[Cite as Hahn v. Hahn, 2017-Ohio-4018.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OTTAWA COUNTY
Debbra Hahn Court of Appeals No. OT-16-029
Appellant Trial Court No. 15DR001B
v.
Steve S. Hahn DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: May 26, 2017
*****
Kristopher K. Hill and Thomas J. DeBacco, for appellant.
Michelle L. Christie, for appellee.
SINGER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Debbra Hahn, appeals from a judgment of the Ottawa County
Court of Common Pleas in which the court granted a divorce and awarded her spousal
support. For the reasons that follow, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, and remand
for the trial court to modify its judgment. Assignment of Error
{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignment of error:
I. The trial court abused its discretion in adopting the Appellee’s
argument regarding spousal support and division of benefits.
Facts
{¶ 3} This matter arises from a final judgment of divorce issued on October 21,
2016. The parties married on May 22, 1993, and separated on December 1, 2014. The
parties had no children during the marriage.
{¶ 4} At the time of divorce, appellant was age 64 and appellee was age 65. Since
1999, appellant has been on disability and unable to work as a result of a heart condition.
Appellee financially supported her during the marriage.
{¶ 5} Appellee is a financial advisor and insurance agent, and the record reflects
his income comes from three sources, including a Prudential pension plan (“the plan”).
Appellant testified the plan was started in 2010. The monthly distribution from the plan
was $2,490, until December 2016, at which point the amount would change to $1,694.
Appellee testified that he made the plan “a hundred percent spousal benefit,” so that
appellant would receive payment in the event of his death.
{¶ 6} Prior to trial, the parties entered into a voluntary agreement, which was read
into the record. The agreement, as read into the record, was clear with regard to all
aspects of the parties’ voluntary property division, with the exception of confusion about
the spousal support award.
2. {¶ 7} The record, in pertinent part, reflects as follows:
Appellee’s counsel: Last, but not least, Your Honor, is the issue of
spousal support. I will say we got a little creative with this because of
several issues and retirement plans and everything else, but until the house
is sold, the defendant [appellee] will pay to plaintiff [appellant] the amount
of $2,000 per month.
We also talked about the sum that plaintiff will pay direct—will be
paid directly from defendant, the pension plan amount, and, again, that
changes in December 2016. We will not be utilizing a Q.D.R.O and
defendant has agreed that he will pay plaintiff that sum by the 15th of each
month.
Upon the sale of the [marital] residence, the parties have agreed that
the spousal support will be the sum of $2,700 per month and that award of
spousal support will go until the defendant reaches the age of 71. * * *
Appellant’s counsel: Your Honor, the only thing I would add, just
for clarification purposes, is that the pension, it appears that the number
would be $1,245 per month until December of next year, at which point it
would change to $847. * * *
{¶ 8} After the agreement was read into the record, the court stated that the parties
had seven days to prepare a proposed judgment entry reflecting the agreement. On
January 19, 2016, appellee moved the court for approval of his proposed judgment entry.
3. Two days later, appellant submitted her proposed judgment entry. The proposed entries
differed with regard to the amount of spousal support awarded.
{¶ 9} Appellant’s position was that the monthly spousal support award of $2,000
(eventually $2,700), should not have included the plan’s monthly pension distribution of
$1,245 (eventually $847). Appellee countered that the plan’s monthly pension
distribution should be included in the monthly spousal support award. The court set the
matter for a hearing.
{¶ 10} At the hearing, the magistrate found that the sole issue was whether there
was mutual assent among the parties when entering the agreement. After the parties
testified to his and her understanding of the agreement, the court requested the parties
brief the matter. Despite requesting briefs, the court made note that the ultimate
determination regarding “distribution of property and spousal support” was still within
the court’s discretion, notwithstanding the issues surrounding the validity of the
agreement.
{¶ 11} The magistrate issued a decision finding the voluntary agreement was
invalid due to a mutual mistake. However, the magistrate’s decision also stated that
appellee’s proposed judgment entry was fair and reflected an equitable determination.
The magistrate adopted appellee’s proposed entry in its entirety.
{¶ 12} Appellant objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing the plan’s payment
should not be included in the spousal support award. Appellant claimed if the plan’s
payment was included in the spousal support award, the award amount was not
4. reasonable in light of her expenses. Appellee responded to appellant’s objection arguing
that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings, and that the court should adopt
the magistrate’s decision as final judgment.
{¶ 13} The trial court journalized its judgment relating to appellant’s objection,
stating “[u]pon careful and independent examination and analysis of the Magistrate’s
Decision, the Court finds the Magistrate’s Decision sufficient for the Court to make an
independent analysis of the issues and to apply appropriate rules of law in reaching a
judgment.” The court then overruled the objection and adopted appellee’s judgment.
Appellant timely appealed.
Standard of Review
{¶ 14} An appellate court reviews a trial court judgment awarding spousal support
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Duffy v. Duffy, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-11-019,
2012-Ohio-2808, ¶ 17, citing Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 554 N.E.2d 83 (1990).
Law and Analysis
{¶ 15} In the sole assigned error, appellant argues the court abused its discretion
when it adopted the terms of the agreement she and appellee entered into, despite a
mutual mistake which rendered the agreement void. Appellant further implies the court
erred in the amount of spousal support awarded.
{¶ 16} Appellee contends the court properly reduced the terms of the agreement to
judgment, and that the aggregate award granted was reasonable and supported by
competent, credible evidence.
5. 1. Effect of the Parties’ Voluntary Agreement
{¶ 17} Both parties agree there was never a valid, voluntary agreement entered
into because of a mutual mistake. The magistrate also found there was no agreement due
to a mutual mistake of the parties. However, the trial court’s final judgment entry states
that the parties “entered into an agreement as to all matters in this case, which the Court
finds to be reasonable and adopts as the terms of this Judgment Entry.” See Hahn v.
Hahn, Ottawa C.P. No. 2015-DR-001-B, *2 (Oct. 21, 2016).
{¶ 18} R.C. 3105.171(F)(8) provides that a trial court may consider, in
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[Cite as Hahn v. Hahn, 2017-Ohio-4018.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OTTAWA COUNTY
Debbra Hahn Court of Appeals No. OT-16-029
Appellant Trial Court No. 15DR001B
v.
Steve S. Hahn DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: May 26, 2017
*****
Kristopher K. Hill and Thomas J. DeBacco, for appellant.
Michelle L. Christie, for appellee.
SINGER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Debbra Hahn, appeals from a judgment of the Ottawa County
Court of Common Pleas in which the court granted a divorce and awarded her spousal
support. For the reasons that follow, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, and remand
for the trial court to modify its judgment. Assignment of Error
{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignment of error:
I. The trial court abused its discretion in adopting the Appellee’s
argument regarding spousal support and division of benefits.
Facts
{¶ 3} This matter arises from a final judgment of divorce issued on October 21,
2016. The parties married on May 22, 1993, and separated on December 1, 2014. The
parties had no children during the marriage.
{¶ 4} At the time of divorce, appellant was age 64 and appellee was age 65. Since
1999, appellant has been on disability and unable to work as a result of a heart condition.
Appellee financially supported her during the marriage.
{¶ 5} Appellee is a financial advisor and insurance agent, and the record reflects
his income comes from three sources, including a Prudential pension plan (“the plan”).
Appellant testified the plan was started in 2010. The monthly distribution from the plan
was $2,490, until December 2016, at which point the amount would change to $1,694.
Appellee testified that he made the plan “a hundred percent spousal benefit,” so that
appellant would receive payment in the event of his death.
{¶ 6} Prior to trial, the parties entered into a voluntary agreement, which was read
into the record. The agreement, as read into the record, was clear with regard to all
aspects of the parties’ voluntary property division, with the exception of confusion about
the spousal support award.
2. {¶ 7} The record, in pertinent part, reflects as follows:
Appellee’s counsel: Last, but not least, Your Honor, is the issue of
spousal support. I will say we got a little creative with this because of
several issues and retirement plans and everything else, but until the house
is sold, the defendant [appellee] will pay to plaintiff [appellant] the amount
of $2,000 per month.
We also talked about the sum that plaintiff will pay direct—will be
paid directly from defendant, the pension plan amount, and, again, that
changes in December 2016. We will not be utilizing a Q.D.R.O and
defendant has agreed that he will pay plaintiff that sum by the 15th of each
month.
Upon the sale of the [marital] residence, the parties have agreed that
the spousal support will be the sum of $2,700 per month and that award of
spousal support will go until the defendant reaches the age of 71. * * *
Appellant’s counsel: Your Honor, the only thing I would add, just
for clarification purposes, is that the pension, it appears that the number
would be $1,245 per month until December of next year, at which point it
would change to $847. * * *
{¶ 8} After the agreement was read into the record, the court stated that the parties
had seven days to prepare a proposed judgment entry reflecting the agreement. On
January 19, 2016, appellee moved the court for approval of his proposed judgment entry.
3. Two days later, appellant submitted her proposed judgment entry. The proposed entries
differed with regard to the amount of spousal support awarded.
{¶ 9} Appellant’s position was that the monthly spousal support award of $2,000
(eventually $2,700), should not have included the plan’s monthly pension distribution of
$1,245 (eventually $847). Appellee countered that the plan’s monthly pension
distribution should be included in the monthly spousal support award. The court set the
matter for a hearing.
{¶ 10} At the hearing, the magistrate found that the sole issue was whether there
was mutual assent among the parties when entering the agreement. After the parties
testified to his and her understanding of the agreement, the court requested the parties
brief the matter. Despite requesting briefs, the court made note that the ultimate
determination regarding “distribution of property and spousal support” was still within
the court’s discretion, notwithstanding the issues surrounding the validity of the
agreement.
{¶ 11} The magistrate issued a decision finding the voluntary agreement was
invalid due to a mutual mistake. However, the magistrate’s decision also stated that
appellee’s proposed judgment entry was fair and reflected an equitable determination.
The magistrate adopted appellee’s proposed entry in its entirety.
{¶ 12} Appellant objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing the plan’s payment
should not be included in the spousal support award. Appellant claimed if the plan’s
payment was included in the spousal support award, the award amount was not
4. reasonable in light of her expenses. Appellee responded to appellant’s objection arguing
that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings, and that the court should adopt
the magistrate’s decision as final judgment.
{¶ 13} The trial court journalized its judgment relating to appellant’s objection,
stating “[u]pon careful and independent examination and analysis of the Magistrate’s
Decision, the Court finds the Magistrate’s Decision sufficient for the Court to make an
independent analysis of the issues and to apply appropriate rules of law in reaching a
judgment.” The court then overruled the objection and adopted appellee’s judgment.
Appellant timely appealed.
Standard of Review
{¶ 14} An appellate court reviews a trial court judgment awarding spousal support
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Duffy v. Duffy, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-11-019,
2012-Ohio-2808, ¶ 17, citing Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 554 N.E.2d 83 (1990).
Law and Analysis
{¶ 15} In the sole assigned error, appellant argues the court abused its discretion
when it adopted the terms of the agreement she and appellee entered into, despite a
mutual mistake which rendered the agreement void. Appellant further implies the court
erred in the amount of spousal support awarded.
{¶ 16} Appellee contends the court properly reduced the terms of the agreement to
judgment, and that the aggregate award granted was reasonable and supported by
competent, credible evidence.
5. 1. Effect of the Parties’ Voluntary Agreement
{¶ 17} Both parties agree there was never a valid, voluntary agreement entered
into because of a mutual mistake. The magistrate also found there was no agreement due
to a mutual mistake of the parties. However, the trial court’s final judgment entry states
that the parties “entered into an agreement as to all matters in this case, which the Court
finds to be reasonable and adopts as the terms of this Judgment Entry.” See Hahn v.
Hahn, Ottawa C.P. No. 2015-DR-001-B, *2 (Oct. 21, 2016).
{¶ 18} R.C. 3105.171(F)(8) provides that a trial court may consider, in
determining whether to make and the amount of any distributive award, “[a]ny division
or disbursement of property made in a separation agreement that was voluntarily entered
into by the spouses[.]” This factor is only one among others to be considered under R.C.
3105.171(F).
{¶ 19} Therefore, we find whether the court adopted the terms of an agreement or,
alternatively, made discretionary divisions and awards under R.C. Chapter 3105, to reach
its final determination, has no effect on our review. The trial court was within its
discretion to adopt either or neither party’s proposed judgment, notwithstanding whether
the agreement was enforceable as a contract or not.
{¶ 20} The only error for our review then is whether the amount of appellant’s
spousal support award was reasonable. However, in order to clarify the record, we must
first address the trial court’s judgment relating to the characterization of appellant’s
awards.
6. 2. Characterization of Awards
{¶ 21} R.C. 3105.18(A) defines “spousal support” in relevant part as “any
payment or payments to be made to a spouse or former spouse, * * * that is both for
sustenance and for support of the spouse or former spouse.” Spousal support “does not
include any payment made to a spouse or former spouse, * * * that is made as part of a
division or distribution of property or a distributive award under [R.C.] 3105.171.” Id.
{¶ 22} In this case, the trial court found appellant was entitled to $2,000 a month
in spousal support until the marital residence sold, at which point her award would
increase to $2,700 a month. Included in this award was $1,245, which was to be derived
from the Prudential pension plan. This pension plan payment was set to decrease to
$847, starting December 2016, and continue at that rate for appellant’s lifetime.
{¶ 23} With respect to spousal support, the court’s final judgment states in
relevant part as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that there shall be a spousal support
obligation in this matter as follows:
A. Effective January 1, 2016 and until the marital residence is sold,
Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum due her from the Prudential Plan
and the remaining balance amount to equal a total sum of $2000 per month
as and for spousal support;
B. Upon the sale of the marital residence, Defendant shall pay to
Plaintiff the sum determined due to Plaintiff from the Prudential Pension
7. Plan and the remaining balance amount to equal a total sum of $2700 per
month as and for a spousal support award until Defendant reaches the age
of seventy-one (71).
C. The parties acknowledge that said sum is $1245 per month each
until December of 2016 at which time the sum will then be $847 per month
each from Defendant’s Prudential Pension Plan which he is currently
vested; Defendant shall continue to pay said sum as and for the pension
benefit directly to Plaintiff by the 15th of each month after the term of the
spousal support award and for the duration of Plaintiff’s life.
D. Said spousal support award shall be modifiable and subject to the
jurisdiction of this court.
{¶ 24} Based on the listed assets, we view the $1,245 which would eventually
become an $847 monthly payment as a division and/or distribution from the pension plan.
Per statute, such a distribution cannot be included in or classified as “spousal support.”
See R.C. 3105.18(A), supra. This requires the trial court to modify the judgment entry to
reflect that the spousal support award does not include these amounts. Id. Further, we
find equity requires that the pension plan be subject to a qualified domestic relations
order. See Patten v. Patten, 4th Dist. Highland No. 10CA15, 2011-Ohio-4254, ¶ 16.
8. 3. Reasonableness of the Spousal Support Award
{¶ 25} Appellant argues the amount of spousal support awarded was not fair in
light of her monthly expenses. Appellee counters the aggregate award amount was fair
and equitable.
{¶ 26} Based upon our analysis above, which excludes the pension distribution
from the spousal support award, we find that the trial court awarded spousal support to
appellant in the amount of $1,153 per month which would increase to $1,853 per month
upon sale of the parties’ residence, for a period of seven years.
{¶ 27} In that regard, we are to now determine whether the trial court’s award of
spousal support, for a duration of roughly seven years, was “fair, equitable and in
accordance with the law.” See Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 518 N.E.2d
1197 (1988); Glick v. Glick, 133 Ohio App.3d 821, 830, 729 N.E.2d 1244 (8th
Dist.1999). In making this determination, we must consider the monthly payments
appellant will receive from the pension plan. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a), infra.
{¶ 28} “[T]he nature, amount, duration and terms of payment of spousal support is
controlled by the factors in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1).” Crites v. Crites, 6th Dist. Nos.
WD-04-034, WD-04-042, 2004-Ohio-6162, ¶ 26-27. “So long as the record reflects that
the trial court considered the factors in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), the award for spousal support
will be upheld.” (Citations omitted) Id. at ¶ 27.
9. {¶ 29} R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) factors are stated as follows:
(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not
limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed
under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code;
(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of
the parties;
(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(e) The duration of the marriage;
(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because
that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek
employment outside the home;
(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not
limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;
(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or
earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party’s
contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;
10. (k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking
spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the
spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the
education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal
support;
(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted
from that party’s marital responsibilities;
(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and
equitable.
{¶ 30} Here, we find that the trial court properly considered the relevant factors
under R.C. 3105.18(C), and therefore the spousal support award was reasonable and
appropriate. In the judgment of divorce, the trial court discussed and incorporated facts
which showed it considered the duration of the marriage, the parties having no children,
the parties’ incomes as well as their retirement benefits, social security benefits, assets,
liabilities, and potential lost income production capacity.
{¶ 31} The record reveals the parties married in May 1993, and separated in
December 2014. They had no children together. Appellant was 64 years old and
appellee was 65 years of age at the time of the separation. Appellant was on disability
during 15 years of the marriage and had annual income of roughly $9,000 per year.
11. Appellee’s income was roughly $100,000 from his IRA, the plan and business. Appellant
was awarded her marital portion of appellee’s IRA and half of the plan. Appellee
planned to retire soon, which would decrease his income. Each party had bank accounts
and insurance policies awarded exclusive of the other’s claim.
{¶ 32} Further, the parties shared various vehicles and other personal property,
along with a marital residence, with a mortgage balance of roughly $232,000, which all
were divided equitably in the parties’ voluntary agreement. Appellee was paying the
expenses related to maintaining the marital residence until it was sold, which is why the
court increased the spousal support award upon the sale of the residence. Based on these
facts and our review of the transcripts and testimony, tax forms, affidavits of income and
expenses, and other exhibits submitted on record, we find the $1,153 (eventually $1,853,
upon the sale of the marital residence) monthly spousal support award for a seven-year
duration was reasonable and the findings of the trial court were supported by competent,
credible evidence. Accordingly, appellant’s sole assigned error is not well-taken.
Conclusion
{¶ 33} The October 21, 2016 judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common
Pleas is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and we vacate the order and remand for
the purpose of modifying the entry to indicate the characterizations of spousal support
and divisions of property as stated in this decision. Further, we order the trial court to
modify its judgment entry to reflect that the Prudential pension plan is subject to a
12. qualified domestic relations order, and that such an order shall be entered with respect to
the plan. We further order the trial court to retain jurisdiction as to the spousal support
award. Appellant is ordered to pay costs of this appeal. See App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________ Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE CONCUR. _______________________________ JUDGE
13.