Haffner v. Crane

115 F. 404, 1902 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226
District Court, E.D. New York·Decided February 18, 1902·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

THOMAS, District Judge.

The yacht Wanda, on the respondents’ sectional dry dock at Brooklyn, that she might be painted, fell to starboard, as the dock was lowered to discharge her. For the injury re; ceived, the libel is filed. The respondents’ duty was to use the care that a good business man, skilled in the vocation, would observe under the same circumstances. The Wanda was very sharp in form, and the respondents’ care required due consideration of the fact. The evidence shows that the Wanda and two other vessels, known as the “Glen Iris” and “Wilbur,” were similar in shape, and that each of these vessels had [405] frequently and safely been raised and lowered on dry docks in New York, held in position only by blocks, without the additional precaution of shoring, and that, as regards the Wanda, this had been done but a few months before. Hence the first conclusion is that the use of shores was not distinctly necessary, nor customary, and that the employment of proper skill and care in blocking was sufficient to protect the vessel. The next necessary conclusion is that, inasmuch as the Wanda and similarly sharp vessels usually are protected by proper blocking, without the precaution of shoring, the fall of the Wanda in the present instance indicates that the respondents’ blocking or handling failed in the result that usually skilled and careful blocking effects. From such history, standing alone, it should be inferred that the respondents were negligent. This inference may be drawn in the present case, not from the sole fact that the Wanda fell, but because she fell when she and others similarly shaped had stood safely. To stand when properly blocked and lowered is the normal condition, and indicates the result of due care and skill; hence her fall is an abnormal result, and indicates lack of due care and skill, in the absence of unusual conditions. This inference would not shift the burden of proof, for the burden does not shift. Certain facts present make a prima facie case for the libelants, which the respondents must meet, but the necessity of producing a preponderance of evidence remains with the libelants. Therefore the next inquiry is, were there other conditions present that should defeat the inference of negligence? Is the evidence in this regard produced by the respondents outweighed by the evidence of the libelants, who have the burden, as well as the benefit, of the inference above stated, and of such other evidence as sustains the charge of fault? The respondents offer evidence which tends, to some degree, to establish that the respondents used due care in ascertaining the kind of blocks that had been used in raising the Wanda by another person in the spring of the same year, when she stood safely; that they carefully and skillfully adjusted such blocks; that they used similar diligence in lowering her; and that the fall was caused by the weakness of the ship’s plates which received the pressure of the blocks. Notwithstanding the evidence of the respondents’ witnesses that the blocks were fitted properly, and that usual and due care was employed in handling, the fact of the fall, when she should not have fallen if due care and skill had been employed, disputes and outweighs the evidence of the witnesses that such care was used, in the absence of other proven cause. But it should be kept in mind that this conclusion is not justified if it appear that some abnormal condition was present in the ship that would not allow properly fitted blocks to be usually effective. This brings the consideration to the respondents’ contention that plates gave way and caused the fall. The learned advocate for the respondents contends that the weight on the plates broke or depressed them; that this caused sufficient jar on the blocks to start them, and thereupon push them to the side of the dock; hence the fall of the vessel was permitted. The argument rests upon three premises: (i) The breaking or denting of the plates before the fall; (2) the consequent jarring of the vessel against the blocks; (3) finally, the thrusting away of the blocks by reason of such jar. Of these three premises, the last is certain, viz., the [406] upper blocks were pushed away towards the side of the dock; but whether this was effected in the first instance by a jar from the plate breaking or indenting, or from the giving way of the dogging on the blocks, or other cause, depends upon the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. The alleged evidences that it was caused by the breaking or yielding of the plates are these: (i) The plates were thin, corroded, and feeble in strength; (2) the depressions and cracks in the plates were at, or in proximity to, the place where the blocks had rested when the vessel was in position; (3) the blocks were not in the holes where the wounds were, as they would have been if they had been caused by the bringing up of the vessel at the end of the fall, for the diver was able to place patches over the cracks in the plates, without any raising of the vessel from the position where she brought up; (4) there were no other blocks on the dock on which the vessel fell. This argument is that feeble plates were found broken or indented at or near by the places where the blocks were fitted, but no blocks were found covering the breaks after the vessel fell, as would have been the case had the vessel fallen on the blocks.

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Haffner v. Crane, 115 F. 404, 1902 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1902).

115 F. 404 (Haffner v. Crane) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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