Halcrombe v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJanuary 22, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-00058
StatusUnknown

This text of Halcrombe v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs (Halcrombe v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Halcrombe v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, (N.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

: T’ANDRA V. HALCROMBE : CASE NO. 1:24-cv-0058 Plaintiff, : : ORDER v. : [Resolving Doc.27] : SECRETARY OF VETERANS : AFFAIRS, : : Defendant. : :

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE:

I. INTRODUCTION This attorney fees motion comes to the Court after Plaintiff T'Andra V. Halcrombe’s accepted a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. Plaintiff seeks $263,992.50 in attorney’s fees and $4,970.34 in costs. These fees arise from Plaintiff’s claims under the Rehabilitation Act, where she alleged that Defendant Secretary of Veterans Affairs failed to accommodate her reasonable workplace adjustments during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court considers the reasonableness of the fees and costs requested. Under the lodestar method, courts calculate attorney fees by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate. While Plaintiff has obtained a favorable outcome through settlement, this Court must balance the need for fair compensation for legal work with an obligation to ensure that such compensation does not exceed what is reasonable and proportionate to the case's complexity and results. II. BACKGROUND At the March 2020 outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff Halcrombe requested a telework accommodation because of an underlying medical condition that placed her at heightened risk for severe illness if she contracted the virus. She supported the request with a note from her treating physician, who recommended either remote work

or medical leave as necessary accommodations to protect her health. Despite the clarity of the request and the provided medical justification, Plaintiff Halcrombe says Defendant failed to address Plaintiff’s need for accommodations. Plaintiff believed that Defendant Veterans Administration failed to sufficiently accommodate her remote-work requests. Plaintiff Halcrombe filed a Veterans Affairs EEO charge alleging that the Defendant Veterans Administration violated the Rehabilitation Act when it failed to accommodate her medical conditions.

In January 2023, the Veterans Administration issued a Final Agency Decision in Halcrombe’s favor on Halcrombe’s first accommodation request but found no discrimination during the FMLA period associated with the time she was COVID infected and otherwise unable to work. The decision recommended Halcrombe receive compensation and receive her attorney fees. In early 2023, Plaintiff made a new Veterans Affairs EEO charge. In her second

charge, Halcrombe complained that the Defendant had not complied with the first Final Agency Decision because it had not paid her lost wages and had not complied because it had not restored all the leave she had used for affected periods. Halcrombe’s second EEO charge was dismissed as untimely. Plaintiff sued the Defendant Veterans Affairs to seek review of the two Veterans Administration EEO cases. As part of Plaintiff Halcrombe’s first Veterans Affairs EEO charge, Halcrombe’s

Attorney Grim gave a declaration to support an attorney fee award. In that declaration, Attorney Grim represented that through January 31, 2023, Attorney Grim had performed 168.3 hours of work. The sworn declaration also said: “my former billing rate of $300. I am asking to be paid at my current billing rate of $400.” Attorney Grim also represented that the: “hourly rate of $400 is reasonable in light of my experience and training and the nature of this case.”

In this lawsuit, Plaintiff Halcrombe claims that Defendant flouted certain back-pay, sick leave, and annual leave reinstatement requirements. Mediation attempts failed, and in July 2024, the VA offered a Rule 68 settlement. Plaintiff accepted the $80,000 settlement offer. The Rule 68 offer allowed Plaintiff Halcrombe to seek attorney fees in addition to the $80,000 settlement. Plaintiff’s counsel, Attorney Nancy Grim, requests fees for 408.95 attorney hours at $550/hour and 112.5 paralegal hours at $250/hour. In response, Defendant contends that

the requested rates and hours are excessive. In support of this Defense argument, Defendant shows that on May 20, 2024, and shortly before Defendant made its offer of judgment, Attorney Grim told this Court that the estimated attorney fees and costs to that point was $119,000 and that estimated discovery would add only $18,000. Attorney Grim gave this estimate after almost all the work on this case had been completed. The Defendant VA argues that the hourly rate should be no more than Attorney Grim’s earlier representation that her rate was $400 per hour, and that Attorney Grim’s now requested $550 per hour rate is not reasonable under market standards in the

Northern District of Ohio. III. LEGAL STANDARD Under 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b), a Rehabilitation Act prevailing plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. The Court uses the lodestar method for calculating fees, requiring courts to multiply the hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.1 In setting the hourly rate, Courts must consider these factors:

1. The time and labor required. 2. The novelty and difficulty of the issues. 3. The skill required to perform the legal services. 4. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney. 5. The customary fee in the locality. 6. The results obtained. A “strong presumption” exists that the lodestar amount is reasonable.2

IV. ANALYSIS A. Hourly Rates Plaintiff’s counsel requests $550/hour for attorney work and $250/hour for paralegal work. She cites to her employment law expertise. True but insufficient to support a $550 per hour fee.

1 , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Plaintiff’s counsel also represents that this case was complex. The Court disagrees. This case’s controlling law presented no complex issues. Instead, this case’s complexity came only from the somewhat tangled historical interplay of Plaintiff’s interspersed

requests for Rehabilitation Act accommodation and Family Leave Act requests, together with a complicating history of Plaintiff not responding to employment offers and both parties not following through on computer use accommodations. Defendant argues the requested $550 rate exceeds market standards, relying, in part, on the 2019 Ohio State Bar Association (OSBA) Report, which lists median hourly rates for employment attorneys as near $300.

While the OSBA Report provides a useful benchmark, the Court finds it insufficient of itself, to decide what is a reasonable fee. Although this case was not legally complex, Attorney Grim brings extensive experience in employment law, and supports an elevated rate. That said, Attorney Grim earlier represented that she was seeking $400 per hour for work on this case. The sudden change with this this fee application undermines her request for more.3 The Court has also considered the testimony of Attorney Subodh Chandra that a rate

higher than $300 should be given for federal fee-shifting employment Ohio cases. But Attorney Grim’s earlier representation that she charges $400 per hour and earlier May 21, 2024 representation that her total fees to that date totaled $120,000 supports finding $400 per hour to be a reasonable fee. But more important, multiple Ohio cases have found this $400 rate range to be a more reasonable rate. , No. 19-cv-1744, 2024 WL 1443280, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2024) (Finding $400 per hour reasonable in employment discrimination case; , No. 17-cv-377, 2019 WL 4071646, at *13 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2019) (Finding $275 - $425 per hour reasonable in

extremely complicated civil rights case); ., No. 18-cv-1557, 2022 WL 1186699, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2022) (Finding $325 per hour reasonable in ADA case); o., No. 20-cv-125 (N.D.

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Halcrombe v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/halcrombe-v-secretary-of-veterans-affairs-ohnd-2025.