Haas v. Warren

459 S.E.2d 254, 341 N.C. 148, 1995 N.C. LEXIS 393
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJuly 28, 1995
Docket571PA93
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 459 S.E.2d 254 (Haas v. Warren) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haas v. Warren, 459 S.E.2d 254, 341 N.C. 148, 1995 N.C. LEXIS 393 (N.C. 1995).

Opinion

FRYE, Justice.

The primary issue presented on this appeal is whether plaintiffs’ evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury on the issue of whether defendants breached the standard of care owed plaintiffs. We conclude that it was; therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings.

This legal malpractice action had its genesis in an abortive effort by defendant Warren and his law firm to save money in a foreclosure proceeding by advertising the sale of land located in Franklin County in a Wake County newspaper. Warren, trustee for plaintiffs under a deed of trust, was asked by plaintiffs to begin foreclosure proceedings; accordingly, his firm placed the advertisement for the foreclosure sale. Following the sale, the adequacy of this advertisement was challenged in a lawsuit brought by the debtors under the note secured by the deed of trust. Defendants and plaintiffs agreed to a settlement of that lawsuit by consenting to set aside the sale and conduct a new sale. After publishing the legal notice again, this time in The Franklin Times, defendants conducted a second foreclosure sale, which went unchallenged by the debtors. Plaintiffs, purchasers at both foreclosure sales, were required to pay a higher price at the subsequent sale and incurred additional expenses due to the initial aborted sale. Accordingly, plaintiffs commenced this action against defendants based on legal malpractice in the handling of the foreclosure.

Plaintiffs’ evidence tended to show that Warren, as trustee, and his law firm took the admittedly unusual step of publishing the notice of sale in The Wake Weekly to avoid the high advertising costs of The Franklin Times; that defendants had always advertised foreclosure notices for land located in Franklin County in The Franklin Times and that this was also the accepted practice among other attorneys in the community; and that an associate in the firm researched the propriety of publishing the notice in The Wake Weekly but did not find and was unaware of N.C.G.S. § 1-597, which provides that a legal notice which is required to be advertised in a newspaper “shall be of no force and effect unless it shall be published in a newspaper with a general circulation to actual paid subscribers which newspaper at the time of such publication, advertisement or notice, shall have been *151 admitted to the United States mails as second class matter in the county or political subdivision where [the land in question is situated].” N.C.G.S. § 1-597 (1983). The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that The Wake Weekly did not comply with N.C.G.S. § 1-597 for purposes of publishing the notice of sale for land located in Franklin County.

At the close of plaintiffs’ evidence, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for directed verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence establishing the standard of care for attorneys in the same or similar community and thus had failed to establish that defendants’ actions violated this standard. The court further concluded that plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence that a competent attorney would have found or been aware of N.C.G.S. § 1-597. Haas v. Warren, 112 N.C. App. 574, 436 S.E.2d 259 (1993). We allowed plaintiffs’ petition for discretionary review, and for the reasons stated herein, we now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In order to show negligence in a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must first prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the attorney breached the duties owed to his client, Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954), and then show that this negligence proximately caused damage to the plaintiff, Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985). The duties promulgated by Hodges are:

Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law and contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he impliedly represents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability necessary to the practice of his profession and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his client’s cause.

Hodges, 239 N.C. at 519, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46.

In Rorrer v. Cooke, we elaborated on the standard of care applicable to attorneys, stating:

The third prong of Hodges requires an attorney to represent his client with such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake. The standard is *152 that of members of the profession in the same or similar locality under similar circumstances.

Rorrer, 313 N.C. at 356, 329 S.E.2d at 366.

Under Rorrer and Hodges, plaintiffs were required in this case to show that defendants failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of their skill and in the application of their knowledge to represent plaintiffs in the foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs were required to show that defendants, in conducting the foreclosure, failed to live up to the standard of care of members of the legal profession in their legal community or in a similar locality under similar circumstances.

In the instant case, the trial judge removed these issues from the jury’s consideration by directing a verdict for defendants. In reviewing the grant of directed verdict for defendants, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as the nonmoving party. West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 40-41, 326 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1985). We may affirm the directed verdict for defendants only if, as a matter of law, a recovery cannot be had by plaintiffs upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish. Id. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 606. All of the evidence that supports the plaintiffs’ claim must be taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference that may legitimately be drawn therefrom, and with contradictions, conflicts, and inconsistencies being resolved ■ in their favor. Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 367, 410 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1991), reh’g denied, 330 N.C. 854, 413 S.E.2d 550 (1992).

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Bluebook (online)
459 S.E.2d 254, 341 N.C. 148, 1995 N.C. LEXIS 393, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haas-v-warren-nc-1995.