Hale v. San Ramon Valley Unified School District

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 12, 2020
• Docket: 4:19-cv-04184
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DARLENE HALE, Case No. 19-cv-04184-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING TO STATE COURT FOR LACK OF 9 v. JURISDICTION

10 SAN RAMON VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 11 Defendant. 12 13 Plaintiff Darlene Hale initially filed this action in Contra Costa County Superior Court on 14 June 9, 2017. Over two years later, on June 21, 2019, Plaintiff amended her complaint for the 15 third time. See Dkt. No. 8-2. Ex. B at 703 (“TAC”). In the operative complaint, Plaintiff alleges 16 that she was employed by Defendant San Ramon Valley Unified School District as a principal for 17 nine years. See id. at ¶ 3. However, in 2014 and 2015, Defendant asked her “to engage in 18 unlawful practices with respect to students with disabilities.” See id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that 19 she resisted these requests, and in response, Defendant harassed her and eventually forced her to 20 resign. See id. at ¶¶ 6–10, 12. On the basis of these facts, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action 21 for: (1) violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5 and (2) “violation of federal statutes.” Id. at 22 ¶¶ 16–21. 23 As part of her first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed and terminated in 24 violation of public policy due to her resistance to unlawful practices. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff listed 25 these allegedly unlawful practices in Exhibit 2 to her complaint. See ¶¶ 17–18, & Ex. 2. As part 26 of her second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant directed Plaintiff to violate the 27 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., including the 1 ¶ 20. She further alleges that Defendant retaliated against her based on her resistance to violating 2 these statutes. Defendant removed this action on the basis of this second cause of action, alleging 3 that it arises under federal law. See Dkt. No. 8. 4 The Court raised its concerns with the parties about whether federal jurisdiction is proper 5 based on these allegations. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 29, 49. And on April 21, 2020, following a 6 discussion with the parties during a telephonic conference, the Court issued an order to Defendant 7 to show cause why the case should not be remanded for lack of jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 47. 8 Both Plaintiff and Defendant responded to the order to show cause. See Dkt. Nos. 52, 53. 9 I. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the federal court would 11 have had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v. 12 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed 13 in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). “If at any time before final 14 judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be 15 remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing 16 federal jurisdiction. See Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 17 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). “The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of 18 removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore–Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 19 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 In response to the order to show cause, Defendant acknowledges that there is no private 22 right of action for money damages under the IDEA for either parents or students, and thus states 23 that “there certainly would not be such a claim available to a non-disabled third-party.” See Dkt. 24 No. 52 at 2. Plaintiff’s second cause of action, therefore, does not state a valid claim under federal 25 law to confer federal jurisdiction. Cf. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 936–37 (9th 26 Cir. 2007) (finding money damages unavailable under IDEA for pain and suffering, but rather 27 only for reimbursement of expenses related to necessary efforts to secure child’s FAPE). 1 California Labor Code § 1102.5, actually provides the basis for federal jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 2 52 at 2–3. 3 Section 1102.5(c) states in relevant part that “[a]n employer, or any person acting on behalf 4 of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity 5 that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a 6 local, state, or federal rule or regulation.” See Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5(c). In support of this 7 claim, therefore, Plaintiff attaches Exhibit 2 to the TAC, which lists myriad provisions of the 8 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as among the 9 “specific federal and state statutes which Defendant directed Plaintiff to violate.” See TAC at 10 ¶¶ 17–18. Both Plaintiff and Defendant note that non-disabled school employees have standing to 11 sue under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA for alleged retaliation for advocating on behalf of 12 disabled students. See Dkt. No. 52 at 2 (citing Barker v. Riverside Cty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 13 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Dkt. No. 53 at 1 (same). But critically, Plaintiff has not sued 14 for retaliation under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. Instead, she has sued under 15 California Labor Code § 1102.5. Merely referencing a federal statute is insufficient to confer 16 federal jurisdiction. 17 The Supreme Court has recognized that in “certain cases federal-question jurisdiction will 18 lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues.” See Grable & Sons Metal 19 Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). Under Grable, a federal court may 20 exercise jurisdiction over a state law claim only if (1) the action necessarily raises a federal issue 21 that is (2) disputed and (3) substantial, and if (4) the Court may entertain the case without 22 disturbing the congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. Id. at 23 314. However, neither party has explained how Plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1102.5 24 implicates any “significant federal issues.” To the contrary, the controversy appears to turn on 25 whether Defendant had a non-retaliatory reason for dismissing Plaintiff rather than on any legal 26 dispute about the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. See, e.g., K2 America Corp. v. Roland Oil & 27 Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that federal question jurisdiction did not exist 1 plaintiff's cause of action relating to the lease did not require the resolution of a federal question 2 of law). 3 Defendant has had ample opportunity to establish why the Court has federal jurisdiction 4 || over this action and has failed to meet its burden. The Court understands that the parties may be 5 || frustrated with the length of time that the case has been pending and the lack of finality, see Dkt. 6 || No. 53 at 3, but the Court has a duty to raise and decide issues of subject matter jurisdiction any 7 time it appears subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Federal 8 || courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and as such, they have no power to consider claims for 9 which they lack subject matter jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 10 || U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 11 || 1. CONCLUSION 12 Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and sua sponte 5 13. || REMANDS the action to Contra Costa County Superior Court. The Court DENIES AS MOOT 14 all other pending motions and the clerk is directed to close the case. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: 6/12/2020

8 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28