Haff v. Pilling

134 F. 294, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 5053
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 20, 1905
DocketNo. 12
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 134 F. 294 (Haff v. Pilling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haff v. Pilling, 134 F. 294, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 5053 (circtedpa 1905).

Opinion

HOLLAND, District Judge.

This is a motion for a new trial, for the reasons (1) the verdict was against the evidence; and (2) against the weight of the evidence.

Mr. Haff brought suit for the recovery of damages for the breach of contract into which he had entered with defendants for the delivery of coal. The dispute arose out of the following facts:

On August 20, 1902, Haff made a contract with the defendants for the delivery of 10,500 gross tons of “Sonman Shaft Bituminous Steam Coal,” f. o. b. cars at piers Pennsylvania Railroad Company, South Amboy, N. J., in about equal monthly quantities between September 1, 1902, and April 1, 1903, which would be 1,500 tons per month for seven months, at $2.95 per ton. The contract contained the usual strike clause, and further it was stipulated as follows:

“It is understood and agreed that if there should be a shortage of cars, shipments will be divided from time to time in fair proportion on all orders. Each month’s delivery to be treated and considered as a separate and independent contract.”

The defendants, during the above-mentioned seven months, delivered, in accordance with their contract, to the plaintiff, at South Amboy, N. J., 2,232 tons of Sonman Shaft and 2,117 tons of other kinds of coal, making a total of 4,347 tons; the difference between this and the amount agreed to be delivered under the contract, to wit, 10,500 tons, being 6,153 tons. This amount the plaintiff was compelled to purchase in the open market during that time to fill contracts made by him, for which he was compelled to pay a much higher price.

If the plaintiff be entitled to recover for the failure of the defendants to comply with their contract to deliver this coal, the measure of his damage is the difference between the price he was to pay the defendants, and the price for which he was compelled to purchase in the open market at the last day of each month, for the amount of coal which the defendants failed to deliver according to contract during the preceding month, as the contract provides that each month’s delivery is to be treated and considered as an independent contract. So that at the end of the month, if there was a failure on the part of the defendants to deliver the entire 1,500 tons, and the plaintiff was compelled to purchase any part thereof in the market at a higher price, he would be entitled to recover, if at all, for the difference. From the evidence, we learn that the plaintiff was required to purchase coal in the open market at an advance price for the purpose of supplying the 6,153 tons.

[296]*296According to the plaintiff’s evidence, the amount the defendants were short on delivery, and the months, the tons short, excess of market price, and total amount of excess paid, are as follows:

He, however, only claims damage in his statement to the amount of $12,943.66.

The defendants, in their affidavit of defense, allege that the reason for their failure to deliver the total amount of the coal contracted for was because of “an interruption of transportation, which resulted from a shortage of cars, and other causes entirely beyond their control.” They further claim a delivery to the plaintiff, under the contract, of 4,347 tons, for which the plaintiff owed them $12,718.80, and advance charges on the coal for plaintiff’s account $376.41, making a total of $13,095.21, and, having received from the plaintiff on account the sum of $12,503.38, claimed a balance due of $591.83.

The plaintiff had entered into contracts for the delivery of coal to his customers during the seven months involved in the contract in suit, and to one customer alone (the sugar refining company) he had obligated himself to deliver an amount of coal during the period in excess of that which he had contracted to purchase from the defendant, and in this contract he protected himself against strike contingencies.

The defendants, prior to August 20, 1902 (the date upon which they made the contract with the plaintiff for Sonman Shaft coal), entered into a contract with the Keystone Coal & Coke Company, on August 19, 1902, for 45,000 tons of Sonman Shaft coal, 6,000 tons of which were to be delivered monthly from September 1, 1902, to April 1, 1903, to the defendants; and on August 16, 1902, three days before, the Keystone Coal & Coke Company contracted for 45,000 tons of Sonman Shaft coal, to be shipped and delivered at the rate of 6,000 tons per month up to April 1, 1903; so that the defendants had contracts for sufficient coal to supply all their customers with whom they had contracted, as they allege, had they not been prevented from the performance thereof by reason of the' shortage of cars. In support of their defense, they call officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and establish the fact that Sonman Shaft Coal Company was rated at 35 cars per day, and that they were unable to, and did not, furnish more than 7 per day, as there was a strike in the anthracite coal region, which largely increased the demand for soft coal, and the railroad company was un[297]*297able to supply sufficient transportation to meet the increased demand. The defendants also showed they had sent a man specially employed by them to the mines, for the purpose of watching the number of cars received, in order that they might get their share of the coal shipped from Sonman Shaft; and they further testified that they called upon the railroad officials to ascertain whether or not more cars could not be had, but they were unsuccessful in obtaining them. There were shipped, however, to the defendants, Sonman Shaft coal to the amount of 10,864 tons, of which 9,383 tons reached South Amboy in cars in which it could be delivered there, and the defendants were not responsible for the failure of a delivery there of the remainder of this coal.

At the time this contract with the plaintiff was running, the defendants claim they had obligated themselves, during the same period, to deliver 14,000 tons of Sonman Shaft coal to Parrish, Phillips & Co., and 7,000 tons to Benedict, Downs & Co., and that, in accordance with their contract, that, in case of a shortage of cars, shipments would be divided from time to time in fair proportions on all orders, they were, m law, required to apportion the 9,383 tons to these customers, of the ■^oal available for supplying contracts, in proportion to the amounts contracted for to these three parties, which defendants claim they actually did. The contracts, however, with Parrish, Phillips & Co. and Benedict, Downs & Co., showed upon their face that they were contracts for the delivery of Nonpareil coal; and the defendants offered evidence to show that, while the contracts called for Nonpareil, they were obliged to deliver Sonman Shaft. No witness, however, of either the firm of Parrish, Phillips & Co. or Benedict, Downs & Co., was called for the purpose of corroborating the claim of the defendants; and the plaintiff insisted that the written contract was to prevail, and that neither of these parties had any right to share in the 9,383 tons of Sonman Shaft coal which the defendants shipped to South Amboy, N. J.

It was established that there was much more Sonman Shaft coal mined and shipped than had been received by the defendants at South Amboy, and it was contended by the plaintiff that the defendants could have secured cars and purchased this Sonman Shaft coal in the open market to comply with the conditions of the contract, if they had made an effort and paid some advance therefor.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
134 F. 294, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 5053, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haff-v-pilling-circtedpa-1905.