Haffner v. Crane

115 F. 404, 1902 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 18, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 115 F. 404 (Haffner v. Crane) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haffner v. Crane, 115 F. 404, 1902 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1902).

Opinion

THOMAS, District Judge.

The yacht Wanda, on the respondents’ sectional dry dock at Brooklyn, that she might be painted, fell to starboard, as the dock was lowered to discharge her. For the injury re; ceived, the libel is filed. The respondents’ duty was to use the care that a good business man, skilled in the vocation, would observe under the same circumstances. The Wanda was very sharp in form, and the respondents’ care required due consideration of the fact. The evidence shows that the Wanda and two other vessels, known as the “Glen Iris” and “Wilbur,” were similar in shape, and that each of these vessels had [405]*405frequently and safely been raised and lowered on dry docks in New York, held in position only by blocks, without the additional precaution of shoring, and that, as regards the Wanda, this had been done but a few months before. Hence the first conclusion is that the use of shores was not distinctly necessary, nor customary, and that the employment of proper skill and care in blocking was sufficient to protect the vessel. The next necessary conclusion is that, inasmuch as the Wanda and similarly sharp vessels usually are protected by proper blocking, without the precaution of shoring, the fall of the Wanda in the present instance indicates that the respondents’ blocking or handling failed in the result that usually skilled and careful blocking effects. From such history, standing alone, it should be inferred that the respondents were negligent. This inference may be drawn in the present case, not from the sole fact that the Wanda fell, but because she fell when she and others similarly shaped had stood safely. To stand when properly blocked and lowered is the normal condition, and indicates the result of due care and skill; hence her fall is an abnormal result, and indicates lack of due care and skill, in the absence of unusual conditions. This inference would not shift the burden of proof, for the burden does not shift. Certain facts present make a prima facie case for the libelants, which the respondents must meet, but the necessity of producing a preponderance of evidence remains with the libelants. Therefore the next inquiry is, were there other conditions present that should defeat the inference of negligence? Is the evidence in this regard produced by the respondents outweighed by the evidence of the libelants, who have the burden, as well as the benefit, of the inference above stated, and of such other evidence as sustains the charge of fault? The respondents offer evidence which tends, to some degree, to establish that the respondents used due care in ascertaining the kind of blocks that had been used in raising the Wanda by another person in the spring of the same year, when she stood safely; that they carefully and skillfully adjusted such blocks; that they used similar diligence in lowering her; and that the fall was caused by the weakness of the ship’s plates which received the pressure of the blocks. Notwithstanding the evidence of the respondents’ witnesses that the blocks were fitted properly, and that usual and due care was employed in handling, the fact of the fall, when she should not have fallen if due care and skill had been employed, disputes and outweighs the evidence of the witnesses that such care was used, in the absence of other proven cause. But it should be kept in mind that this conclusion is not justified if it appear that some abnormal condition was present in the ship that would not allow properly fitted blocks to be usually effective. This brings the consideration to the respondents’ contention that plates gave way and caused the fall. The learned advocate for the respondents contends that the weight on the plates broke or depressed them; that this caused sufficient jar on the blocks to start them, and thereupon push them to the side of the dock; hence the fall of the vessel was permitted. The argument rests upon three premises: (i) The breaking or denting of the plates before the fall; (2) the consequent jarring of the vessel against the blocks; (3) finally, the thrusting away of the blocks by reason of such jar. Of these three premises, the last is certain, viz., the [406]*406upper blocks were pushed away towards the side of the dock; but whether this was effected in the first instance by a jar from the plate breaking or indenting, or from the giving way of the dogging on the blocks, or other cause, depends upon the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. The alleged evidences that it was caused by the breaking or yielding of the plates are these: (i) The plates were thin, corroded, and feeble in strength; (2) the depressions and cracks in the plates were at, or in proximity to, the place where the blocks had rested when the vessel was in position; (3) the blocks were not in the holes where the wounds were, as they would have been if they had been caused by the bringing up of the vessel at the end of the fall, for the diver was able to place patches over the cracks in the plates, without any raising of the vessel from the position where she brought up; (4) there were no other blocks on the dock on which the vessel fell. This argument is that feeble plates were found broken or indented at or near by the places where the blocks were fitted, but no blocks were found covering the breaks after the vessel fell, as would have been the case had the vessel fallen on the blocks.

Consider the alleged insufficienc)r of the plates, under the proper rule, that the respondents were entitled to assume that the plates were sufficient to withstand the pressure that would come on suitable blocking, with the vessel properly handled. The vessel had been raised with a list of the dock to port (that is, towards the gates that let in the water), and she was lowered with the list to starboard, whereupon she fell. The respondents gave evidence tending to show that the list of the dock to port was a few inches, which remained during the 48 hours the vessel was on the dock previous to the attempt to lower her, •and that in lowering the port list was overcome, and that a similar or perhaps somewhat larger list was given to starboard, and that the port and starboard list was that usually present in raising and lowering. The libelants’ evidence is that the starboard list was greater, by a foot or more, than that described by the respondents’ witnesses. Assuming that the respondents’ evidence is correct, — and it is certainly equal in probative force to that of the libelants, — the vessel was blocked upon an even keel, with an incline of the dock to port, and she was lowered with a similar incline to starboard. That is, the uneven pressure on the port blocks was changed to the starboard side, with what abruptness may only be conjectured from the nature of the maneuver and the manner in which it was done. However, it is shown that vessels are usually and safely raised and lowered with a similar or greater list. It is argued that the port plates were strong enough to withstand the uneven pressure upon them, and the starboard not, although in March or April, 1899 (the accident was on October 24, 1899), 37 new plates had been distributed on both sides of the vessel, and all deemed unsuitable by the examiner had been taken out. Yet upon the present trial he stated that the plate shown him was not a proper one to stay. Nevertheless the fact remains that in the previous March or April, with the same plates, and with what is said to be the same kind of blocking, the vessel was raised and lowered safely. In considering this question, it should be observed that the port plates were not subjected to the strain caused by the changing of the list from port to starboard. She [407]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
115 F. 404, 1902 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haffner-v-crane-nyed-1902.