Hagag v. Palmer

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 3, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1735
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RAOOF FOUAD DARWISH MEHESIEN HAGAG,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-01735 (AHA) v.

MATTHEW PALMER, et al.,

Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion

Raoof Fouad Darwish Mehesien Hagag sues to compel the government to make a final

decision on his and his family’s nonimmigrant visa applications. The government moves to dismiss

the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court agrees Hagag has failed to state a claim and

grants the motion.

I. Background1

The J-1 visa program allows people with residence in a foreign country to temporarily

come to the United States to participate in designated programs “for the purpose of teaching,

instructing or lecturing, studying, observing, conducting research, consulting, demonstrating

special skills, or receiving training.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(J). Foreigners apply for a visa through

their local consulate and then interview in person with a consular officer. 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.101(a),

41.102, 41.103(a). After the interview, “the consular officer must issue the visa [or] refuse the

1 As required at the pleading stage, the court accepts the complaint’s well-pled factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in Hagag’s favor. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). visa.” Id. § 41.121(a). If the consular officer concludes additional information could help establish

the applicant’s eligibility, the officer can “refuse” the visa and refer the application for further

administrative processing. Administrative Processing Information, U.S. Dep’t of State,

https://perma.cc/K24G-585C (last visited Feb. 25, 2026).

Hagag was working as a medical fellow in the U.K. and matched with a residency program

at a hospital in the U.S. ECF No. 1 ¶ 5. In April 2024, he applied for a J-1 visa and included his

wife and children as derivative applicants so they could all come to the U.S. during his residency

program. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 17. In May 2024, the family interviewed at a U.S. embassy in the U.K. and,

at the end of the interview, they were told their applications were being referred for administrative

processing. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. Over the next months, Hagag reached out to the embassy periodically

for updates on the applications, and each time he was told that the status remained the same. Id.

¶¶ 25–27. Hagag and his family’s preparations to move to the U.S. have been frustrated by the

delay in processing their visa applications. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.

Hagag brings this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and Mandamus

Act to compel the government to act on his family’s visa applications. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)

(authorizing courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”); 28

U.S.C. § 1361 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform

a duty owed to the plaintiff.”). The government moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

II. Discussion

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

2 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court “must take all the

factual allegations in the complaint as true,” though it is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

A. The Complaint Does Not State An Unreasonable Delay Claim

In cases challenging unreasonable agency delay, “the standards for obtaining relief” under

the APA and the Mandamus Act are “essentially the same.” Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599

F.3d 654, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC,

750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”), the D.C. Circuit identified six non-exclusive factors that

guide the unreasonable delay analysis:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason;

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme

may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in

the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare

are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on

agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take

into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the

court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold

that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv.

Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (recognizing that the TRAC factors are not

exhaustive). These factors “are not ‘ironclad,’ but rather are intended to provide ‘useful guidance

3 in assessing claims of agency delay.’” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir.

2008) (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). Here, the factors favor dismissal.2

The first factor is the “most important consideration” and the second factor “gives content

to the first.” Afghan & Iraqi Allies v. Blinken, 103 F.4th 807, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

They evaluate “whether the agency’s response time complies with an existing specified schedule

and whether it is governed by an identifiable rationale.” Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Int. v. FDA, 74 F.

Supp. 3d 295, 300 (D.D.C. 2014). Here, both factors favor the government. The agency’s response

time is not subject to any specified schedule. At most, Congress has expressed its “sense” that “the

processing of an immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days after

the initial filing of the application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b). That “language is insufficient to set a

deadline,” serving only as an “aspirational statement” and “a ruler against which the agency’s

progress must be measured.” Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344 (cleaned up). The non-binding

congressional aspiration “somewhat favors” Hagag because he has been waiting more than 180

days. Id. But in the absence of a specific deadline, “courts typically turn to case law as a guide” to

assess the reasonableness of a visa delay. Sarlak v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-35, 2020 WL 3082018, at

*6 (D.D.C. June 10, 2020). Courts have recognized “[t]here is ‘no per se rule as to how long is too

long’ to wait for agency action.” In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).

However, they “have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years

are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.” Sarlak, 2020

2 Hagag argues that “analysis of the TRAC factors at this stage of litigation is inappropriate given the incompleteness of the record.” ECF No. 7 at 21. However, the D.C. Circuit has affirmed dismissals of visa delay cases for failure to state a claim based on the TRAC factors. See Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 340–46; Mukkavilli v. Jaddou, No. 23-cv-5138, 2024 WL 1231346, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 2024) (per curiam).

4 WL 3082018, at *6 (citation omitted) (collecting cases). Here, Hagag and his family’s visa

applications were in administrative processing for just over one year when he brought this action

and, even accounting for the time since, the delay is still within the range that courts have found

consistent with a rule of reason. It has not reached the “level of disproportionality” necessary to

tip these two factors in his favor. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344.3

The third and fifth TRAC factors address the interests affected by agency delay, including

whether human health and welfare are at risk. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. These factors favor Hagag.

The complaint alleges significant harm to his and his family’s personal and professional lives

because of the delay. Hagag has already had to delay the start date of his residency by a year, and

he may be at risk of losing the job altogether, after devoting substantial time and money to applying

for the position and making plans to leave his current job. ECF No. 1 ¶ 5. Hagag’s wife stopped

searching for jobs in the U.K. to prepare for the move to the United States, and his children were

already set to leave their schools. Id. ¶ 6. The delay has accordingly frustrated important interests.

That said, Hagag does not allege the type of severe health or welfare threats that could offset the

other factors. See Hajizadeh v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1766, 2024 WL 3638336, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug.

3 This court agrees with the other courts in this district that the reasonableness of delay cannot be determined solely “by reference to some number of months or years beyond which agency inaction is presumed to be unlawful” and can depend on facts such as “the complexity of the task at hand, the significance (and permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the agency.” Jingjing Liu v. Mayorkas, No. 20-cv-654, 2021 WL 2115209, at *5 (D.D.C. May 25, 2021) (quoting Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Courts have accordingly concluded that plaintiffs plausibly alleged the government’s failure to follow a rule of reason when they alleged an agency “arbitrarily and intentionally increased [application] processing times,” Jingjing Liu, 2021 WL 2115209, at *3, or had “no processing queue,” Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2024). Here, although Hagag alleges lack of transparency, he does not allege the absence of a rule of reason. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25, 28, 31 (alleging it is unclear what administrative processing is being done and the agency has given “no meaningful status updates” except that “administrative processing remains underway” and “cannot be waived or expedited”).

5 2, 2024) (concluding that allegations of “severe emotional distress” and significant “visa-related

expenses” did not “threaten Plaintiffs’ physical health and wellbeing in a manner compelling

enough to overcome” the other factors).

The fourth TRAC factor favors the government. This factor asks if “expediting delayed

action” will have a harmful effect on “agency activities of a higher or competing priority.” TRAC,

750 F.2d at 80. The D.C. Circuit has noted the importance of this factor. See Mashpee Wampanoag

Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1100 (observing that the circuit has “refused to grant relief” based on

factor four, “even though all the other factors considered in TRAC favored it”). In the visa context,

compelling agency action is disfavored when relief “would necessarily come ‘at the expense of

other similarly situated applicants,’” with “no net gain” in overall efficiency. Da Costa, 80 F.4th

at 343–44 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016); In re Barr

Lab’ys, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Here, accepting Hagag’s allegations, the most

natural inference is that prioritizing his application would simply reorder applicants, prioritizing

him over others who have been waiting. Compelling the government to complete its processing of

Hagag’s application would therefore simply advantage him over other applicants; there is no

allegation that it would reduce delays more broadly. Because the relief sought entails bumping

others who are ahead in the queue, factor four favors the government.

The sixth factor asks whether the agency’s delay involves any bad faith. TRAC, 750 F.2d

at 80. There is no such allegation here and accordingly the factor is “neutral.” Afghan & Iraqi

Allies, 103 F.4th at 820 (citation omitted); see ECF No. 7 at 27 (explicitly disclaiming any

allegations of “impropriety by Defendants,” and stating that the sixth factor is neutral).

Considered together, the TRAC factors counsel in favor of dismissal here. There is no

denying the “troubling backlog” of visa applications and the way it disrupts the lives of so many

6 people. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344. But under binding precedent, the court must conclude that

Hagag has not stated a claim that entitles him to relief.4

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted and this action is dismissed without

prejudice.

A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: March 3, 2026

4 The government also moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and the nondiscretionary duty requirement for unreasonable delay cases. See ECF No. 6 at 4–11. But “the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is non-jurisdictional.” Baan Rao Thai Restaurant v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020, 1027–29 (D.C. Cir. 2021). And this court follows the approach of others in this district, which have not treated the nondiscretionary duty requirement as jurisdictional. See, e.g., Baygan v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-2840, 2024 WL 3723714, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2024) (assuming without deciding the existence of a nondiscretionary duty and proceeding to analyze the merits of plaintiff’s claims). The court accordingly need not consider these issues because it dismisses Hagag’s claim on other grounds. See Rashidian v. Garland, No. 23-cv-1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *5 n.5 (explaining that courts may proceed to the merits instead of addressing these two threshold issues).