Haden v. Maryland Casualty Co.

18 So. 2d 238
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 2, 1944
DocketNo. 6684.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 18 So. 2d 238 (Haden v. Maryland Casualty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haden v. Maryland Casualty Co., 18 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App. 1944).

Opinion

Plaintiff instituted this suit seeking to recover the maximum amount of compensation allowed under Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended, alleging he is totally and permanently disabled to perform any work of a reasonable character; that his disability was caused by injuries he received in an accident which occurred while he was performing duties within the course and scope of his employment and that the accident arose out of his employment. He impleaded as defendants his employer and his compensation insurer.

The disability of plaintiff is admitted by defendants but they deny that it is the result of any accident or injury received by him and affirmatively allege that his disability is due to and has resulted from systemic conditions. On the trial of the case, it was shown that plaintiff was suffering with pyorrhea, infected tonsils and syphilis, and the lower court found that plaintiff's disability was the result of these systemic conditions and not from the injuries received by him in the accident which occurred while he was in the employ of defendant. Plaintiff is now prosecuting this appeal.

The lower court prefaced its reasons for its refusal to grant a rehearing and award judgment for plaintiff with the following remarks:

"The Court having rejected the demands of plaintiff, he applies for a rehearing on the ground that the Court erred in holding that plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proof. While we confessed that we did not possibly understand the case or the medical testimony as well as counsel for plaintiff, that if we did, we might be able to find a judgment for plaintiff, as there is evidence leading to the conclusion that the condition of the plaintiff's eye is a result of glare blindness, and we are still of the opinion that our lack of knowledge of the subject matter may be the reason that we cannot find from the evidence that it preponderates in favor of plaintiff, and if the Court does feel that it does, either from lack of ability to understand the import of the testimony, it is the Court's duty to so hold, the same that he would do, if there was in reality a lack of evidence or a preponderance in favor of plaintiff. We make this statement so that the Appellate Court will not adhere to the rule of giving `great weight' to the conclusions of the trial Court, but will decide the case on the record, as a large part of the testimony was taken out of Court and I have had to reach my conclusions largely from the record.

"I feel that the record clearly shows that the condition of plaintiff's eye could have resulted from one or two causes, either syphilis or light glare. The preponderance of the medical experts says the cause is syphilis and all of the symptoms or index points are present to prove that it is syphilis; while on the other hand, if the condition is the result of light glare, provided the light was sufficiently strong; if *Page 239 the light was sufficiently near; that if the exposure was sufficiently long enough. These IFS appear to me to be indefinite or not susceptible of proof, therefore, we had before us a given result, which could obtain from either one of two causes. One cause, syphilis, was definite; the other cause, glare blindness, was indefinite (as I view the evidence in the absence of proof of time, distance and intensity required of the light) and with this set-up, I feel compelled to determine the cause of plaintiff's disability to be that resulting from syphilis. Dr. Wilkinson did not find anything that would indicate syphilis or other infection and in answer to the direct question if `he could have glare injury resulting in blindness' and he answered `he could have'. And on page 69, he said `with the history of the exposure to light, I would be inclined to attribute it to that exposure.'

"Again he was asked if he could say definitely that syphilis did not cause the condition, and he said he saw no evidence of it. On cross-examination he said that if the blindness came on suddenly, he would say that it was caused by the torch; and if it came on gradually it could be syphilis.

"We have said that Dr. Wilkinson's testimony appeared to us to be negative in character, rather than positive, and while other physicians admitted some of the statements made by Dr. Wilkinson and vice versa, we concluded that with the positive character of the testimony of the other physicians, with the known and definite syphilitic condition, as against the negative testimony of Dr. Wilkinson, plus the uncertain factors on which it was based, to-wit, intensity of the heat, proximity and duration, we felt and still feel that the preponderance of the testimony, as I have been able to appreciate it, is in favor of defendant.

"For the reasons assigned, the application for rehearing is overruled."

After a careful study of this case, we fail to find any unusual difference between it and the average compensation case which comes before us, in fact, after analyzing carefully the testimony of the lay witnesses and the medical men, it so clearly preponderates in favor of plaintiff's contention until we have had little or no difficulty in arriving at a decision.

Plaintiff is a white man, fifty years of age and an automobile mechanic by trade. About nine years prior to the alleged accident, which is the cause of this suit, he was struck in the right eye by a small piece of steel which caused the loss of sight of that eye for all practical purposes. That condition was permanent at the time of the accident involved in this case, which occurred on March 11, 1942. For all practical purposes and so far as plaintiff knew, his left eye was sound and his vision therein unaffected. He had worked for his present employer and the former proprietor of the same automobile garage for several years. His work required the use of small and large tools and on small and large parts of automobiles. Some of his work was of a delicate nature and, all in all, in order to properly perform his labor, it was necessary that he have good eyesight. Plaintiff did perform this work to the satisfaction of his immediate superior and employer and at no time was there any complaint about his work, in fact, his fellow workers and his employer did not know that he had only the use of one eye. Plaintiff enjoyed hunting birds and ducks and was recognized by his friends and associates as an extra good shot. Only a few days before the occurrence of the accident, he went quail hunting and killed six birds out of six shots. His employer testified that he was a willing worker, ready at all times to work overtime; that he usually worked nine to ten hours a day, six days a week, and earned $40 or more each week.

On the day of the accident, plaintiff went to work as usual. That afternoon he was underneath a car attempting to remove a loose battery carrier when it fell in his face, the trash, dirt and acid on said carrier falling into his eye. He came out from under the car and used his handkerchief to wipe the foreign matter out of his eye. When plaintiff thought he had gotten everything out and his eye was all right again, he was called by a fellow worker, Nevins Flowers, to assist in removing a ring from a flywheel and to put a new one on. To accomplish this job, it was necessary that the ring be expanded by heating it, which heat was produced by an acetylene blowtorch. Flowers handled the torch and plaintiff used the pliers, chisel and hammer. The heat was applied to the ring by the torch which was gradually moved around it. Plaintiff's part of the job was to work on the ring only a few inches behind the moving blowtorch, using pliers, chisel and hammer to loosen the ring from the wheel. After the ring was removed a new one was heated in the same way while the plaintiff held it with a pair of pliers. *Page 240

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Bluebook (online)
18 So. 2d 238, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haden-v-maryland-casualty-co-lactapp-1944.