Gysklys Jimenez Martinez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

GYSKLYS JIMENEZ MARTINEZ,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-594-KCD-DNF

v.

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

Respondent. /

ORDER Petitioner Gysklys Jimenez Martinez has filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 1.)1 He claims that his continued imprisonment violates the Fifth Amendment. Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 5.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED. I. Background Martinez is a native of Cuba who entered the United States in 1995. (Doc. 5-1 at 2.) Removal proceedings were started, and in 2009, an immigration judge ordered him removed to Cuba. (Id. at 2, 4.) When that removal did not come to fruition, Martinez was placed on an order of supervision.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. In 2025, after Martinez was convicted of burglary, fraud, and theft, he was detained by ICE, his supervision was revoked, and he was served with a

notice of removal to Mexico. (Id. at 2-5, 9, 14.) This petition for writ of habeas corpus followed. (Doc. 1.) II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to

issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

III. Discussion The analysis begins with a jurisdictional challenge. Respondents halfheartedly argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips this Court of jurisdiction to even hear Martinez’s plea because it arises from the “execution” of a removal

order. (Doc. 5 at 3.) We need not spend long here. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that § 1252(g) is narrowly tailored to three discrete actions, and it does not operate as a blanket ban on habeas review for prolonged detention. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018). Indeed, if the Government’s sweeping interpretation were correct, Zadvydas

v. Davis —the seminal case where the Supreme Court held it could consider a habeas challenge to unlawful, prolonged immigration detention—would have been stopped in its tracks before ever reaching the merits. The Court is satisfied it has jurisdiction to decide whether Martinez’s detention is lawful,

as interpreted by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 688 (2001) (citing § 1252(g) yet concluding “that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention”).

Respondents also argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars judicial review. (Doc. 5 at 4.) Not so. The Eleventh Circuit has held that § 1252(b)(9) “only affects cases that involve[] review of an order of removal.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d 1250,

1257 (11th Cir. 2020). Martinez is not challenging his removal proceedings— he is challenging the antecedent detention. So “the Government’s reliance on § 1252(b)(9) is misplaced.” Fernandez-Garcia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 1-20-CV- 23599-UU, 2021 WL 8821923, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2021).

That leaves the merits. Here, Martinez invokes the Fifth Amendment to argue that his detention has been for a “prolonged period.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) A bit of statutory plumbing helps set the stage. When a removal order becomes final, the INA starts a 90-day clock. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). During that

window, the government must keep the noncitizen detained. Id. § 1231(a)(2). If that initial period expires without a successful removal, the government has a choice: it may release the individual on supervision or keep them locked up. Id. § 1231(a)(6). Read literally, the statute places no outer limit on that

continued confinement. But holding someone indefinitely is a constitutional non-starter. So the Supreme Court read a practical limitation into the text. The government, the Court held, may only detain a noncitizen for a period “reasonably necessary” to actually bring about their removal. Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 701. And to give lower courts a workable yardstick, the Court drew a line at six months: any post-removal detention lasting six months or less is “presumptively reasonable.” Id. “In order to state a claim under Zadvydas,” then, “the alien not only

must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002).

Apply that framework here, and Martinez’s claim immediately runs into a math problem: he simply has not been detained long enough. To trigger a Zadvydas inquiry, a noncitizen must be confined for more than six months. Martinez, however, has only been detained since November 10—leaving him well short of that mark. See, e.g., Rivera v. Hassell, No. 4:15-01497-WMA-

SGC, 2016 WL 4257692, at *3 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2016). Because Martinez has not been physically detained for six months, his Fifth Amendment claim fails. See Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t & Removal Operations, No. 3:25-CV-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla.

Jan. 26, 2026); , Guerra-Castro v. Parra, No. 1:25-CV-22487, 2025 WL 1984300, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”). Martinez also notes that the conditions at Alligator Alcatraz are “cruel,

inhumane, and degrading.” (Doc. 1-1 at 1.) To the extent this is an argument for habeas relief, it is summarily rejected. Challenges to conditions of confinement are not appropriately raised in the habeas context. See Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Petitioner’s § 2241 petition

is not the appropriate vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as such a claim challenges the conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement.”). IV. Conclusion

Martinez’s legal challenge to the length of his detention is premature, and therefore, his habeas petition must be DISMISSED. However, this dismissal is without prejudice to Martinez refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 25, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek United States District Judge