NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 6 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALAN L. HA, No. 23-3383 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 5:22-cv-02665-VKD v. MEMORANDUM** MICHELLE KING,* Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Virginia Kay DeMarchi, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 4, 2025*** San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, FORREST, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Claimant Alan Lung Ha (“Ha”) appeals the district court’s decision
* Michelle King is substituted as Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c). ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). affirming the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ’s”) denial of his application for
disability benefits. “We review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s
denial of social security benefits de novo, and we will not overturn the
Commissioner’s decision ‘unless it is either not supported by substantial evidence
or is based upon legal error.’” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir.
2022) (citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
1. The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the medical
opinion of Ha’s treating physician, Dr. Luu.1 As to Ha’s asserted mental health
limitations, the ALJ found that Dr. Luu’s opinion of Ha’s “severe major
depression” and inability to concentrate and perform daily activities was not
supported by Dr. Luu’s own treatment notes, which revealed “no significant mental
status findings.” Dr. Luu’s conclusions were also contradicted by the opinions of
other physicians and medical records showing Ha’s “substantially normal mental
status and psychiatric findings,” intact cognitive ability, and no severe mental
impairment.
1 Because Ha filed his claim before March 27, 2017, the Commissioner’s revised regulations concerning the evaluation of medical evidence based on supportability and consistency factors do not apply here. See Cross v. O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2024). Therefore, the ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate” reasons before discounting evidence from a treating physician. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020).
2 23-3383 The ALJ further found that Dr. Luu’s opinion regarding the severity of Ha’s
physical limitations was not supported by his treatment notes, which had “no
documentation of the claimant’s range of motion, neurological findings, or motor
strength.” The ALJ also noted that Dr. Luu’s conclusions were contradicted by
objective clinical findings and the opinions of other physicians who determined
that Ha had a normal range of motion and motor strength. See Ford, 950 F.3d at
1154 (“A conflict between a treating physician’s medical opinion and his own
notes is . . . a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting it.”); Thomas v. Barnhart,
278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any
physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and
inadequately supported by clinical findings.”).
2. Rejection of a claimant’s testimony requires clear and convincing
reasons. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15, 1015 n.18 (9th Cir. 2014).
Contrary to Ha’s testimony about the intensity of his symptoms, the ALJ found
that Ha’s physical examinations showed substantially normal gait and range of
motion. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Contradiction
with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective
testimony.” (citation omitted)). The ALJ also found Ha’s alleged severe symptoms
inconsistent with reports of his admitted daily activities. See id. at 499–500
(affirming denial of benefits where claimant’s subjective symptom testimony was
3 23-3383 inconsistent with daily activities). Ha reported no history of diabetic
complications, and as late as February 2016, Ha declined treatment for his
diabetes. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded
on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (holding that claimant’s failure to
assert a good reason for not seeking treatment can cast doubt on the sincerity of the
claimant’s pain testimony). Thus, the ALJ identified clear and convincing reasons
to discount the severity of Ha’s alleged symptoms.
3. The ALJ did not err in discounting lay witness testimony. “An ALJ need
only give germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses.
Inconsistency with medical evidence is one such reason.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427
F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, the ALJ found that the
lay witness’s report did not warrant further residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
limitations “given the context of the objective medical findings and other evidence
of record.” Moreover, as stated above, the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons
for discounting Ha’s subjective symptom claims, and those reasons apply with
equal force here because the lay witness’s report contains similar claims regarding
Ha’s symptoms. See Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694
(9th Cir. 2009) (noting that clear and convincing reasons to reject claimant’s
testimony apply with equal force to lay witness testimony).
4. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding at step four of the
4 23-3383 disability evaluation process. Ha argues that the ALJ erred when he found a mild
mental limitation but failed to consider a corresponding functional restriction
during the RFC determination. But our decision in Woods forecloses that
argument. See 32 F.4th 785. In Woods, we rejected a similar argument where the
claimant failed to specify what evidence the ALJ did not consider or explain in
support of the ALJ’s RFC determination. Id. at 794. The ALJ here considered the
evidence and addressed the Paragraph B criteria and found that Ha had no more
than mild limitations.
Ha also argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding that allowed standing for only six
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 6 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALAN L. HA, No. 23-3383 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 5:22-cv-02665-VKD v. MEMORANDUM** MICHELLE KING,* Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Virginia Kay DeMarchi, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 4, 2025*** San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, FORREST, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Claimant Alan Lung Ha (“Ha”) appeals the district court’s decision
* Michelle King is substituted as Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c). ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). affirming the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ’s”) denial of his application for
disability benefits. “We review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s
denial of social security benefits de novo, and we will not overturn the
Commissioner’s decision ‘unless it is either not supported by substantial evidence
or is based upon legal error.’” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir.
2022) (citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
1. The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the medical
opinion of Ha’s treating physician, Dr. Luu.1 As to Ha’s asserted mental health
limitations, the ALJ found that Dr. Luu’s opinion of Ha’s “severe major
depression” and inability to concentrate and perform daily activities was not
supported by Dr. Luu’s own treatment notes, which revealed “no significant mental
status findings.” Dr. Luu’s conclusions were also contradicted by the opinions of
other physicians and medical records showing Ha’s “substantially normal mental
status and psychiatric findings,” intact cognitive ability, and no severe mental
impairment.
1 Because Ha filed his claim before March 27, 2017, the Commissioner’s revised regulations concerning the evaluation of medical evidence based on supportability and consistency factors do not apply here. See Cross v. O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2024). Therefore, the ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate” reasons before discounting evidence from a treating physician. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020).
2 23-3383 The ALJ further found that Dr. Luu’s opinion regarding the severity of Ha’s
physical limitations was not supported by his treatment notes, which had “no
documentation of the claimant’s range of motion, neurological findings, or motor
strength.” The ALJ also noted that Dr. Luu’s conclusions were contradicted by
objective clinical findings and the opinions of other physicians who determined
that Ha had a normal range of motion and motor strength. See Ford, 950 F.3d at
1154 (“A conflict between a treating physician’s medical opinion and his own
notes is . . . a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting it.”); Thomas v. Barnhart,
278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any
physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and
inadequately supported by clinical findings.”).
2. Rejection of a claimant’s testimony requires clear and convincing
reasons. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15, 1015 n.18 (9th Cir. 2014).
Contrary to Ha’s testimony about the intensity of his symptoms, the ALJ found
that Ha’s physical examinations showed substantially normal gait and range of
motion. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Contradiction
with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective
testimony.” (citation omitted)). The ALJ also found Ha’s alleged severe symptoms
inconsistent with reports of his admitted daily activities. See id. at 499–500
(affirming denial of benefits where claimant’s subjective symptom testimony was
3 23-3383 inconsistent with daily activities). Ha reported no history of diabetic
complications, and as late as February 2016, Ha declined treatment for his
diabetes. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded
on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (holding that claimant’s failure to
assert a good reason for not seeking treatment can cast doubt on the sincerity of the
claimant’s pain testimony). Thus, the ALJ identified clear and convincing reasons
to discount the severity of Ha’s alleged symptoms.
3. The ALJ did not err in discounting lay witness testimony. “An ALJ need
only give germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses.
Inconsistency with medical evidence is one such reason.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427
F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, the ALJ found that the
lay witness’s report did not warrant further residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
limitations “given the context of the objective medical findings and other evidence
of record.” Moreover, as stated above, the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons
for discounting Ha’s subjective symptom claims, and those reasons apply with
equal force here because the lay witness’s report contains similar claims regarding
Ha’s symptoms. See Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694
(9th Cir. 2009) (noting that clear and convincing reasons to reject claimant’s
testimony apply with equal force to lay witness testimony).
4. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding at step four of the
4 23-3383 disability evaluation process. Ha argues that the ALJ erred when he found a mild
mental limitation but failed to consider a corresponding functional restriction
during the RFC determination. But our decision in Woods forecloses that
argument. See 32 F.4th 785. In Woods, we rejected a similar argument where the
claimant failed to specify what evidence the ALJ did not consider or explain in
support of the ALJ’s RFC determination. Id. at 794. The ALJ here considered the
evidence and addressed the Paragraph B criteria and found that Ha had no more
than mild limitations.
Ha also argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding that allowed standing for only six
hours was inconsistent with his past relevant work, which required him to stand for
eight hours. But Ha’s previous work experience does not demonstrate error in the
RFC finding because he is not disabled if he can perform his past work “as . . . is
generally performed in the national economy.” See Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563,
569 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 1010, 1013
(9th Cir. 2021) (“‘Medium work’ is a term of art in disability law with a well-
established meaning” that includes a limitation of “standing or walking, off and on,
for a total of approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.”).
Ha contends that the ALJ’s finding is also inconsistent with the vocational
expert’s testimony acknowledging that “some medium occupations require more
than 6 hours of standing and walking in an 8-hour day.” We disagree. The ALJ
5 23-3383 permissibly relied on the vocational expert’s response to hypothetical questions,
and the hypotheticals explicitly incorporated Ha’s six-hour standing and walking
limitation. Moreover, the ALJ’s questioning of the vocational expert expressly
highlighted Ha’s six-hour standing and walking limitation. Therefore, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision at step four.
AFFIRMED.
6 23-3383