Halcomb v. Ocean

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedMarch 6, 2020
Docket8:19-cv-01095
StatusUnknown

This text of Halcomb v. Ocean (Halcomb v. Ocean) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Halcomb v. Ocean, (D.S.C. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

Fred R. Halcomb, Jr., ) Case No. 8:19-cv-01095-JMC ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ORDER AND OPINION Major W. Ocean, Tim Riley, ) Mr. Desousa, Mr. McCade, Dennis Patterson, ) Michael McCall, Bryan P. Stirling, ) Crystal Harrell, Joette Scarborough ) Salley Elliott, SCDC, ) ) ) Defendants. ) ) _____________________________________)

This matter is before the court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”) filed on January 31, 2020. (ECF No. 49.) Within the Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends granting in part and denying in part, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20). For the reasons stated herein, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 49). Specifically, the court DISMISSES (a) Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief; (b) Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief; (c) Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants in their official- capacity; (d) All claims against Defendants SCDC, Patterson, Harrell, Scarborough, Elliot, and Desousa; (e) claim 3 for a Fourteenth Amendment violation based on Plaintiff’s transfer; and (f) claim 4 for an Eighth Amendment violation based on the conditions and method of transporting Plaintiff to Illinois. The only claim remaining before the court is claims 2, wherein Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ocean, Riley, and Stirling subjected him to a retaliatory transfer to an out-of-state prison because he engaged in constitutionally protected activities. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which this court incorporates herein without a full recitation. (ECF No. 49.) As brief background, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed

this action on April 5, 2019, alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) On July 26, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint (ECF No. 21.) and a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20.) On July 29, 2019, the court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on December 6, 2019 (ECF No. 42), and Defendants filed a Reply on December 23, 2019 (ECF No. 47.) On January 23, 2020, Plaintiff’s Sur Reply was entered on the docket. (ECF No. 48.). Plaintiff is a state inmate serving a life sentence for a South Carolina state court conviction. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) After being convicted, Plaintiff was placed in the custody of Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and, at the time relevant to Plaintiff’s claims in this

action, he was incarcerated in the Substantiated Security Risk (“SSR”) unit at the Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”) in Columbia, South Carolina. (Id. at 42.) On August 28, 2017, Plaintiff was informed that he was being transferred to an out-of-state prison in Illinois to serve his sentence pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (“ICC”). (Id. at 41–42.) As a result, Plaintiff was transferred to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and is currently incarcerated at the Statesville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois. (Id. at 42–44; ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff asserts four causes of action in his Complaint. First, he asserts an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment against

Defendants Ocean, Riley, Desousa, McCade, Patterson, McCall, and Stirling (“claim 1”). (ECF 2 No. 1 at 9, 11.) Second, he asserts a First Amendment claim for retaliation against Defendants Ocean, Riley, Patterson, Stirling, and SCDC (“claim 2”). (Id. at 9, 28.) Third, he asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of due process against Defendants Harrell, Riley, Scarborough, Elliot, Patterson, Stirling, and SCDC (“claim 3”). (Id. at 9, 41.) And finally, he asserts an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment against Defendants Scarborough, Stirling, and SCDC (“claim 4”). (Id. at 9, 51.) The Magistrate Judge filed her Report on January 31, 2020. (ECF No. 49.) Within the Report,

the Magistrate Judge addressed each claim within Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Magistrate Judge observed that “in his Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that claim 4 should be dismissed.” (ECF No. 49 citing ECF No. 42 at 3, 41.) The Report also points out that Plaintiff “also consents to dismissal of all official capacity claims except those asserting injunctive relief with respect to Defendants Scarborough and Stirling.” (ECF No. 49 citing ECF No. 42 at 3, 41– 42.) Finally, Plaintiff “concedes that Defendants SCDC and Patterson should be dismissed.” (ECF No. 42 at 4, 57, 62; see also ECF No. 48 at 2.) And finally, he withdraws his request for declaratory relief as to all Defendants. (ECF No. 42 at 42; see also ECF No. 48 at 2.) II. LEGAL STANDARD The Magistrate Judge’s Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no presumptive weight. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Id. at 271. As such, the court is charged with making de novo determinations of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). In the absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report, the court 3 is not required to give any explanation for adopting the Report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note). Furthermore, a failure to file specific, written objections to the Report results in a party’s waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of the court based upon such recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Thus, the

court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). III. DISCUSSION The parties were apprised of their opportunity to file specific objections to the Report on January 31, 2020. (ECF No. 49.) Objections to the Report were due by February 14, 2020. However, objections were due by February 17, 2020, if a party was served by mail or otherwise allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P.

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Related

Mathews v. Weber
423 U.S. 261 (Supreme Court, 1976)
David E. Camby v. Larry Davis James M. Lester
718 F.2d 198 (Fourth Circuit, 1983)
Taylor v. Gainey
203 F. App'x 426 (Fourth Circuit, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
Halcomb v. Ocean, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/halcomb-v-ocean-scd-2020.