Hack v. Department of Energy

538 F. Supp. 1098, 29 Cont. Cas. Fed. 82,546, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9468
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMay 13, 1982
DocketCiv. A. 80-3043
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 538 F. Supp. 1098 (Hack v. Department of Energy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hack v. Department of Energy, 538 F. Supp. 1098, 29 Cont. Cas. Fed. 82,546, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9468 (D.D.C. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOYCE HENS GREEN, District Judge.

This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, whereby plaintiff seeks to compel defendants (the Department of Energy and several of its officials) to disclose portions of four documents, known as Conceptual Design Reports (CDRs), previously released to plaintiff in excised form. On August 25, 1980, plaintiff filed a request with the manager of the DOE’s Oak Ridge Operations Office in Oak Ridge, Tennessee for the four reports, which concerned four contemplated projects at Oak Ridge. In a timely response, DOE released the four reports to plaintiff, with deletions. The agency stated that the deleted portions were exempt from disclosure because they were “recommendatory in nature and contain information which will be instrumental in the Government’s negotiations [and] which would expose and jeopardize the selection process [for architect-engineer contractors] if released prematurely.” Letter dated September 11, 1980 from DOE to plaintiff, PI. Exh.B. On September 16, 1980 plaintiff appealed the decision to segregate portions of the reports; that appeal was denied one month later, on the bases that disclosure would expose the deliberative process to public view and would harm the agency’s efforts in procuring architect-engineers. Thus, plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies and the matter became ripe for resolution in the district court. Both sides have moved for summary judgment and have submitted appropriate memoranda and affidavits, and these motions are before the Court now.

Conceptual Design Reports, as their name suggests, are documents prepared in the early planning stages of construction projects. The need for a project is generally determined at the outset by the operator of a DOE installation; 1 this initial determination is reviewed by the agency at the field office and headquarters levels. Once DOE decides to proceed with the project, a conceptual design is prepared. A CDR is a summary of the conceptual design; it attempts to give some dimension to the ideas expressed in the concept so that the scope of the project may be fixed and its cost estimated.

In the administrative adjudication of plaintiff’s request, DOE indicated that CDRs were also important to the process by which architectural/engineering (A/E) contractors are selected, and that disclosure would impair the government’s ability to compete effectively for the services of such professionals. Plaintiff maintains that the government overstates the importance of CDRs to the A/E selection process and disputes the contention that their disclosure would harm the government’s bargaining position with the contractors.

*1100 The selection of A/E firms is governed by the Brooks Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 541-44 (1976), which provides for an unusual, two-step procurement procedure. In the first step, the government agency determines which A/E firms are the most highly qualified to provide the services required. 40 U.S.C. § 543. Then, in the second step, the agency negotiates with the highest qualified firm for a contract to provide the services for a fair price. 40 U.S.C. § 544. DOE implements the Brooks Act by regulations found at 41 C.F.R. §§ 9 — 4.1000 through 9-4.1006 (1981), which embrace federal procurement regulations for architect-engineer services codified at 41 C.F.R. subparts 1-1.10 and 1-4.10 (1981).

The DOE’s argument against disclosure essentially is that the documents may properly be withheld pursuant to Exemption 5 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), which provides that “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency” are exempt from disclosure. The agency asserts that the documents in question fall within Exemption 5 under either of two theories: (1) that CDRs contain “commercial information” to which a qualified privilege against disclosure attaches, following the rule in Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 99 S.Ct. 2800, 61 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979), or (2) that the reports are withholdable as “deliberative process” material. As the Court finds the reports to constitute privileged commercial information, it is unnecessary to consider the “deliberative process” exemption theory.

The Open Market case involved a challenge to the agency’s policy of not publishing certain monthly monetary policy directives in the Federal Register until the end of each monthly period — at which time the directives would have been replaced by new directives possibly rendering the policies in the previous directives without effect. The agency feared that immediate disclosure of the directives would make it difficult to implement gradual changes in monetary policy because market participants might adjust their holdings of Government securities in anticipation of purchases or sales by the agency and would give large investors, who could process the information in the directives and act thereupon more quickly, an unfair advantage over small investors. 443 U.S. at 348-49, 99 S.Ct. at 2806. Looking to Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a district court may prevent or restrict discovery of trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information, the Supreme Court concluded that Exemption 5 incorporates “a qualified privilege for confidential commercial information, at least to the extent that this information is generated by the Government itself in the process leading up to awarding a contract.” Id. at 360, 99 S.Ct. at 2812. Upon remand, the District Court held that since immediate release of the directives would harm the government’s monetary and commercial interests, the documents were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 5. Merrill v. Federal Open Market Committee, 516 F.Supp. 1028, 1030-31 (D.D.C.1981).

The government argues here, as it stated in its administrative denials of plaintiff’s request, that disclosure of the withheld information would harm its commercial interests at both levels of its procurement procedure. First, it asserts that disclosure would interfere with the process by which qualified contractors are selected, to the extent that the process includes an inquiry into the candidate contractors’ ability to create and present good technical proposals for the project.

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538 F. Supp. 1098, 29 Cont. Cas. Fed. 82,546, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9468, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hack-v-department-of-energy-dcd-1982.