Hagedorn v. Reiser

221 S.W.2d 633, 310 Ky. 657, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 992
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedJune 14, 1949
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 221 S.W.2d 633 (Hagedorn v. Reiser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hagedorn v. Reiser, 221 S.W.2d 633, 310 Ky. 657, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 992 (Ky. 1949).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Helm

Affirming.

From a judgment dismissing her intervening petition, the appellant, Yetta Hagedorn, appeals.

Isidore Silver was born about 1877 in the vicinity of Vienna, Austria. He came to Lexington about 1893 where he established a successful business and accumulated an estate of more than $50,000. He died intestate, a resident of Fayette county, on December 24, 1946.

On February 17, 1947, Arthur Lieber, an infant, by his guardian, Harry E. Reiser, filed a petition in the Fayette circuit court against Mary Bauer and her husband . Mary Bauer and her husband filed answer. These pleadings set out that Isadore Silver left no issue surviving him; that his wife, Hannah, had died in 1941; that his father and mother, grandparents and great-grandparents were dead; that he had no brothers; that he had one sister, Machia, who had married Abraham Blaustein; that to the sister was born one child, Rachla, or Rachael, Blaustein; that Machia and Abraham died prior to Silver; that Rachla, or Rachael, married Moses Hanf; that of this marriage were born two children, Rebecca Hanf and Mary Hanf, now Mary Bauer; that Rebecca Hanf married Joel Lieber; that there was born of that marriage one child, Arthur Lieber; that of these collaterals only Arthur and Mary survived Silver; that the decedent, Silver, at the time of his death was the owner of twelve tracts of real estate located in Lexington; that Arthur Lieber and Mary Bauer were the joint owners of the property described; that it should be sold and the proceeds divided equally between them.

Harry E. Reiser, as administrator of Isadore Sil *659 ver’s estate, filed an intervening petition setting out that the aggregate amount of the debts owing by decedent, Silver, is about $5,500; that the value of Ms personal estate is about $1,500, and asking that the twelve tracts of land described be sold; that after payment of all debts and the cost of the action the net proceeds be divided equally between Arthur Lieber and Mary Bauer.

Appellant, Yetta Hagedorn, filed an intervening petition, which she asked be made her answer, setting out that she is a sister of Hannah Silver, the wife of decedent, Isadore Silver; that Isadore Silver was not survived by any grandfather or grandmother or uncles or aunts or their descendants, or any great-grandfather or great-grandmother, or any descendants of any brother or sister or any grandfather or grandmother, or any lineal ancestor or their descendants; that she is the only living sister of Hannah Silver; that Hannah Silver had two brothers, Jake Schubinski and Caesar Schubinski; that she and the descendants of Jake and Caesar, who are now dead, are, under the provisions of KRS 391.010 and 391.030, entitled to recover the entire estate, real and personal, of Isidore Silver.

The descendants of Jake and Caesar Schubinski were made parties. The issues were made by appropriate pleadings. The cause was referred to the Master Commissioner of the Fayette Circuit Court to settle accounts of the administrator of the estate, advertise for claims, and hear proof on all questions of fact involved in the action. After hearing proof, the Commissioner, Honorable R. J. Colbert, filed his report in which he said:

it# # # the hearing before the Commissioner it was * * * insisted by counsel for the intervening petitioner that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff and the defendants, Mary Bauer and Nathan Bauer. The intervening petitioner became a party to tMs action without objection, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 29 of the Civil Code of Practice * * *.
“In the ease of Brown v. Johnson, 132 Ky. 70, 116 S. W. 273, 274 * * *. The court in its decision, said: ‘In the case at bar, Bush intervened, and claimed to be the owner of the property which had formerly belonged to Brown. That being so, the burden was upon him to *660 show ownership, for the rule is well settled that upon issues joined between the plaintiff and the claimant, the burden is upon the claimant to prove the validity of his assignment or the superiority of his title.’
“In the case of Natlee Draft Horse Co. v. Marion Cripe & Co., 142 Ky. 810, 135 S. W. 292, 293, David Orr filed his petition under Sec. 29 of the Civil Code of Practice, alleging that he was the owner of the horse levied upon at the time the action was instituted. The plaintiff asked reversal of a judgment in favor of Orr upon the ground that the court erred in placing the burden of proof upon Orr and in giving his counsel the closing argument. The court, in its opinion, said: ‘The issue between Orr and the appellant was simple and distinct. He claimed to be the owner of the horse, and appellant denied that he was the owner. It seems to us that, if no proof had been introduced, Orr would have failed. Therefore the burden rested upon him to show that he was the owner of it, and this court has so held in the case of Brown, et al. v. Johnson & Johnson, 132 Ky. 70, 116 S. W. 273. Consequently the lower court did not err in that matter. ’
* * The contention of counsel for the intervening petitioner that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff and the defendants, Mary Bauer and Nathan Bauer, her husband, is based upon the fact that the intervening petitioner controverted the allegations of the plaintiff’s petition and the allegations of the Answer and Cross Petition of the defendants. An examination of the pleadings will disclose that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants asserted any claim against the intervening petitioner, and that the intervening petitioner was not even a party to the suit at the time said pleadings were filed. If the intervening petitioner had merely traversed the pleadings filed by the plaintiff and defendants, without asserting any claim to the property involved in the suit, it would have amounted to nothing. A stranger to a suit has no right to question the rights of the parties to the suit unless she asserts that she has some right or claim to the subject matter of the action. Under the pleadings, the burden of proof was upon the intervening petitioner to establish her right to the property described in this action.
*661 ‘ ‘ The intervening petitioner has attempted to establish that Isadore Silver left no relative surviving him and that, therefore, all of his estate passed to the heirs at law of his deceased wife, Hannah Silver. Numerous witnesses have been introduced by the intervenor in her effort to establish this fact. Isadore Silver was closely associated with the members of his wife’s family, and for almost 40 years he lived in the same home with one or more of them. The relatives of the wife, including the intervenor, and numerous other witnesses, testified in substance that they had never heard Isadore Silver mention any relative except his father and a brother. None of the witnesses for the intervenor had ever heard him speak of a sister. Notwithstanding his close association with the members of his wife’s family, it appears that he was not very communicative about his relatives in the country from which he came.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
221 S.W.2d 633, 310 Ky. 657, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 992, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hagedorn-v-reiser-kyctapphigh-1949.