Hale v. ICAO

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 26CA0271
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

26CA0271 Hale v ICAO 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0271 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 22759-2025

Angel Hale,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Lipinsky and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026

Angel Hale, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent ¶1 In this unemployment insurance benefits case, Angel Hale

appeals the final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the

Panel) disqualifying her from receiving benefits following her job

separation from Bread Financial (the Employer). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Hale was employed as a Senior Account Specialist for the

Employer from October 2019 until July 2025, when her

employment was terminated. After she applied for unemployment

benefits, a deputy with the Division of Unemployment Insurance

determined that she was disqualified from receiving benefits under

section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. 2025 for failing to meet

established job performance or other defined standards.

¶3 Hale appealed the deputy’s decision. After an evidentiary

hearing, a hearing officer reversed the deputy’s decision and

awarded benefits. The Employer then appealed to the Panel, which

reversed the hearing officer’s decision and disqualified Hale from

receiving benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV) for rudeness,

insolence, or offensive behavior that would not reasonably be

tolerated by a customer, supervisor, or fellow worker. We affirm the

Panel’s order.

1 II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶4 “[U]nemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons

unemployed through no fault of their own.” § 8-73-108(1)(a). For

purposes of the unemployment statutes, “fault” only requires “a

volitional act or the exercise of some control or choice in the

circumstances leading to the discharge from employment such that

the claimant can be said to be responsible for the termination.”

Richards v. Winter Park Recreational Ass’n, 919 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo.

App. 1996).

¶5 Whether a claimant is at fault for separation from employment

is an ultimate legal conclusion that we review de novo. Mesa Cnty.

Pub. Libr. Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17. If

the evidence “arguably might support the application of more than

one section of the Employment Security Act, . . . the Panel has wide

discretion in determining which section it will apply.” Sch. Dist.

No. 1 v. Fredrickson, 812 P.2d 723, 725 (Colo. App. 1991).

¶6 As relevant here, we will uphold the Panel’s decision unless

the findings of fact do not support the decision or the decision is

erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d), C.R.S. 2025.

2 III. Proceedings Below

¶7 Although the deputy initially determined that Hale was

disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for failing to

meet established job performance or other defined standards, the

hearing officer focused on the Employer’s argument that Hale

should be disqualified under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VII). That

section disqualifies a worker who violates a company rule that

“resulted or could have resulted in serious damage to the

employer’s property or interests or could have endangered the life of

the worker or other persons.” Id. The hearing officer concluded

that Hale did not “cause damage to the customer’s experience” and

awarded benefits.

¶8 The Panel disagreed and disqualified Hale from benefits under

section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV). In doing so, the Panel cited the

following undisputed facts: After a customer yelled curse words at

Hale during a phone call, Hale responded, “You and your momma.

I’m done speaking with you. I hope you have the day that you

deserve,” and then disconnected the call.

¶9 The Panel concluded that those comments seriously damaged

the Employer’s interest. The Panel further concluded that Hale’s

3 comments to the customer were not merely unprofessional, as the

hearing officer determined, but were rude and offensive.

IV. Analysis

¶ 10 Hale asserts that her comments were not a serious violation

because other employees used worse language, including profanity,

during calls to customers. But section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV) is not

limited to circumstances involving the use of explicit obscenity or

profanity. See Olsgard v. Indus. Comm’n, 548 P.2d 910, 911 (Colo.

1976) (affirming disqualification from benefits where a claimant was

discharged after stating, in the presence of other employees, that

the next time he was sick he would “puke right in (the owner’s)

face”). Moreover, any alleged misconduct by other employees does

not absolve Hale of responsibility for her own conduct.

¶ 11 Hale further argues that she was in a senior staff position

handling “escalated calls” and that “escalated teams can release

calls when the customer is excessively swearing or . . . sexist,

discriminatory, racist or belligerent.” But Hale did not simply

disconnect this particular call. Instead, as she admitted, she “did

end up losing [it] a little bit, and [she] said, ‘your mama’ because he

kept repeatedly screaming in [her] ear, ‘F you.’”

4 ¶ 12 She acknowledged that, under the Employer’s policy, she was

required to let the customer know that she was disconnecting

before actually disconnecting the call. During the call at issue, she

told the customer, “If you keep swearing at me, I’ll hang up the

phone.” But instead of stopping there and disconnecting, Hale

made the comments noted above. She admitted that she “blew up

at [the customer], said ‘your mama,’ and hung up the phone.”

¶ 13 Hale also admitted that she was aware of the Employer’s code

of conduct, which stated that failing to meet expectations included

treating a customer “unprofessionally.” The code of conduct also

provided that a violation could result in discipline, including

termination of employment. The code of conduct was an exhibit at

the hearing, along with Hale’s acknowledgment that she had

recently read it.

¶ 14 In Davis v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 903 P.2d 1243

(Colo. App. 1995), a division of this court held:

[I]n assessing the reasonableness of an employer’s termination of an employee for behavior implicating § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV), the Panel must consider the facts and circumstances of the individual case to determine, in the exercise of its independent judgment, whether a reasonable person in the

5 position of a customer, supervisor, or fellow worker would have considered the employee’s behavior to have been rude, insolent, or offensive such as not reasonably to be countenanced.

Id. at 1244-45.

¶ 15 Because an objective standard applies to whether Hale’s

comments are disqualifying, we discern no error in the Panel’s

independent judgment that a reasonable person in the position of a

customer would have viewed Hale’s comments as rude, insolent, or

offensive.

¶ 16 Finally, Hale argues that she was disciplined more severely

than other employees and was unfairly terminated rather than

given a warning. But even if true, in the context of unemployment

benefits, the key question is whether “any violation of [an

employer’s] discipline policy” affected Hale’s ability “to act

volitionally with respect to [her] discharge.” Keil v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off. 847 P.2d 235, 238 (Colo. App. 1993). We conclude

that Hale acted volitionally when she chose to respond to the

customer the way she did, rather than according to the Employer’s

policy. See Richards, 919 P.2d at 934 (disqualification from benefits

6 only requires a volitional act or some exercise of control or choice in

the circumstances leading to discharge).

V. Disposition

¶ 17 We affirm the Panel’s order.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.