for lack of prosecution is necessary to prevent 27 undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars 28 of the district courts); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 1 (9th Cir. 2005) (a court may dismiss under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute or comply 2 with rules of civil procedure or the court’s orders). 3 Dismissal for failure to prosecute, however, is a “harsh penalty and is to be imposed 4 only in extreme circumstances.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 5 1986). Before dismissing Plaintiff’s case, the Court must weigh several factors: “(1) the 6 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 7 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition 8 of cases on their merits, and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. (citing Ash 9 v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984); Mir v. Fosburg, 706 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 10 1983)). Additionally, “[a] dismissal for lack of prosecution must be supported by a 11 showing of unreasonable delay,” but the district court “is in the best position to determine 12 what period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.” 13 Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423. 14 Because dismissal for failure to prosecute is a “harsh penalty and is to be imposed 15 only in extreme circumstances,” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423, the Court will consider the 16 merits of each of the five Henderson factors, in turn. 17 First, “the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation,” id., favors 18 dismissal. In its October 15, 2024 Scheduling Order, the Court set a deadline of October 19 25, 2024, for initial disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1). (Doc. 20 13 at 1.) This deadline ensures that the discovery process will proceed in a timely manner, 21 and the failure to provide initial disclosures will result in a delay of the discovery process 22 and thus the resolution of the matter. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s order 23 to provide Defendant with initial disclosures and subsequent failure to respond to 24 Defendant’s requests that she do so needlessly extended the litigation of this matter. 25 Further, by failing to respond to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff delayed 26 adjudication of this action. 27 Second, “the court’s need to manage its docket,” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423, 28 favors dismissal. Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute has required the Court expend its judicial 1 resources reviewing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and the docket and drafting additional 2 Orders regarding Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this case. 3 Third, “the risk of prejudice to the defendants,” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423, favors 4 dismissal. Defendant cannot properly defend against Plaintiff’s claims if Plaintiff will not 5 participate in the discovery process. Further, Plaintiff’s refusal to communicate has 6 resulted in Defendant expending resources to attempt to communicate with Plaintiff. 7 Therefore, dismissal of this matter will not prejudice Defendant. 8 Fourth, “the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits,” id., neither 9 favors nor disfavors dismissal. A dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication 10 on the merits “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). If the 11 Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice, the adjudication would not be on the 12 merits and public policy would not disfavor dismissal. 13 Fifth, “the availability of less drastic sanctions,” id., favors dismissal. Defendant 14 has shown that Plaintiff was given many opportunities to comply with the Court’s order 15 that initial disclosures be served. Defendant sent Plaintiff a deficiency letter on November 16 21, 2024 and February 6, 2025, which Plaintiff did not respond to. On February 19, 2025, 17 Defendant left a voicemail for Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not return the call. Defendant 18 attempted to call again on February 20, 2025, and Plaintiff’s voicemail was full. (Doc. 16- 19 1.) Defendant made good faith efforts to contact Plaintiff and provide additional 20 opportunities for Plaintiff to comply with the Court’s order. Plaintiff’s failure to respond 21 to the Motion to Dismiss is an indication that a less drastic sanction, such as additional 22 warning to comply with the Court’s order and further attempts to reach Plaintiff are 23 unlikely to have an effect. “The district court need not exhaust every sanction short of 24 dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 25 alternatives.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424 (citations omitted). 26 Henderson factors one, two, three and five favor dismissal, and factor four does not 27 disfavor dismissal without prejudice. Thus, in sum, the Henderson factors weigh in favor 28 of a dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute. See 779 F.2d at 1425 (“Where 1 || counsel continues to disregard deadlines, warnings, and schedules set by the district court, || we cannot find that a lack of prejudice to defendants is determinative.”). 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Based on □□□□□□□□□□□ || Failure to Prosecute, (Doc. 16). 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's case is dismissed without prejudice 7\| for failure to prosecute. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that once judgment has been entered, Defendant shall refile their Bill of Costs. 10 Dated this 26th day of June, 2025. 11 12 / 13 2 / 14 )

H le Sharad H. Desai 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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