Haggerty v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services

39 Fed. Cl. 588, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 274, 1997 WL 739408
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedNovember 14, 1997
DocketNo. 95-306V
StatusPublished

This text of 39 Fed. Cl. 588 (Haggerty v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Haggerty v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, 39 Fed. Cl. 588, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 274, 1997 WL 739408 (uscfc 1997).

Opinion

ORDER

MILLER, Judge.

Petitioner challenges the special master’s denial of compensation for her child’s neurological injuries under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I — 300aa-34 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-l — 300aa-34 (West 1991 and Supp.1997) (the ‘Vaccine Act”), on the basis that the special master abused her discretion in finding that the vaccine administered to the infant was for measles-mumps-rubella (“MMR”), rather than for diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (“DPT”). Argument is deemed unnecessary.

FACTS

The record reveals the following facts. On April 21, 1995, petitioner filed a claim for compensation under the Vaccine Act alleging that her daughter, Mary Elizabeth Haggerty (“Mary”), suffered an encephalopathy and residual seizure disorder as a direct result of receiving a DPT vaccination administered on May 7, 1993. See Haggerty v. Secretary DHHS, No. 95-306V, slip op. at 1. (Fed.Cl. Spec.Mstr. Mar. 4,1997) (unpubl.). .

After an uneventful pregnancy, Mary was born on November 21, 1991. It is undisputed that she was a healthy baby, who proceeded to develop normally. Mary received her first three DPT vaccinations with no reaction on January 12, 1992, August 12, 1992, and November 23, 1992. On May 7,1993, Mary’s pediatrician, Dr. Edward Reilly, administered two vaccines: an oral Sabin polio vaccination and what the special master found was a vaccination for MMR. It is undisputed that Mary received only one injection. After administering the vaccinations, Dr. Reilly recorded the vaccines and their corresponding lot numbers, “Sab[in polio] 664E6 and MMR 1507V,” in his office notes and in Mary’s official immunization records. However, Dr. Reilly wrote “DPT” in a booklet, distributed by Mead Johnson Nutritionals, that he had given petitioner previously. This booklet contains certain information, such as the child’s height, weight, treatments, and vaccinations. At the commencement of the office visit, Dr. Reilly gave petitioner two information booklets, one for the polio vaccine, the other for the MMR vaccine.

On the evening of May 7,1993, while in the care of her aunt, Mary suffered seizures and was rushed by ambulance to the hospital. The diagnosis was Status Epileptieus. Neurological examinations indicated that Mary suffered an abrupt encephalopathy approximately eight hours after her vaccinations. She remains severely impaired, has the mental abilities of a six month-old infant, and requires constant support.

Petitioner maintains that Mary suffered an encephalopathy and residual seizure disorder [590]*590as a direct result of receiving a DPT vaccination. On September 26, 1996, the special master conducted a hearing to determine which vaccine injection Mary, in fact, had received on May 7, 1993. Petitioner, her husband, and Dr. Reilly testified. After the hearing, both parties submitted expert affidavits regarding the positive results of Mary’s measles-titer test, which was performed to determine if she had developed antibodies against measles (the result of either environmental exposure, vaccination, or both). Special Master Elizabeth E. Wright entered her decision on March 4, 1997, finding that Mary had received an MMR vaccination and thus her symptoms — residual seizure disorder and encephalopathy — did not meet the Vaccine Injury Table criteria for a vaccine-related injury. Haggerty, slip op. at 11. Petitioner declined to pursue an actual causation theory; accordingly, on September 3, 1997, the special master dismissed the petition.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of review

When reviewing a special master’s decision, the Court of Federal Claims is authorized to “set aside any findings of fact or eonclusion[s] of law of the special master found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law and issue its own findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B) (1994). As the Federal Circuit has stated:

“These standards vary in application as well as degree of deference. Each standard applies to a different aspect of the judgment. Fact findings are reviewed by [the Federal Circuit], as by the Claims Court judge, under the arbitrary and capricious standard; legal questions under the ‘not in accordance with the law1 standard; and discretionary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard.”

Saunders v. Secretary of DHHS, 25 F.3d 1031, 1033 (Fed.Cir.1994) (quoting Munn v. Secretary of DHHS, 970 F.2d 863, 870 n. 10 (Fed.Cir.1992)).

The dispositive issue in this case— whether Mary received a vaccination for MMR or for DPT — is a factual finding and thus calls for a review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Saunders, 25 F.3d at 1033.1 The decision of a special master may be deemed arbitrary and capricious only if the special master

“relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence ... or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise^]”

Hines v. Secretary of DHHS, 940 F.2d 1518, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1991) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2867, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)). The arbitrary and capricious standard requires a high degree of deference to the special master’s factual findings. Cucuras v. Secretary of DHHS, 993 F.2d 1525, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1993); Bradley v. Secretary of DHHS, 991 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1993); Hines, 940 F.2d at 1528. A special master also “has wide discretion in conducting the proceedings in a case.” Burns v. Secretary of DHHS, 3 F.3d 415, 417 (Fed.Cir.1993) (citing RCFC App. J, Vaccine Rule 3(b)); Murphy v. Secretary of DHHS, 23 Cl.Ct. 726, 730 (1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 1226 (Fed.Cir.1992).

2. Petitioner’s objections

In challenging the special master’s decision, petitioner makes four objections. First, petitioner argues that in arriving at her decision, the special master overlooked the relevant testimony of petitioner and Mr. Haggerty regarding the identification of the vaccine vial. The Haggertys testified that, after they described to hospital physicians the vial that Dr.

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