Hae Sook Moon v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hae Sook Moon v. City of New York

255 A.D.2d 292, 679 N.Y.S.2d 648, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11556

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 2, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 255 A.D.2d 292 (Hae Sook Moon v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hae Sook Moon v. City of New York, 255 A.D.2d 292, 679 N.Y.S.2d 648, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11556 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lerner, J.), dated August 20, 1997, as, upon reargument, adhered to its prior order dated April 7, 1997, which, inter alia, directed her to pay her former attorneys $1,274.75 in disbursements and expenses, and granted the cross motion of her former attorneys for costs and sanctions in the amount of $500 unless she forwarded $1,274.75 to them within 14 days of the court’s order.

Ordered that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof granting the cross motion and substituting therefor a provision denying the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the respondent.

We reject the appellant’s contention that her former attorneys were not entitled to a lien on her cause of action. Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475, an attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client’s cause of action. Where an attorney’s representation terminates upon mutual consent, and there has been no misconduct, no discharge for just cause, and no unjustified abandonment by the attorney, the attorney maintains his or her right to enforce the statutory lien. However, where an attorney withdraws without good cause, his or her lien is automatically forfeited (see, Klein v Eubank, 87 NY2d 459; Suffolk Roadways v Minuse, 56 Misc 2d 6). The plaintiff’s contention that her former attorneys simply withdrew from the case because she rejected a settlement offer is not supported by the record. Thus, the former attorneys maintained their right to enforce their lien.

However, we find no frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c) on the part of either the plaintiff or her present counsel justifying an award of costs or sanctions. Thus, the cross motion is denied. Miller, J. P., Thompson, Pizzuto, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lerner, J.), dated August 20, 1997, as, upon reargument, adhered to its prior order dated April 7, 1997, which, inter alia, directed her to pay her former attorneys $1,274.75 in disbursements and expenses, and granted the cross motion of her former attorneys for costs and sanctions in the amount of $500 unless she forwarded $1,274.75 to them within 14 days of the court’s order.

Ordered that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof granting the cross motion and substituting therefor a provision denying the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the respondent.

We reject the appellant’s contention that her former attorneys were not entitled to a lien on her cause of action. Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475, an attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client’s cause of action. Where an attorney’s representation terminates upon mutual consent, and there has been no misconduct, no discharge for just cause, and no unjustified abandonment by the attorney, the attorney maintains his or her right to enforce the statutory lien. However, where an attorney withdraws without good cause, his or her lien is automatically forfeited (see, Klein v Eubank, 87 NY2d 459; Suffolk Roadways v Minuse, 56 Misc 2d 6). The plaintiff’s contention that her former attorneys simply withdrew from the case because she rejected a settlement offer is not supported by the record. Thus, the former attorneys maintained their right to enforce their lien.

However, we find no frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c) on the part of either the plaintiff or her present counsel justifying an award of costs or sanctions. Thus, the cross motion is denied. Miller, J. P., Thompson, Pizzuto, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

255 A.D.2d 292, 679 N.Y.S.2d 648, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hae-sook-moon-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1998.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack