Haag v. State, Department of Insurance

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Haag v. State, Department of Insurance

699 So. 2d 738, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 9036, 1997 WL 441234

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedAugust 7, 1997

DocketNos. 96-2682, 96-2683 and 96-2885

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 699 So. 2d 738 (Haag v. State, Department of Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Haag v. State, Department of Insurance, 699 So. 2d 738, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 9036, 1997 WL 441234 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellants, John L. Haag, Jr., Roy L. Levine and their attorneys (collectively, “Haag”), challenge the trial court’s orders (1) approving attorney’s fee agreements entered into between appellee, the Department of Insurance, and two law firms, Smith Hulsey & Busey, and Tew & Beasley, and (2) denying appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the first order, because the trial court properly approved the fee agreements pursuant to section 631.141(6), Florida Statutes (1996). We affirm the second order without comment because we conclude that, based on the partial record we have before us, it is supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Contrary to Haag’s contention on appeal regarding the first" order, this case is not controlled by Kuhnlein v. Department of Revenue, 662 So.2d 309 (Fla.1995). There, the court stated that a fee agreement between the named plaintiffs and their attorneys in a common-fund class action cannot bind the remaining members of the class, and that in such cases the court must instead use the lodestar method to determine attorney’s fees. The ease at bar, in contrast, is controlled by section 631.141(6), which provides that the Department of Insurance acting as a receiver in a chapter 631 delinquency proceeding shall enter into a fee agreement with its attorneys, with such compensation to be paid out of the insurer’s funds or assets, subject to the approval of the court. The court’s approval means that it is required to determine the reasonableness of the fee agreement, which the court below did follow[740]*740ing an evidentiary hearing. Kuhnlein cannot be read to require a trial court to disregard an agreement required by section 631.141(6) and adopt instead the lodestar approach.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, KAHN and BENTON, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellants, John L. Haag, Jr., Roy L. Levine and their attorneys (collectively, “Haag”), challenge the trial court’s orders (1) approving attorney’s fee agreements entered into between appellee, the Department of Insurance, and two law firms, Smith Hulsey & Busey, and Tew & Beasley, and (2) denying appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the first order, because the trial court properly approved the fee agreements pursuant to section 631.141(6), Florida Statutes (1996). We affirm the second order without comment because we conclude that, based on the partial record we have before us, it is supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Contrary to Haag’s contention on appeal regarding the first" order, this case is not controlled by Kuhnlein v. Department of Revenue, 662 So.2d 309 (Fla.1995). There, the court stated that a fee agreement between the named plaintiffs and their attorneys in a common-fund class action cannot bind the remaining members of the class, and that in such cases the court must instead use the lodestar method to determine attorney’s fees. The ease at bar, in contrast, is controlled by section 631.141(6), which provides that the Department of Insurance acting as a receiver in a chapter 631 delinquency proceeding shall enter into a fee agreement with its attorneys, with such compensation to be paid out of the insurer’s funds or assets, subject to the approval of the court. The court’s approval means that it is required to determine the reasonableness of the fee agreement, which the court below did follow[740]*740ing an evidentiary hearing. Kuhnlein cannot be read to require a trial court to disregard an agreement required by section 631.141(6) and adopt instead the lodestar approach.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, KAHN and BENTON, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

699 So. 2d 738, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 9036, 1997 WL 441234, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haag-v-state-department-of-insurance-fladistctapp-1997.

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