Opinions of the United 1996 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
1-18-1996
H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Assn. Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 95-3182
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Recommended Citation "H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Assn." (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 249. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/249
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No. 95-3182
H. K. PORTER COMPANY, INC., a Corporation Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 93-0212)
Argued October 30, 1995
BEFORE: NYGAARD, ALITO and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 18, 1996)
Frederick J. Francis (argued) Meyer, Unkovic & Scott 1300 Oliver Building Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Attorneys for Appellant
John W. Jordan IV (argued) Gaca, Matis & Hamilton 300 Four PPG Place Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Attorneys for Appellee
1 OPINION OF THE COURT
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff H.K. Porter Company, Inc. ("Porter") filed suit in
federal district court against the Pennsylvania Insurance
Guaranty Association ("PIGA") seeking a declaration that PIGA was
legally obligated to indemnify Porter under the terms of three
insurance policies issued to Porter by an insolvent insurance
company. Porter claimed that each of the approximately 100,000
lawsuits filed against it constitutes a separate "covered claim"
for which Porter is entitled to the statutory limit of $300,000
on each claim, subject to the $5 million coverage limit of each
policy. The district court entered an order for partial summary
judgment in favor of PIGA, holding that Porter was only entitled
to indemnity for three covered claims -- one for each policy that
Porter held with the insolvent insurance company -- on the theory
that Porter, rather than those claiming against it, was the
claimant. We disagree and reverse.
I.
Beginning in 1958, H.K. Porter was engaged in the
manufacture and sale of various types of asbestos-containing
products. These products were sold for use in shipyards and the
ship-building industry across the country and around the world.
2 In 1984, Porter began to be inundated with lawsuits by
individuals alleging bodily injury or death as a result of
exposure to asbestos-containing products. By 1991 Porter was
being sued at the rate of approximately 2,000 separate cases per
month. The sheer volume of these lawsuits eventually forced
Porter into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, by which time there had been
approximately 100,000 lawsuits filed against Porter. Porter
settled or disposed of many of these claims through payment of
$30 million of its own funds. At the time of the bankruptcy, the
estimated value of identified pending lawsuits against Porter was
approximately $590 million.
During its operational years, Porter had maintained several
different insurance policies, including three "commercial
catastrophe liability" policies issued by Integrity Insurance
Company. These policies had indemnity limits of $5 million per
occurrence/$5 million annual aggregate, resulting in a total
aggregate of $15 million under the three policies. All parties
agree that the policies cover liability and indemnity for bodily
injury arising from Porter's manufacture and sale of asbestos
products.
When the flood of lawsuits began in the late 1980s, Porter
sought indemnity from Integrity for all amounts which Porter had
paid in the process of settling lawsuits or would become legally
obligated to pay in the future. In March of 1987, however,
Integrity Insurance Company was declared insolvent. Porter thus
turned to PIGA for indemnity. PIGA is an unincorporated
association created by statute for the purpose of providing means
3 for payment of covered claims when the insurance company
responsible for those claims has become insolvent, and for the
purpose of avoiding financial loss to claimants and policy
holders. See 40 P.S. § 1701.102(1) (repealed 1994).1
PIGA persistently refused to indemnify, defend, or in any
way become involved in Porter's asbestos lawsuits, despite
Porter's continual requests starting in 1987. As a result,
Porter filed suit against PIGA on February 12, 1993, seeking a
declaration that PIGA could be required to pay Porter up to $15
million -- the $5 million aggregate limit for each of the three
Integrity policies -- as well as counsel fees and expenses for
the defense of the lawsuits.2
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. One
of the issues presented in the motions was whether the $299,900
statutory limit3 set forth in section 201 of the PIGA Act for
each "covered claim" applied to three claims (one claim
supposedly made by Porter under each Integrity policy), or
1 The PIGA Act was repealed on December 12, 1994, see 1994, Dec. 12, P.L. 1005, No. 137, § 2, and replaced by the Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act, 40 P.S. § 991.1801 et seq. The PIGA Act, however, applies in the instant matter. 2 Porter has already paid approximately $30 million to defend and settle lawsuits thus far, $18 million of which was for the cost of defense, and the remaining $12 million for the actual disposition and settlement of the claims. See H.K. Porter Company, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association, No. 93-212, typescript at 2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1995); Appellant's Brief at 2. The issue of whether PIGA must indemnify Porter for the $18 million dollars it paid for the defense of lawsuits is before the district court and not at issue in this interlocutory appeal. 3 The statutory limit is actually $300,000, subject to a $100 deductible. See 40 P.S. § 1701.201(b)(1)(i).
4 whether it applied to each separate, individual claimant lawsuit
submitted by Porter to PIGA. This section provides, in relevant
part, as follows: (1) The association shall:
(i) Be obligated to make payments to the extent of the covered claims of an insolvent insurer existing prior to the determination of said insurer's insolvency, and covered claims arising within thirty days after the determination of the insolvency, or before the policy expiration date if less than thirty days after such determination . . . but such obligation shall include only that amount of each covered claim which is in excess of one hundred dollars ($100), and is less than three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000). In no event shall the association be obligated on a covered claim in an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy under which the claim arises.
40 P.S. § 1701.201(b)(1)(i).
The district court held that the $299,900 statutory limit
applied to each of the three claims it determined Porter had made
(one under each of the Integrity policies), for a total maximum
recovery of $899,700, far below Porter's $15 million indemnity
claim against Integrity. H.K. Porter Company, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association, No. 93-212,
typescript at 11-12 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1995).
Porter filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the district
court denied the motion. Porter then filed a motion requesting
that the district court amend its Order regarding the statutory
limit to acknowledge the existence of a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion, which was granted. Subsequently, Porter filed a
Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order,
5 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This court granted Porter's
Petition, and we now decide this appeal.
II.
The district court had jurisdiction over the instant action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), which provides federal district courts
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under
Title 11 of the United States Code. This court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Our review of a grant or denial
of summary judgment by the district court is plenary. See Rappa
v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1050 (3d Cir. 1994).
III.
In November of 1970, Pennsylvania adopted the Pennsylvania
Insurance Guaranty Association Act in order to provide insurance
policy holders with a means to receive payment of claims covered
against insolvent insurance companies. 40 P.S. § 1701.102(1).
The Act and the statutory creation of PIGA were based on a model
bill created by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners in response to the social harm that results from
insurance companies becoming insolvent. See Sands v.
Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 423 A.2d 1224, 1225-26
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
One of the stated purposes of Pennsylvania's Act is: (1) To provide a means for the payment of covered claims under certain property and casualty insurance policies, to avoid excessive delay in payment of such claims, and to avoid financial loss to claimants or
6 policyholders as a result of the insolvency of an insurer.
40 P.S. § 1701.102(1).
Under section 201 of the Act, PIGA is obligated to make
payments for each "covered claim" against the insolvent insurance
company, subject to a $299,900 statutory limit per "covered
claim." 40 P.S. § 1701.201(b)(1)(i). In no instance is PIGA
obligated to pay a covered claim in excess of the maximum amount
the insolvent insurance company would have paid under the terms
of the policy. Id. The resolution of this case rests on the determination of
what, exactly, constitutes a "covered claim." The Act defines it
as follows: "Covered claim" means an unpaid claim, including a claim for unearned premiums, which arises under a property and casualty insurance policy of an insolvent insurer and is:
(i) The claim of a person who at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or liability was a resident of this Commonwealth, or
(ii) A claim arising from an insured event resulting in loss or liability to property which was permanently situated in this Commonwealth.
40 P.S. § 1701.103(5)(a).
The district court concluded that the "covered claims" for
which Porter was entitled to indemnity from PIGA included only
one claim under each Integrity policy, for a total of three
claims. H.K. Porter v. PIGA, No. 93-212, typescript at 11-12.
The district court's rationale focused upon the word "person" in
the phrase of the statutory definition of "covered claim" which
reads: "'Covered claim' means . . . [t]he claim of a person who
7 at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or liability
was a resident of this Commonwealth." 40 P.S. §1701.103(5)(a)(i)
(emphasis added). The district court noted that under the
statute "person" is defined as "an individual, a corporation, a
partnership, an association, or any other holder of or claimant
under a property and casualty insurance policy." H.K. Porter v.
PIGA, No. 93-212, typescript at 11 (citing 40 P.S. §
1703.103(8)). The court thus concluded that by "[a]pplying that
language to the claims of Porter, it is clear that the claims at
issue are the claims of a person (Porter) for indemnification
under the three Integrity policies," H.K. Porter v. PIGA, No.
93-212, typescript at 11, and therefore Porter is limited to
indemnification for only $899,700, or $299,900 for each of the
three Integrity policies.
Upon Porter's Motion for Reconsideration of this
determination, the Court succinctly clarified its position as
follows: This Court is aware that "person" is defined by statute as, among other things, a holder of or claimant under a property and casualty insurance policy. However, that is not the issue. The issue is who is the "person" making the claim in this case. Clearly, the "person" making the claim in this case is Porter. . . .
* * *
[T]he clear language of the PIGA Act dictates that the covered claim is the claim of Porter for indemnification. We find no support in either the statute or the case law of this jurisdiction for Porter's assertion that its claims somehow encompass the claims of the underlying asbestos claimants. We believe that the reading of such a concept into the statute would violate the clear and express language of the Act.
8 H.K. Porter v. PIGA, No. 93-212, typescript at 4-5 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
9, 1995).
Porter submits that the "salient question is not whether
Porter has 'covered claims' within the meaning of the PIGA Act,
but how many covered claims Porter is able to assert."
Appellant's Brief at 18 (emphasis in original). We agree.
The district court's analysis appears to rest on the faulty
premise that if the insured submits numerous claims of others,
such claims are to be treated as one covered claim per policy.
Such a position, however, is untenable. As clearly illustrated
by an analogy presented to the district court by Porter, there
are circumstances in which one person is entitled to receive
indemnity for more than one covered claim per policy: Let's suppose, Your Honor, that you, yourself, are insured with Acme Automobile Insurance Company and that, unfortunately, in one month you have two separate accidents, each magically causing a $300,000 damage to each victim in each accident. Two lawsuits arrive at your house on the same day. You tender them to your insurance company. But on the same day your insurance company goes insolvent. So you tender them to PIGA.
Now, let's suppose that . . . PIGA does not step up to the plate to defend Your Honor and to indemnify Your Honor. . . . Your Honor then is left at the plate. Your Honor will have to reach into your pockets to pay each $300,000 claim. Now Your Honor is out $600,000 and Your Honor files a lawsuit against PIGA. Under Your Honor's construction of the statute, you would only be entitled to $300,000. But aren't the two claims that Your Honor has presented to PIGA separate covered claims? If they are separate covered claims and if PIGA has to pay out $300,000 on each claim, it doesn't make sense to reward PIGA for refusing to pay each of those claims, wait for PIGA to be sued, and then for PIGA to assert in the lawsuit that Your Honor brought,
9 ah ha, there is only one covered claim here because Your Honor is the "person" who's making the claim.
Appendix at 145-46. Unlike the district court, we find this
analogy instructive and persuasive.
Accordingly, we reject the district court's conclusion that
the PIGA Act only allows insureds to receive indemnity for one
covered claim per policy. Rather, we conclude that the PIGA Act
must be read to provide insureds with indemnity for each claim
raised by underlying claimants. Each "covered claim" to which
the $299,900 statutory cap applies is appropriately read to
encompass the claims of the underlying tort victims, i.e. the
underlying claimants. There are four bases upon which we reach
our conclusion.
First, contrary to the district court's conclusion, the
plain language of the PIGA Act militates that the "covered
claims" to which the statutory cap applies include the claims of
underlying claimants. Under the PIGA Act, a "covered claim" is
"[t]he claim of a person who at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or liability was a resident" of Pennsylvania.
40 P.S. § 1701.103(5)(a)(i) (emphasis added).4 A "person" is
defined as "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an
association, or any other holder of or claimant under a property and casualty policy." 40 P.S. § 1701.103(8) (emphasis added).
Therefore in Pennsylvania a "covered claim" for which PIGA must
pay up to $300,000 is:
4 There is an additional debate as to whether PIGA must pay the underlying claims of asbestos victims who are not residents of Pennsylvania. That issue is not before us on this appeal and we do not address it here.
10 The claim of a [holder of or claimant under a property and casualty insurance policy] who at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or liability was a resident of [Pennsylvania].
40 P.S. § 1701.103(5)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
Second, as stated above, the intent of the Pennsylvania
legislature in passing the PIGA Act was to "provide a means for
payment of covered claims . . . , to avoid excessive delays in
payment of such claims, and to avoid financial loss to
policyholders as a result of the insolvency of an insurer." 40
P.S. § 1701.102(1). While we recognize that the Pennsylvania
legislature did not intend for all insureds in all cases to be
placed in the same position they would have been if their insurer
had not become insolvent, see Blackwell v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 567 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), the
result that the district court's decision would bring, whereby
Porter could only recover $899,700 -- a mere 6% of the $15
million Porter would have been able to obtain from Integrity --is
inconsistent with the stated policy goals of the legislation.
Third, it is only logical that the covered claims for which Porter seeks indemnity be viewed as comprised of the individual
claims of the underlying tort victims. When multiple persons
have been injured in an accident, each injured person has a
separate covered claim even if their individual claims are
asserted by the insured -- in this case Porter -- rather than the
individuals themselves. Indeed, under Pennsylvania's "direct
action" statute, tort victims may sue an insurer directly if the
11 insured has gone bankrupt or become insolvent.5 Therefore,
provided the relevant residency requirements are met, it makes
logical sense that PIGA indemnify Porter for each claim of the
injured tort victims, given that these tort victims could have
instituted claims against Integrity themselves.
Finally, the district court's conclusion that PIGA need only
indemnify Porter once for each of the three policies would have
grave policy consequences if allowed to stand. The district
court's conclusion would encourage PIGA or a carrier insuring
"covered claims" to limit its liability by wrongly refusing to
honor the individual injury claims presented by the insured. When
the insured filed suit to compel payment, the numerous claims of
those injured suddenly would be converted into a single claim by
the insured and be subject to the maximum limit. As a result,
5 This statute reads as follows: No policy of insurance against loss or damage resulting from accident to or injury suffered by an employee or other person and for which the person insured is liable . . . shall hereafter be issued or delivered in this State by any corporation, or other insurer, authorized to do business in this State, unless there shall be contained within such policy a provision that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the person insured shall not release the insurance carrier from payment of damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during the life of such policy, and stating that in case execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied in an action brought by the injured person, or his or her personal representative in case death results from the accident, because of such insolvency or bankruptcy, then an action may be maintained by the injured person, or his or her personal representative, against such corporation, under the terms of the policy, for the amount of the judgment in the said action, not exceeding the amount of the policy. 40 P.S. § 117.
12 insureds would receive virtually no coverage for their claims
and, even if the victims were ultimately able to obtain coverage
through the direct action statute, extensive delays and
litigation would result.
Our conclusion that the "covered claims" at issue encompass
the claims of the underlying tort victims finds further support
from several cases which present a similar issue and which
interpret insurance statutes from other states that, like
Pennsylvania's Act, are based upon the model bill.
A.
The case which most closely parallels this action is the
Connecticut Supreme Court case, Connecticut Insurance Guaranty
Association v. Union Carbide Corp., 585 A.2d 1216 (Conn. 1991).
Union Carbide grew out of the 1984 chemical disaster in Bhopal,
India, which resulted in the deaths of 2,300 people and injuries
to more than 200,000 others. Id. at 1219. Union Carbide brought
a declaratory judgment action against the Connecticut Insurance
Guaranty Association (CIGA) to resolve numerous issues relating
to CIGA's obligation to reimburse Union Carbide for claims
arising out of the disaster. Union Carbide had reached a
settlement agreement with the Indian government and had then
approached its insurance companies for reimbursement. The
insurance companies had become insolvent, and Union Carbide thus
approached CIGA for indemnity. Id.
One of the primary claims raised in Union Carbide was
whether a "covered claim" referred to the claim of each victim
who filed an action against Union Carbide or whether Union
13 Carbide presented only one covered claim which was subject to the
$300,000 limit. Just as PIGA argues in the instant action, CIGA
argued that the only covered claims were Union Carbide's six
claims, each under one of six insurance policies issued by the
insolvent insurers, limiting Union Carbide to a maximum recovery
of $1,800,000. Id. at 1220.
The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed and held that CIGA
was required to pay the claims presented up to the total limits
of the underlying policies. The Supreme Court based its
conclusion on several grounds, each of which is equally
applicable in the instant case.
First, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that, under
the Connecticut statute, the Bhopal victims could sue Union
Carbide's insolvent insurance companies directly under a
Connecticut statute. Id. This direct action statute allows a
tort victim to file an action directly against an insurer if the
victim has obtained a judgment against an insured that remains
unsatisfied for thirty days. Id.; see also C.G.S.A. § 38-175.
Thus, sheer logic dictated that CIGA be held liable for the
claims of the individual tort victims. As explained above,
Pennsylvania also has a "direct action" statute allowing tort
victims to sue an insurer directly if the insured has become
bankrupt or insolvent. 40. P.S. § 117. Therefore, the
Connecticut Supreme Court's reasoning applies to the instant
action.
Second, the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected CIGA's
argument that the definition of "covered claim" only encompassed
14 the claim of the insured Union Carbide, rather than the claims of
the underlying tort victims. Union Carbide, 585 A.2d at 1221.
The Court recognized that under the statute a "covered claim"
encompasses the claims of "the claimant or insured." C.G.S.A.
§38-275(4) (emphasis added). The Court thus concluded that under
this language either the insured resident of Connecticut or the
underlying claimant, in that case the Bhopal victims, might
present a "covered claim" to CIGA. Id.
While the language in Pennsylvania's statute is not
identical to that in Connecticut's statute,6 it, too, suggests
the same conclusion. As explained above, when the definition of
"person" from 40 P.S. § 1701.103(8) is inserted in the definition
of "covered claim" the resulting definition makes clear that the
Connecticut Supreme Court's conclusion that a "covered claim" may
be presented by either the insured or a claimant is equally true
in Pennsylvania: The claim of a [holder of or claimant under a property and casualty insurance policy] who at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or liability was a resident of [Pennsylvania].
6 We recognize that the definition of a "covered claim" in the Connecticut statute at issue in Union Carbide differs in some respects from the definition in the Pennsylvania statute at issue here. For example, under the Connecticut statute, a claim against a Connecticut resident insured could qualify as "covered" even if asserted by a non-resident based on an event occurring outside of the state of Connecticut. See Union Carbide, 585 A.2d at 1220. Under the Pennsylvania statute, by contrast, a claim can qualify as "covered" only if it is either "(i) The claim of a person who at the time of the insured event resulting in loss or liability was a resident of this Commonwealth, or (ii) A claim arising from an insured event resulting in loss or liability to property which was permanently situated in this Commonwealth." 46 P.S. §1701.103(5)(a). This difference, however, is not significant for present purposes.
15 40 P.S. § 1701.103(5)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
Third, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled as it did because
it concluded that such a ruling was consistent with the intent of
the legislature: Apart from our conclusion that the text of the act does not support the imposition of a $300,000 limit upon [Union Carbide's] claim for indemnification under each of the six policies whose insurers have become insolvent, we are also persuaded that the remedial purpose of this legislation would be largely defeated by such a restriction. Although this case involves a substantial indemnification claim of $32,500,000 presented by a large corporate enterprise, it is not exceptional today for individuals to carry liability insurance with limits far in excess of $300,000. The recovery of $300,000 by a single victim of an automobile accident is not extraordinary, and when there are multiple victims the total liability of the insured can readily exceed that amount. If we were to accept CIGA's argument that only an insured may present a covered claim and that such a claim for indemnification from a single occurrence is limited to $300,000, the protection of Connecticut residents against losses resulting from insolvency of insurance carriers, which the legislature intended to provide, would often prove illusory.
Union Carbide, 585 A.2d at 1222-23. There can be no doubt that
this same rationale applies in the context of Pennsylvania. As mentioned above, Connecticut's Insurance Guaranty Act is based
upon the same model bill as the Act in Pennsylvania, and the
purpose of Pennsylvania's Act is to "provide a means for the
payment of covered claims . . . and to avoid financial loss to
claimants or policyholders as a result of the insolvency of an
insurer." 40 P.S. § 1201.102(1).
A case recently decided by this court involving a similar
issue suggests that the reasoning in Union Carbide may be
16 appropriately adopted by this court. In T & N v. Pennsylvania
Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 44 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1994), we were
presented with the question of whether an insured company who had
entered into one settlement agreement for all underlying claims
with its now-insolvent insurer and sought recovery from PIGA,
presented one covered claim for recovery or multiple covered
claims. T & N argued that under the reasoning of Union Carbide
it presented separate covered claims for each of the underlying
claimants. We considered Union Carbide and determined that the
facts of Union Carbide were different from T & N's scenario: Union Carbide settled with the underlying claimants. The settlement agreement can thus be viewed as the embodiment of each claim which was filed against Union Carbide. However, in the present case, T & N settled with the insurance company. The settlement agreement is not the embodiment of claims filed by the underlying claimants . . . . Payment was not related to the individual claims which had been filed. As a result, we find that in light of the fact that T & N had entered into a single settlement agreement with [its insurer] which encompassed all of its claims against the insurance company, it only has one covered claim which is subject to the $300,000 statutory limit.
Id. at 184 (emphasis added). We did not discredit Union Carbide's reasoning in any way. To the contrary, this court's
language in T & N indicates that, had T & N entered into a
settlement agreement with the underlying claimants rather than
the insurance company, we would have followed Union Carbide's
lead.
The facts in this case are very similar to those in Union
Carbide. Porter has entered into settlement agreements with
underlying claimants, and those settlements "can thus be viewed
17 as the embodiment of each claim which was filed," id., against
Porter.
B.
Our construction of the statute is supported by cases from
other jurisdictions as well. These cases all grow out of
insurance disputes involving state Guaranty Agencies and statutes
that are based on the model bill, and their reasoning is very
much applicable to the instant case. See, e.g., Plymouth Rubber
Co. v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, No. 87-440, slip
op. (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 1988); Commercial Union Insurance
Company v. Sepco Corp. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18378 (S.D. Alab.
1989), aff'd, 918 F.2d 920 (11th Cir. 1990); Oglesby v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, 832 P.2d 834 (Okla. 1992).
For example, in Plymouth Rubber Co., the Massachusetts
Superior Court held that each underlying claim raised against
Plymouth Rubber Company, for which Plymouth Rubber sought
indemnification from Massachusetts's Guaranty Fund, was a covered
claim separately subject to the statutory $300,000 limit.
Plymouth Rubber Co., No. 87-440, slip op. at 5. The court
explained as follows: Under the Ideal Mutual insurance policy . . . the covered claims which arose out of the policy were the obligations to "indemnify the insured for all sums which the insured shall become legally liable to pay as damages arising out of claims made" against the insured in excess of the policy's $250,000.00 aggregate annual deductible. According to this language in the policy, Ideal Mutual was obligated to indemnify the plaintiff for all customer claims. . . . As such, every demand for indemnification was a covered claim.
18 Id. The language of the insuring obligations in the policies
issued by Integrity to Porter is substantially similar to the
above quoted language in Plymouth Rubber's policy: . . . [Integrity Insurance] Company hereby agrees . . . to pay all sums, as more fully defined by the term ultimate net loss, for which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of liability (a) imposed upon the insured by law or (b) assumed under contract or agreement by the insured arising out of personal injury, property damage or advertising liability caused by an occurrence.
App. at 29. Therefore, the reasoning of Plymouth Rubber applies in the instant case as well.
Guidance in this area is also offered by Sepco Corp. There
the district court analyzed the purpose of the Alabama Insurance
Guaranty Association Act, which is substantially the same as
Pennsylvania's Act, and it concluded that the Alabama Insurance
Guaranty Association (AIGA) was responsible for paying each of
the underlying 2,000 claims made against Sepco by persons
claiming bodily injury from exposure to Sepco's asbestos-
containing products: AIGA argues there is one aggregate claim, limiting AIGA's liability to $149,900.00. This argument is without merit. Each of the over 2,000 underlying cases produces a separate claim. To accept this specious argument would defeat the intent of the liability policy which [the insolvent insurer] issued Sepco and would leave Sepco substantially without insurance for the year's time during which [the insolvent insurer] supposedly covered its liability. . . . This interpretation would defeat the intent of the Alabama Legislature when it enacted "The Act" to protect the public against insolvency of insurance carriers.
Sepco Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18378 at *13 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). When the Eleventh Circuit reviewed
19 and affirmed this case on appeal, it declined to even address
this specific claim by AIGA, noting it was "without merit and
warrant[s] no discussion." Sepco Corp., 918 F.2d at 923 n.3.
Finally, Porter's position is supported by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's decision in Oglesby v. Liberty Mutual. There,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the wife and two minor
children of a man killed in an industrial accident each presented
their own separate covered claim for which they were entitled to
Oklahoma's $150,000 statutory cap of recovery from the Oklahoma
Guaranty Association. The Court noted that the portion of
Oklahoma's statute in which the obligations of the Oklahoma
Guaranty Association are laid out requires that "such obligations
shall include the amount of each covered claim which is less than
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) . . . ." 36
Okla. Stat. § 2007 (emphasis added). The Court explained, "[t]he
Legislature's use of the word 'each' rather than 'all' covered
claims indicates that it anticipated the possibility of multiple
recoveries." Oglesby, 832 P.2d at 840. The same logic applies
in the context of Pennsylvania where the statute explains that
PIGA's "obligation shall include only that amount of each covered
claim which is in excess of one hundred dollars ($100), and is
less than three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000)." 40 P.S.
§1701.201(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
We find that the rationale applied by these other courts is
equally applicable to the facts of the instant case. We find it
all the more persuasive and compelling because PIGA has not
20 pointed to any case in any other court, nor have we found any, in
which this issue was decided differently.
IV.
We now briefly address PIGA's argument that Porter is only
entitled to recover $299,900 for each of its three Integrity
policies because the policies cover liability per "occurrence,"
and injuries caused by the ongoing manufacture and sale of
asbestos are all deemed to be part of the same "occurrence."
PIGA asserts that when two Pennsylvania superior court
cases, Vickodil v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 514
A.2d 635 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), allocatur denied, 523 A.2d 346
(1987), and Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Long, 564 A.2d 937
(1989), aff'd, 597 A.2d 1124 (1991), are read together a rule
emerges requiring that in instances where an insurance policy has
a "per occurrence" limit but has no "per person" limit, the
statutory limit of $299,900 applies to and substitutes for the
occurrence limit, thus entitling the insured to only one covered
claim under the policy. We have reviewed both of these cases at
length and conclude there is no merit to PIGA's argument
whatsoever.
Furthermore, there is no support in the language of the Act
itself that suggests that it is appropriate for PIGA to consider
a "covered claim" to be all claims arising out of one occurrence.
The language of the statute provides that PIGA's "obligation
shall include only that amount of each covered claim" up to the
21 statutory limit. 40 P.S. § 1701.201(b)(1)(i). The legislature
used the phrase "each covered claim," not "each occurrence." This
plain language in and of itself indicates that PIGA is obligated
to pay up to the statutory cap on a per claim basis, not a per
occurrence basis. See, e.g., Ramage v. Alabama Insurance
Guaranty Association, 919 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that "the statutory language places a limit on the
liability amount for a claim . . . but does not limit the number
of claims which can be asserted from a particular occurrence");
Union Carbide, 585 A.2d at 1222 (holding that in context of
Connecticut statute "[t]here is no basis for substituting the
word 'occurrence' for the word 'claim'"); Florida Insurance
Guaranty Association v. Cole, 573 So.2d 868, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that each injured person is entitled to file
a claim regardless of whether injuries arose from the same
occurrence); Trans Louisiana Gas Company v. Louisiana Insurance
Guaranty Association, 652 So.2d 686, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1995) (holding that the claims of two injured children arising
from one occurrence constituted two covered claims for which LIGA
was responsible to the statutory limit).
One might well argue that the Pennsylvania legislature never
intended to compensate claims of this magnitude. Mass tort
claims may not have been considered or contemplated. However,
the statute makes clear that individual claims are subject to the
statutory limitations and those limitations are not further
22 limited when asserted by the insured seeking indemnification for
claims paid to or pending by others entitled to assert them.
Our interpretation carries out the legislative policy of
protecting the insured and other claimants when an insurance
carrier becomes insolvent and is unable to honor its commitments.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the order of
the district court granting partial summary judgment in favor of
PIGA.