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H. M. v. T. L.* (AC 48406)
Cradle, C. J., and Clark and Wilson, Js.**
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the plaintiff ’s application for a civil protection order on the ground of stalking. He claimed that the court improperly issued the order pursuant to the statute (§ 46b-16a) governing civil protection orders without making the requisite factual finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant would continue to stalk the plaintiff. Held:
The trial court abused its discretion by issuing the civil protection order, as the court failed to make the requisite factual finding pursuant to § 46b-16a that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant would continue to stalk the plaintiff.
Argued June 4—officially released August 25, 2026
Procedural History
Application for a civil protection order, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Hon. John F. Kavanewsky, Jr., judge trial referee; judgment granting the plaintiff ’s application for a civil protection order, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; order vacated.
Scott T. Garosshen, with whom were Dan A. Brody and, on the brief, Mallori D. Thompson, for the appellant (defendant).
H. M., self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
CRADLE, C. J. The defendant, T. L., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application
*
In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
**
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
for an order of civil protection for the plaintiff, H. M., pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-16a1 on the ground of stalking.2 On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly issued an order of civil protection for the benefit of the plaintiff without making the requisite factual finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant would continue to stalk the plaintiff. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.3 The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On December 2, 2024, the plaintiff filed an application seeking an order of civil protection against the defendant on the ground that the defendant had stalked her (application).4 In the supporting affidavit accompanying the application, the plaintiff averred 1 General Statutes § 46b-16a provides in relevant part: “(a) Any person who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section . . . . As used in this section, ‘stalking’ means two or more wilful acts, performed in a threatening, predatory or disturbing manner of: [h]arassing , following, lying in wait for, surveilling, monitoring or sending unwanted gifts or messages to another person directly, indirectly or through a third person, by any method, device or other means, that causes such person to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety. . . .”
2 We note that, in her application seeking an order of civil protection, the plaintiff also selected sexual abuse as a ground for her application; however, she handwrote the word “[harassment]” next to “[s]exual [a]buse.” Our legislature has not made sexual harassment an independent ground upon which one may seek an order of civil protection pursuant to § 46b-16a. See General Statutes § 46b-16a (a) (“[a]ny person who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section” (emphasis added)). Moreover, there is no indication that the court granted the order of civil protection on the basis of sexual abuse and both parties appear to assume that the court granted the application solely on the ground of stalking, not sexual abuse. In light of the foregoing, we consider stalking to be the basis of the plaintiff’s application.
3 Because this conclusion is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the defendant’s additional claims, namely, that the court failed to make the requisite finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had stalked the plaintiff, including the attendant finding that a reasonable person would fear for their personal safety due to the defendant’s alleged conduct, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the alleged stalking would continue.
4 See footnote 2 of this opinion.
that she and the defendant worked at the same school and lived in the school’s faculty housing. The plaintiff further averred, inter alia, that (1) the defendant sexually harassed her at work and “made comments about [her] body” and (2) via video camera, she observed the defendant enter her screened porch, touch her mail, and look in her window while she was away from home.5 On December 2, 2024, the trial court, Zingaro, J., issued an ex parte order prohibiting the defendant, inter alia, from stalking, contacting, or coming within 100 yards of the plaintiff, as well as ordering the defendant to surrender all firearms and ammunition. On December 16, 2024, the court, Hon. John F. Kavanewsky, Jr., judge trial referee, extended the ex parte order of civil protection and further ordered that a hearing on the application be held on January 6, 2025.
At the January 6, 2025 hearing on the application, the court heard testimony from the plaintiff, the defendant, 5 The plaintiff further averred in her application that the defendant, who was the school’s director of finance, “withheld [a certain reimbursement ] payment until I met with him in person, in his office, we went over paperwork and [he] offered me espresso. I am the only one he required to do this.” The plaintiff, who was the school’s cross-country team coach, further averred that he “showed up to . . . [cross-country team races that] he didn’t have any reason to be at.” The plaintiff also averred that, after she accepted faculty housing, the defendant “texted me [without] my permission stating ‘the hidden keys (to my unit) were no longer where they used to be.’ ” The plaintiff testified in support of these allegations at the January 6, 2025 hearing regarding her application.
We also note that the plaintiff averred in her application that “[m]y [daughter’s] underwear started to go missing in September. I noticed my front door was unlocked after I know I locked it (October).” On appeal, the plaintiff again relies on those allegations; however, the plaintiff did not present any evidence in support of these allegations at the hearing. See, e.g., Anketell v. Kulldorff, 223 Conn. App. 345, 360, 308 A.3d 594 (2024) (“[t]his evidence was not presented to the trial court and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, although the plaintiff mentions these allegations on appeal, she has not directly accused the defendant, either before the trial court or this court, of being the one who stole her daughter’s underwear or unlocked her door. In fact, regarding her door being unlocked, the plaintiff specifically testified that, “I never said I think it’s [the defendant].”
and the defendant’s wife, and the defendant introduced into evidence several exhibits.6 The plaintiff testified, inter alia, that she is a teacher and former cross-country coach at the school and lives in off campus faculty housing on the same property as the defendant. The plaintiff also testified that the defendant was the school’s director of finance and responsible for faculty housing placements, but he no longer worked at the school. She further testified that it was her understanding that the defendant was supposed to move out of faculty housing on January 6, 2025, the day of the hearing. The plaintiff testified, inter alia, that the defendant “commented on [her] body” at a cross-country race in 2022. The plaintiff did not clarify what the comments were. The plaintiff also testified that she had installed video cameras in her home’s screened porch in late November 2024. Soon after they were installed, the plaintiff observed the defendant “walking through the [screened] porch, by my windows, picking up my mail, moving my mail and then going through a different door . . . .”7 The plaintiff testified that packages meant for the defendant and other neighbors had been misdelivered to her house in the past and that, when it was raining, she would bring the packages into her screened porch and out of the rain. On the day she observed the defendant via surveillance footage, however, the plaintiff had not given the defendant permission to enter the screened porch of her home. The defendant testified, inter alia, that he had never made comments about the plaintiff’s body and had never been accused of sexual harassment. According to the defendant, he was unaware that he had made the plaintiff uncomfortable. The defendant also testified that, on 6 Specifically, the defendant introduced two text message exchanges, one between the plaintiff and himself concerning the hidden key; see footnote 5 of this opinion; and one between the plaintiff, the defendant, and other neighbors concerning misdelivered packages. In addition, the defendant introduced an email exchange between the plaintiff and himself concerning her then upcoming move into faculty housing, as well as confirmation of delivery of two packages from an online retailer, Amazon, on November 29 and 30, 2024.
7 The plaintiff did not introduce the surveillance footage into evidence at the hearing.
the night that the plaintiff observed him in her screened porch via the video cameras, “my wife got [an] email from Amazon that said [a] package was delivered, it wasn’t at our door, so we assumed it was misdelivered again. And my . . . path is to go to [the plaintiff’s] porch first because [the plaintiff’s] porch is the one where most packages get delivered . . . . I approached her porch. There was nothing outside of her screen door, but I noticed a package just inside her screen door. . . . I opened that door and picked it up, saw it wasn’t mine and put it down. I saw another package a few feet away, picked it up, saw it wasn’t mine, put it down. And I proceeded to leave her porch and go to the next porch where I found my packages and went home.” According to the defendant, packages were misdelivered more frequently prior to the plaintiff’s moving in. The defendant testified that, “I would feel comfortable going to get them, especially with the text that [the plaintiff] sent me eight days earlier to the [recorded] incident in question where she said come and get your packages. I just thought it was normal, neighborly.”
At the conclusion of the January 6, 2025 hearing, the court issued an oral decision granting the plaintiff’s application for an order of civil protection, in which it stated: “I have to determine whether or not the applicant has sustained her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that any conduct of any kind by the [defendant ] merits the issuance of a protective order.
“We all know what the statute says. What concerns me the most, if we were to look at any of these events in a single, isolated context they may not merit closer attention . Well, when I consider them together, it’s basically comments which I understand there’s a dispute . . . but it’s basically comments concerning the appearance or body or form of a coworker. That is troubling to the court.
“And then when we juxtapose that into the pickup routine or situation practiced by the [defendant] to get packages and where that occurred and the timing of it, it’s of great concern to the court. I am going to find that the burden of proof has been sustained. I am going to issue a protective order that the respondent have no contact with the applicant for a period of one year. That’s my order.” This appeal followed.8 This court has explained that “[w]e apply the same standard of review to civil protection orders under § 46b- 16a as we apply to civil restraining orders under General Statutes § 46b-15. Thus, we will not disturb a trial court’s orders unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion . . . we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . Our deferential standard of review, however, does not extend to the court’s interpretation of and application of the law to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) S. S. v. D. M., 228 Conn. App. 559, 562–63, 324 A.3d 233 (2024).
Section 46b-16a (a) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section . . . .” Section 46b-16a (b) provides in relevant part that, “[i]f the court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has committed acts constituting grounds for issuance of an order under this section and will continue to commit such acts, or acts designed to intimidate or retaliate against the applicant, the court, 8 We note that the court’s order of civil protection expired on January 6, 2026, after the defendant filed the present appeal with this court. On December 30, 2025, the plaintiff moved for an extension of the order of civil protection. On January 5, 2026, the trial court granted that motion and extended the protective order for a period of one year. The defendant thereafter appealed the extended protective order to this court. On January 27, 2026, the defendant filed a motion to stay that appeal pending the outcome of this appeal, which this court granted on February 18, 2026.
in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate for the protection of the applicant. . . .” Therefore, “[i]n order for a court to issue an order of civil protection under § 46b-16a on the basis of stalking, it must find that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant both stalked the plaintiff and will continue to commit such acts. . . . If a court issues an order without a proper finding or without sufficient evidence to support such a finding, as to either stalking or the continuation of such acts, it will constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) S. S. v. D. M., supra, 228 Conn. App. 564.
In the present case, the court was required to, inter alia, make a specific finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant would continue to stalk the plaintiff in order to issue the order of civil protection. See id. The court’s decision, however, is devoid of any express finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant would continue to commit such acts.9 In fact, it is not apparent from the court’s decision that it even considered the potential of future conduct. Moreover, the court’s comment that the conduct of the defendant was “of great concern to the court” is insufficient to support a finding that the defendant would continue to stalk the plaintiff. Because the court failed to make the requisite factual finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant would continue to stalk the plaintiff, we conclude that the court abused its discretion by issuing the order of civil protection. The order of civil protection therefore cannot stand.
The judgment is reversed and the order of civil protection is vacated.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
9 The plaintiff has not argued on appeal that the court made the requisite finding that the defendant would continue to stalk her. Rather, she only contends that the court properly determined that the defendant had stalked her.