Hall v. Hudson

CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedSeptember 20, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-00956
StatusUnknown

This text of Hall v. Hudson (Hall v. Hudson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hall v. Hudson, (D. Del. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE MURRAY HALL, II, ) Plaintiff, Vv. Civ. Action No. 22-956-GBW RODNEY HUDSON, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM ORDER At Wilmington, this 20th day of September, 2023, having considered Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (D.I. 10), and Defendant’s motion to dismiss (D.I. 15); Motion for a temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only if (1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the defendant; and (4) granting the injunction is in the public interest.” NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (“NutraSweet IT”). The elements also apply to temporary restraining orders. See NutriSweet Co. v. Vit-

Mar Enterprises., Inc., 112 F.3d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1997) (“NutraSweet I’) (a temporary restraining order continued beyond the time permissible under Rule 65

must be treated as a preliminary injunction, and must conform to the standards applicable to preliminary injunctions). “[F]ailure to establish any element in [a plaintiffs] favor renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.” NutraSweet II, 176 F.3d at 153. In his motion for a temporary restraining order, Plaintiff asserts

that he is “victimized every time [Defendant] Rodney Hudson is allowed to work

around [him],” he does not feel safe, Defendant engages him in personal conversations despite his objections, and Defendant taunts him. (D.I. 10). Plaintiffs motion will be denied for two reasons. First, he has failed to

adequately allege irreparable injury. Second, a party pursuing injunctive relief is

confined to arguing the merits of his or her complaint. See, e.g., Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 300 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining plaintiff “had no grounds to seek an

injunction pertaining to allegedly impermissible conduct not mentioned in his

original complaint”); Martin v. Keitel, 205 F. App’x 925, 928-29 (3d Cir. 2006) (injunctive relief motion was “legally deficient” because it targeted conduct that

bore no relation to plaintiff's underlying claim); Alabama v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1128 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o obtain a permanent injunction, a party must show .. . that he has prevailed in establishing the violation

of the right asserted in his complaint.”); Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A district court should not issue an injunction when the

injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying

wholly outside the issues in the suit.”); Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting injunctive relief motion that raised new assertions that

were entirely different from the claim raised in the complaint because “a party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint’). Motion to dismiss. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 5). On November 18, 2022, the Court screened the Complaint, identified what appeared to be a cognizable and non-frivolous claim within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) against Defendant Rodney Hudson, and entered a service order. (D.I. 9). The legal standard used when screening cases for failure to state a claim

pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standard. See Malcomb v. McKean, 535 F. App’x 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing De ‘lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013), and Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). Nothing has changed since the Complaint was screened. In addition, the Court must liberally construe the Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In doing so, the Court concludes that the allegations contained in the Complaint are sufficient to withstand the instant motion to dismiss and, therefore, denies the motion.

Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (D.I. 10) is

DENIED. 2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (D.I. 15) is DENIED.

3. Defendant shall file an answer within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Memorandum Order.

United States District Judge

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Related

Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Florida
122 F.3d 41 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
State of Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
424 F.3d 1117 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Colvin v. Caruso
605 F.3d 282 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
The Nutrasweet Company v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc.
176 F.3d 151 (Third Circuit, 1999)
Michael Malik Allah v. Thomas Seiverling
229 F.3d 220 (Third Circuit, 2000)
Ophelia De'Lonta v. Gene Johnson
708 F.3d 520 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)
Joseph Malcomb v. Craig McKean
535 F. App'x 184 (Third Circuit, 2013)
Martin v. Keitel
205 F. App'x 925 (Third Circuit, 2006)
Devose v. Herrington
42 F.3d 470 (Eighth Circuit, 1994)
Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc.
112 F.3d 689 (Third Circuit, 1997)

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Hall v. Hudson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hall-v-hudson-ded-2023.