Haley v. Goodheart

44 A. 193, 58 N.J. Eq. 368, 13 Dickinson 368, 1899 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 66
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedSeptember 15, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 44 A. 193 (Haley v. Goodheart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haley v. Goodheart, 44 A. 193, 58 N.J. Eq. 368, 13 Dickinson 368, 1899 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 66 (N.J. Ct. App. 1899).

Opinion

Stevens, V. C.

This is a suit brought under the act of 1896 to compel the determination of claims to estates in remainder and to quiet the title to the same. P. L. of 1896 p. 243; P. L. of 1897 p. 211. The act as amended is nearly a copy of the act to quiet titles. Gen. Stat. p. 3486. It provides in substance that when any person claims to be entitled to a vested remainder in lands or personalty and his title is denied or disputed, he may maintain a suit in chancery to settle the title and to clear up all doubts and disputes concerning the same. It did not, as does the act to quiet titles, provide for an issue 'at law on the application of either party. In 1897 this defect was remedied, and counsel on both sides being desirous that any question relating to the jurisdiction should as far as possible be eliminated, it was stipulated that the case should be deemed to have been brought under the act as amended. I think that the act as it- now stands rests substantially upon the same foundation as the act to quiet titles. The latter act confers jurisdiction in cases over which, before its passage, equity did not take jurisdiction. Story Eq. Jur. § 852 ; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1396. Mr. Justice Depue, in American Dock Co. v. Trustees, 10 Stew. Eq. 272, says: “ It enlarged the jurisdiction of the court of chancery in this respect. It gave a party who is in peaceable possession of lands, where his title is disputed, a right to come into chancery to , settle the title, in advance of a determination of the title at law, where no suit to enforce or test the validity of the title is pending.” The same judge says, in Sheppard v. Nixon, 16 Stew. Eq. 631: “ The foundation of the jurisdiction is the inability of the complainant to obtain relief by an' action at law or the inadequacy of the legal remedy.” “ The purpose of the act,” said Chief-Justice Beasley in Jersey City v. Lembeck 4 Stew. Eq. 255, “is [370]*370to relieve, not persons who had the power, to test the hostile claim by a direct proceeding in the usual mode, but to aid those persons who had no such opportunity.” See, also, Yard v. Ocean Beach, 4 Dick. Ch. Rep. 306; Southmayd v. City of Elizabeth, 2 Stew. Eq. 203, 650.

These authoritative cases show that it is within the competence of the legislature to confer upon the court of chancery jurisdiction to determine legal questions, in cases so circumstanced that no relief can be given by action at law, at least, and this is as far as it is necessary for me to go in the present case, where it is provided that, on application of either party, an issue at law shall be directed. For if the legislature has the power to thus provide in one class of cases, it must have power to so provide in other classes of cases similarly situated — cases in which there is a similar inability to obtain relief in an action of law. The class of cases provided for in the act of 1896 is characterized by this inability and the case in hand is a strong illustration of its utility. I think that the authorities which sustain the constitutionality of the act to quiet titles are authorities in favor of the constitutionality of the present enactment. I therefore proceed to an examination of the case on its merits.

Complainant’s mother is Mary Lavinia Vreeland. She was born August 22d, 1850, and it is claimed that Jeremiah married her in August or September, 1866. The claimant was born March 21st, 1871, about three years and a half before Jeremiah’s death. There is no doubt whatever that between 1866 and 1873 Jeremiah and Lavinia cohabited to some extent, and the question is whether this cohabitation was matrimonial or illicit. I have a strong conviction that it was illicit, notwithstanding the direct evidence of Lavinia to the contrary.

For the sake of clearness, I will consider, first, the life and character of Jeremiah and Lavinia before the alleged marriage; second, the story of the marriage; third, the life of the parties and their conduct from that time on to Jeremiah’s death; and fourth, the conduct of Lavinia after that time.

And, first, as to their life and character before the alleged marriage in 1866. Jeremiah, or Jerry, as he is called in the evidence, was the son of a fruit dealer, who lived in Essex street, Jersey City, and who had accumulated a considerable fortune. After he left school he appears to have been allowed to live in idleness — whether on account of his health or because of misjudged affection does not clearly appear. It does, however, appear very clearly that the son soon became dissipated. He was a frequenter of saloons and disreputable resorts, and was occasionally found in a condition of intoxication. His comrades were of the same character. One of the witnesses characterizes him as a gentlemanly loafer. In 1866 he was twenty-five years old.

Lavinia Vreeland was the daughter of Nicholas D. Vreeland, a man of respectable family, but of no property. In 1866 she lived with her father and mother in what was then known as Bergen, now a part of Jersey City. Nicholas had three daughters — Kate, Jennie and complainant’s mother. The decided weight of the.evidgnce is that in the year 1866, or about that time, Lavinia and Jennie were regarded by the police.au[372]*372thorities as somewhat fast. There does not seem to be any doubt but that Lavinia occasionally: visited the plumber shop of O’Connor & Pierson, a place resorted to by loose women, and that Pierson enjoyed an unenviable reputation for consorting' with them. It is proper to say, however, tliat there is no-other proof of Lavinia’s misconduct at this period than that which I have referred to. She does not appear to have attended school or to have had any occupation. In the early part of 1866 she was engaged to a respectable young :man by the name of Smith. While so engaged, Pierson brought Jerry to her house, when called there, it is said, to do some-plumbing work, and introduced him to her. Jerry seems to-have been attracted by her beauty, and thereafter visited her frequently, and on several occasions took her out riding in his - father’s carriage. This was so displeasing to Smith that he-broke off the engagement. In 1866 she was sixteen years old.

Second. Lavinia gives the following account of their marriage, which, she says, occurred either in August or September, 1866, and just after her sixteenth birthday:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
44 A. 193, 58 N.J. Eq. 368, 13 Dickinson 368, 1899 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haley-v-goodheart-njch-1899.