Hall v. Hall

132 N.W.2d 217, 178 Neb. 91, 1964 Neb. LEXIS 45
Nebraska Supreme Court·Decided December 31, 1964·No. 35735·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Messmore, J.

Betty Jo- Hall, plaintiff, brought this action in the district court for Lancaster County against Herbert Richard Hall, defendant, to obtain an absolute divorce, the custody of a 9-year-old daughter of the parties, child support, alimony, costs, and attorneys’ fees.

A motion was filed by the defendant that the issues in this case be transferred to the separate juvenile court of Lancaster County. By order of the district court, the case was transferred to the .separate juvenile court of Lancaster County as provided for by law.

The trial judge of the separate juvenile court made findings as follows: That the plaintiff and defendant were married on May 29, 1953; that one child was bom to this marriage, Courtney Lynne Hall, on August 11, 1954; that the care, custody, control, and support of this child were the issues in this case; that the defendant had been guilty of extreme cruelty to the plaintiff to such an extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony had been defeated and destroyed which entitled the plaintiff to an absolute divorce; that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a proper person to have the care, control, and custody of the minor child, which care, control, and custody of the child should be awarded to- Mr. and Mrs. Mark M. Baldwin of Omaha, Nebraska, an uncle and aunt of the child, who- offered to take such custody; that Mr. and Mrs. Mark M. Baldwin were fit and proper persons to- have the care and custody of Courtney Lynne Hall, a minor child; that it was in the best interests of the minor child that her custody be given to- Mr. and Mrs. Mark M. Baldwin subject to reasonable rights of visitation by the plaintiff and the defendant; that child support should be paid by the defendant in the amount of $100 a month commencing forthwith until the child reaches 21 years of age, dies, or until further-order of the *93 court; that the personal clothing and personal effects of the plaintiff should be awarded to her and the personal clothing and personal effects, including insurance policies of the defendant, should be awarded to him; that the household furniture and furnishings should be awarded to the plaintiff; that the 1959 Ford automobile should be awarded to the defendant subject to any encumbrance against the same; that the described real estate owned by the parties should be sold and, after paying the balance due on the first mortgage at the First Federal Savings and Loan Association and the expenses of the sale, the balance should be divided equally between the parties as a division of property and alimony; that any lien resulting from this proceeding should be released in order that the property might be sold; and that the defendant should pay the costs of the action and reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1,200. The decree was entered in accordance with the above findings.

The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial which was overruled. The plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff’s petition set forth certain acts, of extreme cruelty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff which embarrassed and humiliated the plaintiff to the extent of destroying the objects and purposes of matrimony, and particularly this marriage relationship; alleged that the defendant was employed by the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company as an engineer and earned in excess of $600 a month, and that the parties had accumulated certain real estate; and further alleged the birth of the minor child of the parties. The plaintiff prayed for an absolute divorce from the defendant, the custody of the minor child of the parties, reserving reasonable rights of visitation to the defendant, and for an award of child support, alimony, costs, and attorneys’ fees.

The defendant’s answer admitted the residence of the parties, the date of their marriage, and the birth of the *94 minor child of the parties; generally denied all other allegations of the plaintiff’s petition; specifically alleged that the plaintiff was not a fit and proper person to have the care and custody of the minor child of the parties; and prayed for a dismissal of the plaintiff’s petition and that the care and custody of the minor child be vested in the defendant.

The plaintiff has set forth many assignments of error, in substance as follows: That the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff was not a fit and proper person to have the care, control, and custody of Courtney Lynne Hall, minor child of the parties; in failing to award the home of the parties to the plaintiff; in failing to require the defendant to pay the balance due on the mortgage on the home of the parties, which was a lien against such home; and in receiving evidence which was too remote in time, hearsay, incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial to the issues in this case.

There are certain rules of law that are applicable to- a determination of this appeal.

In an appeal to this court in a divorce action the cause is tried de novo. See Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625, 107 N. W. 2d 407.

In a divorce suit in which the custody of a minor child is involved, the rule is that the custody of the child is to be determined by the best interests of the child, with due regard for the superior rights of fit, proper, and suitable parents. The care, custody, and control of a child of tender years is almost uniformly awarded to the mother if she is a fit and suitable person to' have its custody. See Campbell v. Campbell, 156 Neb. 155, 55 N. W. 2d 347.

Where in an action for divorce both parents are found to be unfit or unsuitable to have the care and legal custody of the minor child of the parties, the welfare and best interest of the child will constitute the sole consideration in determining the right of custody. Under the provisions of section 43-236, R. R. S. 1943, where the *95 parents of a minor child are unfit or unsuitable to have its custody, the separate juvenile court may properly place its legal custody in the chief juvenile probation officer on such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe. See Beck v. Beck, 175 Neb. 108, 120 N. W. 2d 585.

In a case* where the fixing of the custody of a minor child is concerned, the wishes of the child are not controlling, but if the child has reached sufficient age and has the ability to express an intelligent preference, such an expression is entitled to consideration. See Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, supra.

The record discloses that the plaintiff and the defendant were married in Lincoln, Nebraska, on May 29, 1953. One child was born to this marriage on August 11, 1954, and named Courtney Lynne Hall, hereafter referred to as Courtney. During the marriage the parties accumulated real estate at 1834 North Sixty-seventh Street in Lincoln. The defendant is a project engineer employed by the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, and his income is about $700 a month. The plaintiff was 32 years of age and the defendant 42 years of age at the time of trial.

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Hall v. Hall, 132 N.W.2d 217, 178 Neb. 91, 1964 Neb. LEXIS 45 (Neb. 1964).

132 N.W.2d 217 (Hall v. Hall) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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