[Cite as Haery v. Spaeth, 2025-Ohio-5801.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
TRENT HAERY, : CASE NO. CA2024-07-054 Appellant, : OPINION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY - vs - 12/30/2025 :
JAMES L. SPAETH, CLERK OF : COURTS, WARREN COUNTY, OHIO : Appellee.
CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 24-CV-096913
Brunner Quinn, and Rick L. Brunner, Patrick M. Quinn, and Hannah Fard for appellant.
Fishel Downey Albrecht Riepenhoff LLC, and David C. Moser and Makenzie E. McAfee, for appellee.
____________ OPINION
BYRNE, J.
{¶ 1} Trent Haery appeals from the decision of the Warren County Court of
Common Pleas, General Division, which dismissed his complaint against James L. Warren CA2024-07-054
Spaeth, in his official capacity as the elected Clerk of Courts of Warren County, Ohio ("the
Clerk").1 For the reasons described below, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} This case was resolved on the pleadings pursuant to a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
motion to dismiss. The following facts are derived from the complaint and any attached
exhibits and are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. Fontain v. H&R Cincy Properties,
L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-1000, ¶ 55 (12th Dist.) ("In ruling on a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6),
the trial court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.").
{¶ 3} Haery was one of multiple financial crime victims in two criminal
prosecutions in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas. The total loss to the victims
was approximately $800,000. The defendants in the two cases paid $300,000 in partial
restitution. In November 2023, the Warren County Court of Common Pleas issued a
restitution order directing distribution of the $300,000 to the various victims, on a pro rata
basis.
{¶ 4} According to the court's restitution order, Haery's pro rata share of restitution
was $15,075.38. Shortly after the court issued its restitution order, the Clerk issued two
restitution checks to Haery totaling the incorrect amount of $40,000.00, rather than the
correct $15,075.38 amount ordered by the court. In fact, the Clerk erroneously issued to
multiple crime victims restitution checks in amounts that were inconsistent with the
amounts stated in the restitution order. As a result, some crime victims received more
than they were entitled to, and some received less.
1. James L. Spaeth ended his term as Warren County Clerk of Courts in January 2025. Spaeth was replaced by a newly-elected clerk, Breighton Smith. Spaeth, not Smith, was the Clerk during the events at issue in this appeal. -2- Warren CA2024-07-054
{¶ 5} When Haery received the restitution checks he contacted the Clerk's office.
The Clerk's office confirmed to Haery that the checks had been issued to him and that
the amount of the payments he received, $40,000.00, was correct. Haery then deposited
the restitution checks into his personal bank account. He began issuing checks of his
own, spending the deposited restitution money he received from the Clerk.
{¶ 6} Unbeknownst to Haery, the Clerk's office discovered it had issued restitution
checks to the various crime victims in incorrect amounts, and, on December 4, 2023, the
Clerk issued stop-payment orders on the two incorrect restitution checks issued to Haery.
{¶ 7} On December 6, 2023, the Clerk contacted Haery by email notifying him of
the error and the stop-payment order. However, as stated above, Haery had already
issued personal checks spending some of the deposited restitution money. According to
Haery, his personal bank account "went from a positive balance of $22,00[0].00 to a
negative balance of [$]18,000.00 as a result of the stop payment order" as of December
10, 2023. According to a later trial court entry, the Clerk eventually paid Haery $9,436.36.
{¶ 8} In January 2024, Haery filed a complaint against the Clerk, asserting five
causes of action based on the above facts. In Count One, Haery alleged that the two
restitution checks were "wrongfully dishonored" without timely notice to Haery. In Count
Two, Haery alleged that the Clerk acted with reckless disregard and/or negligence by
treating him "worse or disparately" from other victims. In Count Three, Haery alleged that
the Clerk intentionally caused him injury by failing to notify him of the stop-payment order
and by treating him worse or disparately from other victims. In Count Four, Haery alleged
entitlement to specific performance and "payment for full face amounts of the checks." In
Count Five, Haery alleged that the Clerk's actions had "slandered the credit and/or
damaged the credit standing of [Haery]." In sum, Haery demanded a money judgment
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against the Clerk exceeding $25,000, specific performance (delivery of the original
restitution check amounts), attorney fees, interest, and court costs.
{¶ 9} The Clerk moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The
Clerk made two main arguments. First, the Clerk argued that Haery's Complaint failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted because none of the five causes of action
described in the Complaint were cognizable claims supported by any statute or common
law doctrine. Second, the Clerk argued that, even if Haery did state one or more
cognizable claims, he and his office were entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial
immunity from those claims. In support, the Clerk argued that the actions of issuing
checks for court-ordered restitution arose out of the performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial activities and that court clerks have absolute immunity for these activities under
well-settled law.
{¶ 10} Haery filed a memorandum opposing the Clerk's motion to dismiss. In
response to the Clerk's first argument, Haery argued that his complaint set forth
cognizable claims in sufficient particularity to meet the requirements of notice pleading.
In response to the Clerk's immunity argument, Haery argued that the actions of issuing a
check and ordering a stop-payment were purely ministerial and clerical acts and were not
related to judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, he argued, the Clerk's office was
not entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity.
{¶ 11} The trial court granted the Clerk's motion to dismiss. The court found that
Haery "fail[ed] to set forth in requisite detail what his causes of action are" and found that
"none of [Haery's] so-called claims constitutes a cognizable cause of action" under Ohio
law. Next, with respect to the immunity question, the court found that the payment of
restitution to a crime victim was a judicial function or quasi-judicial function for which the
Clerk was entitled to immunity. The court noted that the common pleas court had given
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the Clerk specific instructions as to how restitution funds were to be distributed to each of
the victims. The court found that the Clerk was engaged in the performance of the court's
functions and was therefore entitled to absolute immunity.
{¶ 12} Haery appealed, raising a single assignment of error.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 13} Haery's assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS WHERE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LIABILITY ON A DISHONORED NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, AND WHERE APPELLEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY.
{¶ 14} Haery argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint. First, he
argues that the complaint did state a cognizable claim for relief. He bases this argument
on a theory first referred to in his memorandum opposing the Clerk's motion to dismiss
and greatly expanded in his appellate briefing. He asserts that his five claims were based
on the theory that the Clerk, by stopping payment on the restitution checks and not paying
those amounts to Haery, violated requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code, codified
in Ohio state law in R.C. Ch. 1303. Second, Haery argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that the Clerk was entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. Haery argues
that the Clerk's purely ministerial act of "writing a check that is dishonored or causing a
check to be dishonored, is not an act performed exclusively by judicial officers, and he is
therefore not protected by immunity for doing the same thing that millions of private
citizens or businesses do each day."
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 15} Civ.R. 12(B)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Marchetti v. Blankenburg, 2011-Ohio-2212, ¶ 9
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(12th Dist.). "In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, 'it must appear beyond doubt
from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling relief.'" Id., quoting
DeMell v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2007-Ohio-2924, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). In ruling on a
complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the trial court must presume that all factual allegations
in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). But unsupported legal
conclusions are not accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Schulman v.
Cleveland, 30 Ohio St.2d 196, 198 (1972).
{¶ 16} "A trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
is subject to de novo review on appeal." BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Kolenich,
2011-Ohio-3345, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.). This court must independently review the complaint to
determine the appropriateness of the trial court's dismissal. Id.
B. Analysis: Immunity
{¶ 17} We begin with the question of immunity. There are two different sources of
immunity potentially relevant in this case.
{¶ 18} First, federal and Ohio state courts, applying common law principles, have
long applied immunity to judicial and quasi-judicial government actors. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained that "It is well established that judges
and other court officers enjoy absolute immunity from suit on claims arising out of the
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions." Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417
(6th Cir. 1988). Accord Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1973) (applying
immunity to clerk of municipal court with respect to quasi-judicial duties); Fish v. Murphy,
22 Fed. Appx. 480, 482 (6th Cir. 2001) (defendant-appellant was sued "in his capacity as
court clerk performing a quasi-judicial function and, as such, is entitled to a grant of
absolute immunity from a suit for monetary damages"). Likewise, the Supreme Court of
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Ohio has explained that "It is well-settled that a judge is immune from civil liability for
actions taken in his judicial capacity when jurisdiction is proper" and other government
parties—including a clerk of courts—"also enjoy a similar immunity." Kelly v. Whiting, 17
Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1985). Accord Wholesale Elec. & Supply, Inc. v. Robusky, 22 Ohio
St.2d 181 (1970), syllabus ("A ministerial officer of a court and those acting under him
and at his direction are immune from liability for any damages flowing from their
obedience to process issued to such officer which appears prima facie regular and to
have been issued by a tribunal possessing judicial powers with apparent jurisdiction to
issue the same.").
{¶ 19} Second, the General Assembly enacted similar protections to those existing
at common law in the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act of 1985, codified at R.C.
2744.01, et seq. The act provides that "a political subdivision is not liable in damages in
a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or
omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in
connection with a governmental or proprietary function." R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). "Political
subdivision" is defined to include a "county," and "employee" is defined to include "an
officer, agent, employee, or servant . . . authorized to act and is acting" within the scope
of their employment by a political subdivision, and also includes "any elected or appointed
official of a political subdivision." R.C. 2744.01(B), (F). Thus "the political-subdivision-
immunity analysis set forth in R.C. 2744.02 applies to lawsuits in which the named
defendant holds an elected office within a political subdivision, and that officeholder is
sued in his or her official capacity," including a county clerk of courts. Lambert v. Clancy,
2010-Ohio-1483, ¶ 22. As a result, political subdivision immunity often applies to county
clerks of court—like the Clerk in this case—and it would be reasonable to expect that this
statute would have been discussed by the parties and trial court in this case.
-7- Warren CA2024-07-054
{¶ 20} But the parties in their trial court motion practice and appellate briefing, and
the trial court in its decision/entry granting the Clerk's motion to dismiss, spoke about
immunity generally, rather than specifically. As a result, during our initial review of this
appeal, we determined that we needed additional information about the potential
applicability of Chapter 2744 political subdivision immunity. We issued an entry requiring
supplemental briefing on two questions: "Whether the political subdivision immunity
framework set forth in R.C. Chapter 2744 governs this appeal; and (2) Whether the Clerk
is or is not immune from liability under the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2744." The parties
filed supplemental briefs addressing these questions.
{¶ 21} In his supplemental brief, Haery argued that the Clerk "has waived any
argument based upon [R.C. Ch. 2744] statutory immunity by virtue of failing to raise it at
the earliest possible opportunity," and that even if it were not waived, "it was still plainly
never raised below or passed on by the trial court, and therefore does not serve as a
basis for decision by this Court." We must address Haery's waiver argument before
considering the merits of Chapter 2744 political subdivision immunity.
{¶ 22} During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio was
considering an appeal in a different case that involved the question of waiver of Chapter
2744 immunity. Our analysis of waiver is significantly aided by the supreme court's very
recently-issued opinion in that case. In Durig v. Youngstown, 2025-Ohio-4719, the
supreme court explained that "political-subdivision immunity under R.C. Ch. 2744 is well
established as an affirmative defense and must be specifically asserted in a timely fashion
to avoid waiver." Id. at ¶ 17. Accord id. at ¶ 19, quoting Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v.
Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 2013-Ohio-2410, ¶ 17. The supreme court further
explained that "[b]ecause R.C. Ch. 2744 immunity holds the possibility of a complete
defense, a political subdivision must raise R.C. Ch. 2744 immunity in its first responsive
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pleading under Civ.R. 8(C)." Id. at ¶ 20. Such a responsive pleading may include (1) a
Civ.R. 12(B) motion to dismiss, (2) an answer to a complaint, or (3) an amended answer
to a complaint. Id. at ¶ 33 (describing the immunity defense as being raised in "a
prepleading motion under Civ.R. 12(B), affirmatively in a responsive pleading under Civ.R.
8(C), or by amendment under Civ.R. 15").
{¶ 23} As stated above, Haery argues that the Clerk did not raise Chapter 2744
political-subdivision immunity in the Clerk's motion to dismiss, or anywhere else. Haery is
correct that the Clerk did not explicitly cite Chapter 2744 in the Clerk's motion to dismiss.
But Haery is incorrect in concluding that the Clerk did not refer to Chapter 2744 at all in
the Clerk’s motion to dismiss. In fact, the Clerk repeatedly discussed the concept of
"absolute quasi-judicial immunity," while citing multiple federal and state cases. Some of
those cited cases, like Foster, Denman, and Kelly (discussed above), discuss common
law judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. But two cases cited by the Clerk in the motion to
dismiss discussed and applied Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity. In the first of
those cases, Harper v. New Philadelphia Municipal Court, 1995 WL 347863 (10th Dist.
June 8, 1995), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's application of Chapter 2744
political-subdivision immunity to a malicious prosecution claim brought against a
municipal court clerk. Id. at *3. The court of appeals also applied Chapter 2744 political-
subdivision immunity to a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought against
a county sheriff. Id. at *5. In the second case, Blankenship v. Enright, 67 Ohio App.3d 303
(10th Dist. 1990), the court of appeals held that Chapter 2744 political-subdivision
immunity rendered a clerk of courts immune from a claim of negligence for wrongful arrest
and incarceration for a period of four days. Id. at 304-305, 311-312. Despite the Clerk's
citation of these cases in the motion to dismiss, Haery ignored Chapter 2744 political-
subdivision immunity in his memorandum opposing the Clerk's motion to dismiss. In the
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Clerk’s reply memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, the Clerk pointed out that
Haery relied on case law "rendered inapplicable" by Chapter 2744 political-subdivision
immunity and explicitly argued that Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity barred
Haery's claims.
{¶ 24} While it would have been preferable for the Clerk to explicitly cite Chapter
2744 in his motion to dismiss, we find that the Clerk did raise that form of immunity in a
"clear, affirmative manner" by explicitly referring to judicial and quasi-judicial immunity
and by citing Harper and Blankenship, which both discussed and applied Chapter 2744
political-subdivision immunity. Durig, 2025-Ohio-4719 at ¶ 33. As a result, the Clerk did
not waive Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity. See id. at ¶ 20. Thus, even though
the trial court did not discuss Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity in its decision
and entry, and even though the parties did not discuss it in their initial appellate briefs, the
issue of Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity was before the trial court, and we
may address it in this appeal. See id. We therefore turn now to the question of whether
Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity applied to Haery's claims against the Clerk.
{¶ 25} The extent and limits of political-subdivision immunity are fleshed out by
Chapter 2744 of the Revised Code, which "establishes a three-tiered analysis for
determining whether a political subdivision is immune from tort liability." Conaway v. Mt.
Orab, 2024-Ohio-36, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). This analysis includes the general definition in R.C.
2744.02(A), five exceptions to immunity listed in R.C. 2744.02(B), and defenses to liability
that can reinstate immunity when an exception to immunity would otherwise apply, which
defenses are described in R.C. 2744.03. Conaway at id.
{¶ 26} In the first-tier, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) sets forth the basic premise of the
political subdivision immunity law. Subject to certain exceptions,
a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action
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for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.
Under the first tier of the analysis, the Clerk's office is presumptively not liable for
damages for any losses suffered by Haery. This immunity applies whether the actions or
omissions by the Clerk were connected with "proprietary functions" or "governmental
functions." R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).
{¶ 27} "The second tier of the analysis focuses on the five exceptions to immunity
listed in R.C. 2744.02(B), which can expose the political subdivision to liability." Smith v.
McBride, 2011-Ohio-4674, ¶ 14. Relevant to this appeal, one of these exceptions, found
in R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), provides that political subdivisions are liable for loss caused by the
"negligent performance" of acts by their employees with respect to the "proprietary
functions" of the political subdivision.2 Note that the exceptions to immunity do not include
negligent performance of "governmental functions." R.C. 2744.02(B). Thus, if the act of
issuing checks in conjunction with a court-ordered restitution order could be construed as
a "proprietary function" of a Clerk of Courts, then Haery's complaint may survive a motion
to dismiss.
{¶ 28} R.C. Chapter 2744 names many specific acts or functions that constitute a
"government function," including but not limited to the provision of police services, the
provision of public education, the provision of a "free public library system," the regulation
of roads, the operation of a job and family services department or agency, and more. R.C.
2744.01(C)(2)(a) thru (x). As relevant here, this specific list of "governmental functions"
includes "[j]udicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, and quasi-legislative
2. The other exceptions concern negligent operation of motor vehicles ([B][1]), failure to keep public roads safe ([B][3]), failure to keep public buildings safe ([B][4]), and when civil liability is expressly imposed upon a political subdivision by the Revised Code ([B][5]). These exceptions are not relevant to Haery's claims asserted in the complaint. - 11 - Warren CA2024-07-054
functions." R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(f). The statue provides that other functions not specifically
listed are "governmental functions" if they meet any of three more general descriptions,
including those that "promote[] or preserve[] the public peace, health, safety, or welfare;
that involve[] activities that are not engaged in or not customarily engaged in by
nongovernmental persons; and that [are] not specified in division (G)(2) of this section as
a proprietary function." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c).
{¶ 29} Similarly, Chapter 2744 lists specific acts or functions that constitute a
"proprietary function," including the operation of a hospital, the operation of a public
cemetery, the operation of a utility such as a gas company, the upkeep of a sewer system,
and the operation of a public stadium. R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(a)-(e). The statute provides
that other functions not specifically listed are "proprietary functions" if they do not qualify
as a governmental function and "promote[] or preserve[] the public peace, health, safety,
or welfare and that involve[] activities that are customarily engaged in by
nongovernmental persons." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2744.01(G)(1)(a),(b).
{¶ 30} "Quasi-judicial" activities qualifying as "governmental functions" under R.C.
2744.01(C)(2)(f) are not defined by statute. When terms are not defined by a statute, "we
afford the terms their plain, everyday meanings, looking to how such words are ordinarily
used . . . This work includes reading words in their context and construing them 'according
to the rules of grammar and common usage.'" State ex rel. More Bratenahl v. Bratenahl,
2019-Ohio-3233, ¶ 12, citing Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa, 2018-Ohio-5207, ¶
8-10 and quoting R.C. 1.42. We cannot say that the term "quasi-judicial" is in everyday
usage among the public, but we believe the public would understand that term
consistently with the definition given by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, which described "quasi-judicial" functions as those "so integral or intertwined with
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the judicial process" that the person performing the function is "considered an arm of the
judicial officer who is immune." Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir.1994).
{¶ 31} Here, the Clerk's office issued two checks to Haery pursuant to a restitution
order issued in two criminal cases by the court of common pleas. These acts were without
a doubt "quasi-judicial" functions as the Clerk's actions were directed by the common
pleas court and were "so integral or intertwined with the judicial process" that the Clerk
would, in this case, be considered an arm of the court. Id. Enforcing or executing a court
order is "intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding." Id.
{¶ 32} Our analysis of "quasi-judicial" functions is consistent with the Tenth District
Court of Appeals' reasoning in Blankenship. In that case, the appeals court held that
Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity barred claims against a clerk of courts for
negligence in failing to enter a judge's withdrawal of a capias in the record, which failure
led to the plaintiff-appellant being arrested and incarcerated for four days. Blankenship,
67 Ohio App.3d at 304-05, 312. The court explained that "[t]he act of recording a capias
and docketing it accordingly is properly classified (under either the common or the
statutory law) as being governmental." Id. at 312. Plainly, issuing a restitution check
pursuant to a court order is an act "not customarily engaged in by nongovernmental
persons." R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(c). The same applies to the Clerk's stop-payment order and
efforts to recover the amounts improperly paid to Haery, as those efforts were directed to
ensuring that the proper amounts of restitution were paid to the proper victims pursuant
to the court's restitution order.
{¶ 33} Accordingly, we find that the Clerk's actions challenged in Haery's complaint
were quasi-judicial functions, and thus governmental functions pursuant to R.C.
2744.02(C)(1)(f). Therefore, the exception for negligent acts in connection with
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proprietary functions under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) is inapplicable, and no exception to
immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B) applies to the Clerk.
{¶ 34} Citing Wholesale Elec. & Supply, Inc. v. Robusky, 22 Ohio St.2d 181,
(1970), Haery contends that the Clerk's actions were not quasi-judicial in nature because
the Clerk failed to properly act in accordance with the court's restitution order when his
office issued restitution checks in amounts different from those ordered by the court. In
Wholesale Elec., the Ohio Supreme Court held that a county sheriff was immune from
liability in executing a writ of possession according to its terms, regardless of whether the
court issuing the writ had jurisdiction to do so. Id. at 183-184. In finding that the sheriff
was entitled to immunity, the supreme court discussed two of its cases from the 1860s in
a manner that suggested the sheriff would have been liable if he had not acted in accord
with the terms of the writ. Id. at 183. However, Wholesale Elec. is a pre-R.C. Ch. 2744
case that applied common law, not the political-subdivision immunity framework created
by Chapter 2744.
{¶ 35} Haery portrays the Clerk's act of the writing a check as a purely ministerial
act—and so not subject to immunity—because "millions of checks are written every single
day by all manner of persons, corporations, partnerships, or other entities, then it cannot
be the case that doing so is a judicial or quasi-judicial just because it is done by a Clerk
of Courts." Haery's argument essentially suggests that we should just consider the fact
that the Clerk issued a check and ignore the fact that the Clerk issued a restitution check
at the direction of the common pleas court in a criminal case. Haery presents no authority
or argument as to why we would consider the Clerk's actions in an effective vacuum. And
Haery's focus on "ministerial" acts draws on pre-1985 case law holding that immunity
does not protect clerks of court from claims with respect to ministerial acts. See Dalton v.
Hysell, 56 Ohio App.2d 109, 111 (10th Dist.1978). As explained by the Tenth District,
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At common law the negligent performance of a ministerial act by a public officer or employee was actionable and no immunity applied. Under R.C. Chapter 2744, however, there is no provision imposing liability for governmental ministerial acts. Dalton is no longer applicable.
Blankenship, 67 Ohio App.3d at 312. As set forth above, the Clerk's actions squarely fall
within the statutory definition of "government function."
{¶ 36} The third tier of the Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity analysis
considers whether any of the defenses included in R.C. 2744.03 apply to reinstate
immunity. Conaway, 2024-Ohio-36 at ¶ 15. But this third tier is only necessary and
applicable if any of the exceptions to immunity apply under R.C. 2744.02(B). See Clancy,
2010-Ohio-1483 at ¶ 9. Because we found that the only exception to immunity potentially
applicable in this case—R.C. 2744.02(B)(2)—does not apply, we need not consider the
third tier.
{¶ 37} The Clerk's issuance of restitution checks to Haery, even in incorrect
amounts, was a "quasi-judicial" governmental function. The same is true with regard to
the Clerk's issuance of stop-payment orders on those checks, as the stop-payment orders
were issued in furtherance of the Clerk complying with the court's restitution order. As a
result, Chapter 2744 political-subdivision immunity rendered the Clerk immune from
Haery's claims. As such, we need not examine the parties' arguments and the trial court's
analysis regarding common law judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. Though our
reasoning is different from that applied by the trial court, our analysis concerns an
argument that was raised by the Clerk in its motion to dismiss, was therefore not waived,
and is properly before us. We affirm the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss
on the basis of immunity.
C. Analysis: Cognizable Cause of Action
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{¶ 38} Next, Haery argues that he stated a cognizable cause of action against the
Clerk, cites provisions of R.C. Ch. 1303 (Ohio's codification of the Uniform Commercial
Code) in support, and argues the trial court erred in finding that he did not bring a
cognizable causes of action. In his supplemental brief, Haery argues that even if Chapter
2744 was not waived and was applicable, the Clerk would not be entitled to immunity
because his claims were not based in tort, but rather were statutory in nature. Haery
asserts that his claims were premised on statutory rights set forth under R.C.
1303.54(B)(1). He asserts that this statute obligated the Clerk to pay a dishonored check
"according to its terms at the time it was issued."
{¶ 39} We have carefully reviewed Haery's complaint. The complaint does not cite
or otherwise reference Chapter 1303. Nor does the complaint refer to any statutory basis
for relief. Haery first referenced Chapter 1303 in his memorandum contra to the Clerk's
motion to dismiss. But Haery did not request leave to amend his complaint to assert any
statutory claims under Chapter 1303. We find that a fair reading of the complaint does not
support Haery's position that his complaint was based on any statutory rights under
Chapter 1303. Instead, the complaint states causes of action in the nature of intentional
or negligent tortious actions by the Clerk in issuing checks in conjunction with a court's
restitution order. We therefore find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Haery's
complaint failed to state "cognizable" causes of action against the Clerk.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 40} From Haery's perspective, he was a victim of a crime, he received restitution
checks, he confirmed with the Clerk's office that those checks were issued in the correct
amounts, and he suffered a financial loss as a result of the Clerk's incorrect assurance,
which led him to spend the restitution money before it was clawed back by the Clerk. We
sympathize with Haery, though we note that the money he spent was never properly his
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in the first place. Also, we emphasize that political-subdivision immunity plays an
important and necessary role in ensuring "the continued orderly operation of local
governments and the continued ability of local governments to provide public peace,
health, and safety services to their residents." Am.Sub H.B. No. 176, Section 8, 141 Ohio
Laws 1699. In any event, we must apply the law as written, and we have done so.
{¶ 41} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Clerk was entitled to
political subdivision immunity pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. We overrule the Clerk's
sole assignment of error.
{¶ 42} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Judge
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