Hafen v. Evans

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedAugust 9, 2021
Docket2:19-cv-00895
StatusUnknown

This text of Hafen v. Evans (Hafen v. Evans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hafen v. Evans, (D. Utah 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

JONATHAN O. HAFEN, as Court-appointed Receiver,

Plaintiff, ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Case No. 2:19-cv-00895-TC WALTER EVANS, NYLA EVANS, and MICHAEL WILLIAMS Judge Tena Campbell Defendants.

In this ancillary action to Commodity Futures Trading Commission et al v. Rust Rare Coin et al, 2:18-cv-00892-TC-DBP, Plaintiff Jonathan O. Hafen (the Receiver) moves the court for partial summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the Receiver’s motion (ECF No. 30) in part and denies it in part. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On November 13, 2018, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the Utah Division of Securities (“UDOS”) initiated a civil enforcement action against Rust Rare Coin, Inc. (“RRC”), Gaylen Dean Rust, and affiliated individuals and entities (collectively, the “Receivership Defendants”). Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Rust Rare Coin, Inc., Civil No. 2:18-cv-00892-TC-DBP (D. Utah Nov. 13, 2018) (ECF No. 1) (the “Enforcement Action”). The CFTC and UDOS alleged that the Receivership Defendants contrived a silver investment opportunity (the “Silver Pool”) through which Receivership Defendants purported to generate returns for investors through the buying and selling of physical silver. The CFTC and UDOS also alleged that—rather than a legitimate investment opportunity—the Silver Pool was a Ponzi scheme. The court appointed Mr. Hafen as Receiver for the assets of the Receivership Defendants. (See Enforcement Action, (ECF Nos. 22, 54).) The Receiver was charged with, among other

things, investigating the financial and business affairs of Receivership Defendants and recovering all assets of the Receivership Estate. The Receiver initiated the present ancillary action to recover funds transferred to Defendants by Receivership Defendants. (See Compl. (ECF No. 2).) On May 14, 2021, the Receiver filed a partial motion for summary judgment, asking the court to make three findings: (1) that the Receivership Defendants operated the Silver Pool investment scheme since at least 2008; (2) that the Silver Pool operated not as a legitimate investment opportunity but instead as a classic Ponzi scheme; (3) and that Defendants Nyla Evans, Walter Evans, and Michael Williams received money and precious metals from RRC in excess of the amount they invested, as follows:

• Nyla and Walter Evans made payments to RRC totaling $152,267.79; • Nyla and Walter Evans received cash from RRC totaling $150,778.69; • Nyla and Walter Evans received 6,270 Silver Eagle coins from RRC with a value of $131,356.50; and • Mr. Williams made no payments to RRC and received $46,417.08 from RRC totaling. (See Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 2 (ECF No. 30).) As exhibits in support of his motion, the Receiver submitted his own expert declaration

(Hafen Decl.), as well as expert reports from Jeffrey T. Shaw (Shaw Decl.), D. Ray Strong (Strong Report), and Ian Russel (Russel Decl.). The experts were retained to assist with the investigation and administration of the Receivership estate. Mr. Hafen’s declaration incorporated and relied upon an attached report (the Receiver’s Report), which was issued in the Enforcement Action. The Receiver’s Report details Mr. Hafen’s

extensive investigation into the business operations and financial condition of Receivership Defendants and summarizes the key findings of that investigation. Attached to the Receiver’s report are hundreds of pages of exhibits and appendices containing the documents on which Mr. Hafen bases his conclusions. These exhibits and appendices were filed under seal in the Enforcement Action, but they were not filed in the present case in order to avoid the filing of duplicative voluminous exhibits in all of the ancillary lawsuits to the Enforcement Action. The Receiver did produce these materials to Defendants on a hard disc and through an online database. (See Pl.’s Reply Ex. H (ECF No. 35-1).) Defendants also retained an expert, Brett Johnson, and submitted his expert report (Johnson Report) in opposition to the Receivers’ motion. In his report, Mr. Johnson examined

the Mr. Strong and Mr. Shaw’s calculations and opinions. DISCUSSION I. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate “when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lints v. Graco Fluid Handling (A) Inc., 347 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1002 (D. Utah 2018); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In applying this standard, the Court “view[s] the factual record and draw[s] all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to the nonmovant.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). II. Ponzi Schemes in the Context of Utah’s Uniform Voidable Transactions Act Under Utah law, a transfer is voidable under the Act “if the debtor made the transfer . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” Utah Code § 25-6- 202(1)(a). The Act allows a creditor to obtain “avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the

extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.” Id. § 25-6-303(1)(a); see also id. § 25-6- 304(2)(a) (“[T]o the extent a transfer is avoidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25- 6-303(1)(a), . . . the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred.”). In the context of a Ponzi scheme, this court has stated that “the mere existence of a Ponzi scheme is sufficient to establish a defendant’s actual intent to defraud.” Klein v. Nelson, No. 2:13-cv-497-TC, 2015 WL 4545748, at *2 (D. Utah July 28, 2015); see also Wing v. Dockstader, 482 F. App’x 361, 363 (10th Cir. 2012) (same); In re Indep. Clearing House, 77 B.R. 843, 860 (D. Utah 1987) (“One can infer an intent to defraud future undertakers from the mere fact that a debtor was running a Ponzi scheme. Indeed, no other reasonable inference is possible.”). “[A] receiver of an entity which was used to perpetrate a Ponzi scheme has standing to recover

fraudulent transfers as though the receiver were a creditor of the scheme.” Dockstader, 482 F. App’x at 363, adopting the reasoning of Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 753–55 (7th Cir. 1995). Once a plaintiff establishes that the debtor operated as a Ponzi scheme, all transfers by the debtor entity are presumptively fraudulent and are subject to avoidance. See Nelson, 2015 WL 4545747, at *2. The recipient of funds from the Ponzi scheme then bears the burden of demonstrating that (1) the funds were received in good faith and (2) in exchange for reasonably equivalent value. See Klein v. King & King & Jones, P.C., No. 2:12-CV-00051, 2013 WL 4498831, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 19, 2013). “It is well established that an investor in a Ponzi scheme does not exchange reasonably equivalent value for payments which exceed the investor’s investments.” Miller v. Wulf, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1274 (D. Utah 2015); see also Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 777 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that amounts above “the innocent investor’s initial outlay . . . are merely used to keep the fraud going by giving the false impression that the

scheme is a profitable, legitimate business,” and “[t]hese amounts are not a ‘reasonably equivalent’ exchange for the defrauded investor’s initial outlay”); Scholes v. Ames, 850 F. Supp. 707, 715 (N.D. Ill.

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Related

Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
144 F.3d 664 (Tenth Circuit, 1998)
Wing v. Dockstader
482 F. App'x 361 (Tenth Circuit, 2012)
Donell v. Kowell
533 F.3d 762 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Scholes v. Ames
850 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Illinois, 1994)
Klein v. Cornelius
786 F.3d 1310 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
Scholes v. Lehmann
56 F.3d 750 (Seventh Circuit, 1995)
Jobin v. McKay
84 F.3d 1330 (Tenth Circuit, 1996)
Miller v. Wulf
84 F. Supp. 3d 1266 (D. Utah, 2015)
Lints v. Graco Fluid Handling (A) Inc.
347 F. Supp. 3d 990 (D. Utah, 2018)

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Hafen v. Evans, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hafen-v-evans-utd-2021.