Hall, C. v. Mill Pond Unit

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 6, 2021
• Docket: 263 EDA 2021
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A19025-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CHERYL LYNN HALL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MILL POND UNIT OWNERS : No. 263 EDA 2021 ASSOCIATION :

Appeal from the Order Entered December 18, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County Civil Division at No. 2019-CV-01035

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 6, 2021

Cheryl Lynn Hall (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order sustaining

the preliminary objections of Mill Pond Unit Owners Association (Mill Pond) and

dismissing Appellant’s complaint with prejudice.

The trial court summarized the procedural history, as well as its

rationale for sustaining Mill Pond’s preliminary objections, as follows:

[Appellant] filed a pro se Complaint on August 15, 2019, alleging that she was injured on the premises located at 5728 Decker Road in the [Mill Pond] Association. [Mill Pond] filed Preliminary Objections to the Complaint and objected based on improper service and that the Complaint was not signed by [Appellant] or an attorney. This Court sustained [Mill Pond]’s Preliminary Objections and dismissed the Complaint, with prejudice, on December 18, 2020.

[Appellant] filed her Notice of Appeal on January 14, 2021. [Appellant] filed her Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on January 28, 2021, although we note that the record ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A19025-21

does not reflect that defense counsel was ever served with the Concise Statement. Nevertheless, [Mill Pond] became aware that a Concise Statement had been filed and submitted a Response on February 16, 2021. *** . . . Pa.R.C.P. 400 requires the Sheriff to serve original process in a civil action. Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 401(a), the Complaint must be served by original process within thirty (30) days of its filing. If service of original process cannot be completed within thirty (30) days, the Complaint must be reinstated pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 401(b)(1). We respectfully submit that this Court did not abuse its discretion . . .

First, we noted that the record reflected [Appellant] did not effectuate proper service of the Complaint by the Sheriff within thirty (30) days. [Appellant] attempted to have the Complaint served by improper means for original process, including by mail and by having a clergyman hand deliver the Complaint in March of 2020. These attempts at service of original process are clearly improper under the Rules. While [Appellant] did eventually have the Sheriff properly serve the Complaint upon [Mill Pond] in June of 2020, the Complaint was never reinstated and thus was null and void. Finally, we noted that the Complaint was not signed by an attorney of record or by [Appellant] and therefore violated Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1.

Furthermore, in our Order dated December 18, 2020, we noted that even though [Appellant] elected to proceed pro se in her case, she was still expected to follow the proper procedures set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/5/21, at 1-2.

On appeal, Mill Pond filed a motion to quash based on deficiencies in

Appellant’s brief. Mill Pond enumerated “substantial and considerable defects

that render appellate review impossible and should result in the quashing of

this appeal.” Motion to Quash, 5/20/21, at 1-8. On June 14, 2021, this Court

denied Mill Pond’s request without prejudice. Upon review, we agree that

quashal is warranted.

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It is well settled that an appellant risks quashal when a brief fails to

“materially conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure.” See Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 497-

98 (Pa. Super. 2005); Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See also Pa.R.A.P. 2111-2119

(discussing required content of appellate briefs and addressing specific

requirements for each subsection of the brief). “When issues are not properly

raised and developed in briefs, [and] when the briefs are wholly inadequate

to present specific issues for review, a Court will not consider the merits

thereof.” Branch Banking and Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942-43

(Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present

arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must

support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record,

and with citations to legal authorities.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d

766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). An appellant’s pro se status

does not relieve her of the duty to follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 213 n. 11 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Appellant’s brief is patently defective. It contains none of the sections

prescribed by Pa.R.A.P. 2111, and lacks coherent argument. See Pa.R.A.P.

2119 (setting forth requirements for the argument portion of appellate briefs).

As best we discern, Appellant’s statements are conclusory, undeveloped, and

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lack citation to legal authority.1 Also, as Mill Pond stated, “Appellant’s brief

appears that it may simply be a restatement of the averments of her complaint

filed with the lower court.” Motion to Quash at 4. For these reasons, we are

unable to conduct meaningful review and are compelled to quash.

Appeal quashed.2 Case stricken from the argument list.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/6/2021

____________________________________________

1 Appellant references United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous

People Article 40 and her “religious obligations,” but no case law or statutory authority. This Court has explained we “will not consider the merits of an argument which fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority. Failure to cite relevant legal authority constitutes waiver of the claim on appeal.” In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa. Super. 2012).

2 Mill Pond filed a second motion to quash which we received after issuing this

memorandum and therefore deny as moot.

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