Hall v. Cheshire County DOC, et al.

2007 DNH 037

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: March 27, 2007
• Docket: 05-CV-381-JD
• Status: Published

Opinion

Hall v . Cheshire County DOC, et a l . 05-CV-381-JD 3/27/07 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Kevin D. Hall

v. Civil N o . 05-cv-381-JD Opinion N o . 2007 DNH 037 Cheshire County Department of Corrections, et a l .

O R D E R

Kevin D. Hall, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

brings civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that

the Superintendent of the Cheshire County Department of

Corrections (“CCDOC”), Richard N . Van Wickler; former Captain of

CCDOC, Robin Cook; and an unnamed CCDOC doctor denied him medical

care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that Van Wickler

discriminated against him in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.1 The defendants move for summary judgment on the

grounds that Hall failed to exhaust administrative remedies as

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), that he cannot prove his § 1983

claims, and that the defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. Hall objects to summary judgment.

1 These are the claims that were allowed following preliminary review. Hall never identified the CCDOC doctor, who has not been served, and the claims against him or her are now dismissed without prejudice. See Figueroa v . Rivera, 147 F.3d 7 7 , 82-83 (1st Cir. 1998). Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record.

See Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323 (1986). A party

opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment must

present competent evidence of record that shows a genuine issue

for trial. See Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 ,

256 (1986). All reasonable inferences and all credibility issues

are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. at 255.

Discussion

Hall’s claims arise from the circumstances of his

incarceration at the CCDOC during a period between December of

2004 and February 1 1 , 2005, when he was transferred to the

Hillsborough County Department of Corrections. Hall contends

that he was suffering from mental illness and that he was known

as an “eater” when he arrived at the CCDOC based on his past

history. While incarcerated at the CCDOC, several of his

2 cellmates were moved because of Hall’s threats and the cellmates’ fear of him. Hall destroyed parts of several cells. Hall also engaged in self-injurious conduct, including cutting himself repeatedly and eating glass, metal, and other objects. Hall contends that he was not given treatment for his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that Superintendent Van Wickler discriminated against him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him adequate medical care. The defendants move for summary judgment, asserting that Hall failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by § 1997e(a) and cannot prove his constitutional claims. The defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity.2

Section 1997e(a) requires prisoners who bring suit under §

1983, challenging prison conditions, to exhaust all

administrative remedies available through the correctional

facility. “‘Prison conditions’ under this provision include

individual instances of medical mis- or non-treatment. . . .”

Acosta v . U.S. Marshals Serv., 445 F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 2006).

The CCDOC had a grievance procedure available to its inmates when

2 Although the court does not reach the issue of qualified immunity, the defendants are cautioned that their argument in support of that theory is woefully inadequate and would not sustain their defense on that ground.

3 Hall was incarcerated there. See, e.g., Dullen v . Cheshire

County, 2006 WL 995141 at *1-2 (D.N.H. Apr. 1 4 , 2006).

Superintendent Van Wickler states in his affidavit that

review of Hall’s inmate file and an online compilation of inmate

grievances found no grievance filed by Hall during the relevant

period. In response, Hall does not argue that he filed or attempted to file grievances about the treatment he received or

did not receive at CCDOC. Instead, he states that the incidents

on which his claims are based were constantly occurring so that

“any other ‘methods’ to remedy this continuous and unrestrained

spread of wrongs - - Just doesn’t exist to someone in this

condemned situation.” O b j . at 3 7 . That explanation is

insufficient to show that Hall satisfied his obligation to pursue

the available grievance procedure before bringing suit.

The summary judgment record establishes that Hall failed to comply with the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a). Because

exhaustion is a required prerequisite to bringing Hall’s claims

under § 1983, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

The court does not reach the remainder of the issues raised by

the defendants on summary judgment.

4 Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (document n o . 41) is granted pursuant to §

1997e(a). The claim against the unknown CCDOC doctor is

dismissed without prejudice due to the plaintiff’s failure to

complete service. The clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly and

close the case.

SO ORDERED.

^—'Joseph 'Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge March 2 7 , 2007

cc: John A . Curran, Esquire Kevin D. Hall, pro se