Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc.

28 Mass. L. Rptr. 419
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedApril 20, 2011
DocketNo. WOCV200102367C
StatusPublished

This text of 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 419 (Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 419 (Mass. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

Agnes, Peter W., J.

The defendant has moved in limine to exclude the testimony of Dr. William A. Farone, a witness proposed by the plaintiff. Based upon the memoranda of law submitted by the parties and the presentations made during the hearings conducted on December 15-16, 2010, the areas of disagreement between the parties have narrowed. The defendant is opposed to any expert witness testimony by Dr. Farone regarding the process of nicotine extrae[420]*420tion and tobacco flavorant technology on grounds that his proposed testimony is based on speculation and not data that is of the type that scientists ordinarily rely upon, and that the scientific principles he relies upon are not shown to be reliable. See Mass.G.Evid. §702, Note pp. 205-11 (2011 ed.) (five foundations for the admission of scientific opinion testimony); §703 (bases of opinion testimony by experts). Based on the credible evidence presented at an evidentiaiy hearing conducted by this court, I make the following findings of fact and rulings of law.

BACKGROUND

This is a civil action in which plaintiff, Brenda Haglund (“Haglund”), as executrix for the estate of Stephen C. Haglund, brings a claim for breach of warranty and wrongful death against Defendant, Philip Morris Incorporated (“Philip Morris”), based on a design defect theory.2 This case has been before the Supreme Judicial Court. See Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc. 446 Mass. 741 (2006). The background facts are set forth in the SJC’s opinion and in a subsequent decision by this court denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 205, 2009 WL 3839004 (Superior Court 2009) (Henry, J.).

In Haglund, the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether, in a cigarette product liability case based on a theory of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability for defective design, the manufacturer may assert as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff knew that the product was defective and dangerous, but went ahead and used it anyway. Id. at 749. This defense has come to be known as the Correia defense. See id. at 746, citing and discussing Correia v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 354-55 (1983), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A comment c (1965).

In answering that question, the Supreme Judicial Court made certain determinations and observations that may be relevant to questions yet to be determined in this litigation. First, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that “as a for-profit enterprise and a publicly traded company, Philip Morris seeks to manufacture, market, and sell cigarettes to the general adult public in a manner intended to attract and retain as many consumers as possible. Philip Morris does not dispute that its efforts to market and sell its cigarettes to the broad general adult public is anything other than robust.” Haglund, 449 Mass. at 750. Second, the Court acknowledged that “Philip Morris readily admits, cigarettes are a product that cannot be used safely for the ‘ordinary purposes’ for which they are fit, namely, smoking.”3 Id. Third, The Court noted that the nicotine in cigarettes makes smoking addictive, and that the defendant’s product was designed to cause smokers to become addicted.4 Because there is no such thing as a safe cigarette, the Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that “[t]he social policy that animates the Correia defense—to encourage reasonable use of products by consumers—cannot be accomplished. The legislative intent of our warranty laws would be sidestepped were the manufacturer of cigarettes permitted routinely to escape all liability merely by proving that the plaintiff was an ordinary consumer who used its products in a manner readily foreseeable.” Haglund, 449 Mass. at 751.5

Based on the decision by the Supreme Judicial Court in Haglund and the pleadings and the discovery of which this court is aware, the plaintiffs theory of recovery for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is that when the plaintiffs decedent began smoking, defendant Philip Morris violated the law by making a conscious choice to design, manufacture and market cigarettes with levels of nicotine that were addictive and with knowledge of their dangerous properties when it was feasible for the defendant to have used a safer, alternative design, namely the so-called non-nicotine cigarette. Id. at 747-48 (citations and quotations omitted). In Haglund, the Supreme Judicial Court instructs that in making this determination “the jury must weigh multiple factors, including the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design.” Id. at 748 (quotation omitted).6 Massachusetts law requires that if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing the existence of a design defect, recovery for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability requires her to shoulder a second burden, namely, that the defect was the legal cause of the loss sustained by the decedent. See G.L.c. 106, §2-314.7

More specifically, Haglund alleges that when Stephen Haglund began smoking, Philip Morris could have implemented a “safer reasonable alternative design: a non-addictive nicotine cigarette through nicotine extraction,” and that if it had done so, Haglund would not have become addicted to cigarettes and would not have developed lung cancer.8 The plaintiff s position on the safer alternative design has changed as this litigation has progressed. Since the summary judgment proceeding, the plaintiff has adjusted her definition of the non-nicotine cigarette and now, through her experts, seeks to prove that a cigarette with 0.003 mg of nicotine would not be addictive and it was technically feasible for Philip Morris to have made such a cigarette at the time Philip Haglund began smoking.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Dr. William A. Farone has an undergraduate degree in Chemistry from Clarkson University in New York. He also has a Masters of Science in chemistry from Clarkson. He received a Ph.D. in Physical Chemistry from Clarkson in 1965. See Declaration of Support of [421]*421William A. Farone, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dr. Farone was employed by the defendant from 1976 to 1984. He was employed as an Associate Principal Scientist and then was promoted to the position of Vice-President and was the Director of Applied Research and Development. He holds patents where extraction of chemicals from substances is the key feature. In his work for the defendant, Dr. Farone was involved in some of the defendant’s programs to extract nicotine from cigarettes and to then reconstitute the tobacco leaf into a form that could then be used to make cigarettes with a lower level of nicotine. Dr. Farone has extensive experience in the published research concerning the removal of alkaloids like nicotine from tobacco, and first-hand knowledge of the existing laboratory procedures and industrial processes for the removal of nicotine from tobacco, as well as the procedures in use by the defendant dating back to the time when the plaintiffs decedent began smoking.

Dr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
446 N.E.2d 1033 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1983)
Commonwealth v. Francis
453 N.E.2d 1204 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1983)
Sevigny's Case
151 N.E.2d 258 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1958)
Commonwealth v. Barbosa
933 N.E.2d 93 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2010)
Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc.
29 Misc. 3d 395 (New York Supreme Court, 2010)
Adamo v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
900 N.E.2d 966 (New York Court of Appeals, 2008)
Commonwealth v. Lanigan
641 N.E.2d 1342 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1994)
Commonwealth v. Richardson
667 N.E.2d 257 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1996)
Commonwealth v. Frangipane
744 N.E.2d 25 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2001)
Aspinall v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.
442 Mass. 381 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2004)
Commonwealth v. Patterson
840 N.E.2d 12 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2005)
Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc.
446 Mass. 741 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2006)
Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc.
26 Mass. L. Rptr. 205 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2009)
Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
268 F.R.D. 1 (D. Massachusetts, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
28 Mass. L. Rptr. 419, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haglund-v-philip-morris-inc-masssuperct-2011.