Hall County Board of Tax Assessors v. Oliver Family Investments, Lp

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: March 12, 2025
• Docket: A24A1678
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 12, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A1677, A24A1678. HALL COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS v. OLIVER FAMILY INVESTMENTS, LP (two cases)

GOBEIL, Judge.

The Hall County Board of Tax Assessors (the “Board”) appeals from two

identical superior court orders denying its motions for summary judgment in these tax

appeal cases.1 Oliver Family Investments, LP (“Oliver”) applied to renew

conservation use covenants for two pieces of real property it owns. The Board denied

Oliver’s applications, which Oliver appealed to the superior court. Ultimately, the

superior court denied the Board’s motions for summary judgment, finding that issues

1 The two cases are identical, aside from pertaining to a different parcel of land. The parties have filed identical briefs in both cases. of fact remain. We granted the Board’s applications for interlocutory review of these

superior court orders. Court of Appeals Case Nos. A24I0171, A24I0172. The legal

question presented on appeal concerns what qualifies as “income from bona fide

conservation uses, including earnings on investments directly related to past or future

bona fide conservation uses” in connection with an application for a conservation use

covenant within Georgia’s tax code. OCGA § 48-5-7.4. Because we find open material

questions of fact remain, it would be premature to rule on the statutory interpretation

question, and so we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

When this Court considers the denial of a motion for summary judgment, we

review the decision de novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable conclusions and

inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. City of St.

Marys v. Reed, 346 Ga. App. 508, 508-509 (816 SE2d 471) (2018). It is the movant’s

burden to show that summary judgment is warranted. Champion v. Pilgrim’s Pride

Corp. of Delaware, 286 Ga. App. 334, 335 (649 SE2d 329) (2007). And summary

judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 508; see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Further,

“[t]he grant or denial of summary judgment will be affirmed if it is right for any

2 reason.” Peachstate Developers v. Greyfield Resources, 284 Ga. App. 501, 505 (2) (644

SE2d 324) (2007).

Relevant Facts

The facts here are relatively straightforward. In 2022, Oliver applied as a

“family owned farm entity” to renew2 conservation use covenants for two parcels of

land, both of which are used to produce trees and cattle. See OCGA § 48-5-7.4

(defining conservation use properties). One section of the application asks for the farm

entity’s percent of gross income from bona fide conservation uses in the past year,

which Oliver left blank. Upon investigation, Oliver disclosed that its only income in

2021 was $7,800, which came from renting out a storage building located on a third

parcel of land.3 This third piece of land was not used for agricultural purposes, but

2 The properties previously were granted conservation use covenants in 2012 for a period of ten years. However, the 2012 application, which the Board approved, was filed by Thomas D. Oliver and Marcia Hammock as “one or more naturalized citizens” who owned the properties. The instant 2022 applications listed the owner of the properties as a family owned farm entity, which triggered the income requirement described below. OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (a) (1) (C) (iv). 3 As described in the record, with cattle and tree farming, income varies from year to year, and there are often years with no agricultural-based income while assets are being managed for future harvesting. 3 Oliver averred that this third parcel — and indeed “all of the property” owned by

Oliver — was purchased with income derived from agricultural investments.

The Board denied Oliver’s applications, finding that Oliver did not meet the

statutory income requirement to qualify as an owner of conservation property as a

family owned farm entity. Under the statute, a family owned farm entity must derive

80 percent of its income from bona fide conservation uses, but Oliver earned all of its

2021 income from renting a storage unit to a third party on separate parcel of land. See

OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (a) (1) (C) (iv). The Board determined that the rental income was

not a bona fide conservation use, and denied the applications. Oliver appealed the

denials first to the Hall County Board of Equalization, which affirmed the Board’s

denials.

Oliver then appealed to the superior court. The Board filed motions for

summary judgment on the ground that Oliver did not meet the income requirements

set forth in OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (a) (1) (c) (iv). The superior court denied the Board’s

motions after a hearing. The trial court’s 1-page orders found “that an issue of fact

exists as to whether the $7,800.00 rental income that [Oliver] received in 2021 was

‘earnings on investments directly related to past or future bona fide conservation

4 uses.’” Thus, the superior court found that a trial would be necessary to resolve this

question of fact. These appeals followed.

Legal Framework

Conservation use covenants are governed by OCGA § 48-5-7.4. Pursuant to this

provision, “owners of bona fide conservation use property, including property used

for certain agricultural purposes and meeting other statutory criteria and conditions,

may apply to the county board of tax assessors for current use assessment of their

property for purposes of calculating ad valorem taxes.” Terrell County Bd. of Tax

Assessors v. Goolsby, 324 Ga. App. 535, 536 (751 SE2d 158) (2013) (citation and

punctuation omitted). The conservation use covenant allows the property’s taxes to

be assessed based on its current use value instead of its fair market value, resulting in

tax savings. Id. Relevant here, “bona fide conservation use property” includes

property that has a primary purpose of good faith production of agricultural products

or timber. See OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (a) (1). There is no dispute in this case concerning

the primary purpose of the two tax parcels at issue.

5 Apart from the property itself, only certain types of property owners are eligible

under the statute. See OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (a) (1) (C). One category of qualifying owner

is a “family owned farm entity” that is owned by qualifying individuals, and which

derived 80 percent or more of its gross income from bona fide conservation uses, including earnings on investments directly related to past or future bona fide conservation uses, within the state within the year immediately preceding the year in which eligibility is sought . . . .

OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (a) (1) (C) (iv).

The underlying question in this appeal is whether Oliver qualifies as a family

owned farm entity given the source of its income. But given the procedural posture of

the case, the question before us is simply whether the trial court erred in denying the

Board’s motion for summary judgment and allowing the case to proceed to trial. We

conclude that it did not.

Though many facts may be undisputed, we, like the trial court, find that open

questions of fact remain to decide what ultimately is a highly fact-intensive inquiry:

did Oliver “derive 80 percent or more of its gross income from bona fide conservation

uses, including earnings on investments directly related to past or future bona fide

conservation uses, within the state within the year immediately preceding the year in

6 which eligibility is sought[?]” OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (a) (1) (C) (iv). There are several

components to that question, including the percent and source of funds, their sourcing

from bona fide conservation uses, determinations of relatedness to past or future bona

fide conservation uses, and temporal considerations. To decide in the Board’s favor,

we would have to make assumptions of fact, which we decline to do. For instance, it

is not clear whether the income-producing asset was purchased with money earned

through bona fide agricultural pursuits. Oliver averred that it was purchased with such

funds (at least in part), however, even the affidavit is unclear as to whether the

property was wholly purchased by such funds. Moreover, the Board does not

necessarily dispute the source of funds, but nor does it concede it.4 Instead, the Board

argues that, even if the rental property was purchased with money that came 100%

from agricultural uses, Oliver would still not qualify under the statute. And Oliver has

4 More specifically, Oliver averred that the real property upon which the rental building was located was purchased with income derived from agricultural assets, but the record is unclear as to whether Oliver expended any other funds to construct or purchase the building, or whether it came with the purchase of the land. This too could be relevant to any analysis of whether the earnings on the investment was directly related to past or future bona fide conservation uses, and further supports our conclusion that additional facts need be resolved before the Court delves further into the legal issues. 7 argued (at least in part) that, if a jury believes its affidavit, it will qualify under the

statute.

We find this fact question critical to answering the legal question. Only if the

funds used to purchase the income-producing asset (either in whole or in part) were

derived from bona fide agricultural uses could the asset even arguably be considered

an “investment” directly related to a past or future bona fide conservation use. And

it is only after that question is answered that we could fully consider whether its

income could be considered “earnings on investments directly related to past or

future bona fide conservation uses” as described in the statute. See Ly v. Jimmy Carter

Commons, LLC, 286 Ga. 831, 833 (1) (691 SE2d 852) (2010) (only if no disputed issue

of material facts remain is a court authorized to grant summary judgment). Otherwise,

any holding we reach essentially would be advisory, as it might not apply to Oliver’s

case, if, for instance, the jury finds that the storage building and/or land were

purchased with any funds derived from non-agricultural pursuits. See Cotton States

Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins., 235 Ga. App. 510 (510 SE2d 78)

(1998) (Blackburn, J., dissenting) (an opinion based on hypothetical or assumed facts

is an advisory opinion).

8 Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that facts remain that must be

resolved before this case can be fully adjudicated. See Chatham Area Transit Auth. v.

Brantley, 353 Ga. App. 197, 208 (834 SE2d 593) (2019) (affirming denial of summary

judgment on different issue than the one stated by the trial court). We therefore affirm

the trial court’s denial of summary judgment.

Judgments affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Pipkin, J., concur.