Haimdas v. Haimdas

401 F. App'x 567

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: November 17, 2010
• Docket: 10-2532-cv
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Jagmohan Haimdas (“Appellant”) appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Vitaliano, J.) following a bench trial granting Felicia Haimdas’ (“Appellee”) petition for the return of the parties’ two sons to England pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abductions, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,498 (Mar. 26, 1986) (implemented at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611) (the “Hague Convention”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by finding that Appellee has custodial rights. We disagree for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum and Order.

Appellant also argues that the district court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the children. We review a decision not to appoint a guardian ad litem for abuse of discretion. Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir.2003). Here, Appellant’s proffered reason for seeking a guardian — to represent the best interests of the children— was not relevant to the court’s analysis under the Hague Convention. See Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir.2005) (explaining that the best interests of the child are not at issue in a Hague Convention analysis). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion.

Finally, Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion or violated his due process rights by excluding Appellant’s expert’s report and testimony. We review a decision to exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Zaremba v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 F.3d 355, 357 (2d Cir.2004). Appellant characterized his expert as a rebuttal expert and failed to satisfactorily explain to the district court how his expert was qualified to rebut Appellee’s expert. Given the district court’s decision not to rely on Appellee’s expert, the district court’s exclusion of Appellant’s rebuttal expert was neither an error nor a violation of Appellant’s due process rights.

We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.