Hackley v. Mayor of Baltimore

519 A.2d 1354, 70 Md. App. 111, 1987 Md. App. LEXIS 244
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJanuary 20, 1987
Docket568, 570, 571 and 771, September Term, 1986
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 519 A.2d 1354 (Hackley v. Mayor of Baltimore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hackley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 519 A.2d 1354, 70 Md. App. 111, 1987 Md. App. LEXIS 244 (Md. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

ALPERT, Judge.

We address here the consolidated appeals of four police officers (hereinafter occasionally referred to as “claimants”) whose applications for special disability retirement benefits pursuant to Article 22, Section 34(e) of the Baltimore City Code were denied. 1 The single issue presented by these cases may be succinctly stated:

Is a police officer who is capable of performing light duty specially assigned to officers injured in the line of duty, “incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of his job classification?”

I. Procedural Background and City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 777 (1984).

Claimants, William Hackley, William Wedemeyer, James Possidente and Edward McCarthy were employed as police officers with the Baltimore City Police Department. Each sustained an injury in the line of duty, which injury was not caused by the wilfull negligence of the officer. Claimants were unable to return to their duties as patrolmen because of their injuries. All four, however, were certified by police physicians for “light duty” within the department and, while performing those duties, carried their weapons and retained full powers of arrest. Additionally, no claimant received a reduction in pay or grade and all were carried on police rosters as “patrolmen” or “foot patrol.” Claimants Hackley and Wedemeyer performed clerical work, claimant *114 Possidente dispatched police cruisers from the department’s communications center, and claimant McCarthy worked as a gunsmith in the police department’s armory.

Claimants retired 2 and in 1981, filed applications for special disability benefits with the Board of Trustees of the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System (hereinafter, “the Board”). Each asserted that, though able to perform light duty, his injury prevented him from performing the more rigorous duties associated with police work. Therefore, each claimant argued that he was incapacitated from performing “the duties of his job classification” within the meaning of the special disability benefit provisions. Claimants’ applications were heard by special examiners in the spring of 1981. In each case, an examiner found that the claimant was capable of performing sedentary duties required of police officers. Therefore, the examiners held in each case that the claimant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incapacitated for the performance of the duties of his job classification. Accordingly, claimants’ applications for special benefits were denied. Each claimant was awarded instead “ordinary benefits” pursuant to § 34(c) on the assumption that such benefits are appropriate where an officer is partially, rather than totally, incapacitated. The officers appealed these determinations to what is now the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In each case, that court reversed the decision of the claims examiner. The cases were consolidated for appeal, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.

Without reversal or affirmance, the Court of Appeals remanded the cases to the hearing examiner pursuant to Rule 871 a. City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 477 A.2d 1174 (1984). The court held that the examiners had applied an incorrect standard for the term “incapacitated.” Under the correct standard, benefits may be awarded *115 pursuant to either § 34(c) or (e) only upon a showing of total incapacitation. Id. at 289, 477 A.2d 1174. The court then adopted the majority rule governing incapacitation for cases in which the claimant has been assigned to light duty: a police officer who is capable of performing sedentary, non-rigorous tasks is not incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of his job classification. Id. at 288, 477 A.2d 1174. The court noted, however, that this rule applies only to those cases in which the police department that employed the claimant normally assigns its members to full-time, regular, light duty positions. Id. Pursuant to Rule 871 a, the court expressed the purpose for its remand:

The claims examiners then shall not only apply the correct legal standard for the term “incapacitated” [i.e., total incapacitation] but shall also receive additional evidence as necessary for resolving the questions we raised above.

Id. at 290-291, 477 A.2d 1174. Those questions were:

[I]s it in fact a practice of the Baltimore City Police Department to assign personnel to regular, permanent, full-time, light duty jobs which are within the job classification of police officer? Have the police officers assigned to such positions in the past been those with physical limitations, those who are completely physically fit, or both? Is each claimant in the cases before us assigned to such a position? Finally, is each claimant able to perform the duties of the position to which he has been assigned?

Id.

Although the court did not indicate how the resolution of these questions fit into the broader task of determining whether claimants were totally incapacitated from further performing their duties, the relationship between the two is apparent. If the light duties to which claimants were assigned have, through custom or practice, become “duties within the job classification of police officer,” claimants are incapacitated with the meaning of § 34(e) only if they are unable to perform the light duties to which they were assigned. Thus, by resolving the four questions above, the *116 examiners would also be applying the majority rule adopted by the court.

On remand, the hearing examiners determined that, in each case, the claimant had again failed to establish that he was incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of his job classification. Accordingly, all four claimants were denied special disability benefits. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed the decisions of the Board. This appeal followed.

The scope of our review in resolving these appeals is narrowly defined. Our duty is to determine whether the decisions of the Board were arbitrary or capricious. Adams v. Bd. of Trustees, 215 Md. 188, 193-94, 137 A.2d 151 (1957) . An arbitrary or capricious administrative determination cannot stand. If the conclusion reached in each of these cases, i.e., that the claimant is not incapacitated within the meaning of § 34(e), is supported by sufficient evidence, see Bd. of Trustees v. Rollins, 269 Md. 722, 309 A.2d 758

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519 A.2d 1354, 70 Md. App. 111, 1987 Md. App. LEXIS 244, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hackley-v-mayor-of-baltimore-mdctspecapp-1987.