NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2600-17T1
G.Y.,
Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Respondent,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF HANOVER,
Defendant-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant.
Argued December 18, 2018 – Decided February 19, 2019
Before Judges Rothstadt, Gilson, and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-0698-17.
Shalom D. Stone argued the cause for appellant/cross- respondent (Stone Conroy LLC, attorneys; Shalom D. Stone and James D. DeBartolo, of counsel and on the briefs).
Stephen E. Trimboli argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Trimboli & Prusinowski, LLC, attorneys; Stephen E. Trimboli, of counsel and on the briefs; Lauren W. Kavanagh and Sarah Gober, on the briefs). PER CURIAM
This appeal arises out of disciplinary charges brought by the Township of
Hanover (Township) that resulted in the termination of employment of a police
officer. The officer, G.Y.,1 appeals from a January 2, 2018 judgment that denied
his action to dismiss the disciplinary charges and vacate the decision of the
Township to terminate his employment. The Township cross-appeals from a
decision of the trial court to allow G.Y., on de novo review, to supplement the
record with his testimony. We reject the arguments on both the appeal and cross-
appeal and affirm.
I.
The Township terminated G.Y.'s employment as a police officer after
finding he had committed disciplinary infractions, including two counts of
misconduct, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. Those disciplinary infractions arose out of a
domestic dispute between G.Y. and his wife, K.Y.
On June 18, 2014, K.Y. called the Township Police Department to report
a domestic dispute. Police officers responded to the home. Upon arrival, an
officer found G.Y. standing outside on the porch. G.Y. told the officer that his
1 Because the disciplinary charges involve allegations of domestic violence, we use initials to protect privacy interests and the confidentiality of the record. See R. 1:38-3(c)(12). A-2600-17T1 2 wife was "drunk again, like she is every night." The officer then entered the
house and saw K.Y. walking out of a downstairs bathroom, crying and visibly
upset. The officer later testified that K.Y. did not appear intoxicated. K.Y.
informed the officer that she and G.Y were in the midst of a divorce proceeding,
and they had gotten into an argument.
Later that evening, K.Y. provided the officer with a signed, written
statement, which read:
I, [K.Y.], hereby make the following voluntary statement. At approximately nine p.m. I was sitting in the TV room in chair, [G.Y.] was on couch, I asked him why he keeps moving the ottoman I use. He said why do you worry about that when you are destroying the family and filing for divorce. I am trying to make arrangements for Disney. I told him I was not going to Disney, we were getting a divorce. He said there was no reason to get divorced. I said there was because he is abusive. He then said he is not abusive. He then said his lawyer said I was being a bitch and was trying to take the houses in Arizona. He said if I try to take the houses in Arizona he would take me and the family down. He walked over and whispered this in my face. I then got up and walked into the study to get the house phone as I felt threatened. He followed me and said you are not calling the police and knocked the phone out of my hand. I then went to get my cell phone and he said again if I try to take his houses he will take me down. I was in the TV room. He pushed me down, slapped the cell phone out of my hand and to the ground, and said I am taking you down. He got on top of me on couch and put both hands tightly around my throat. I was screaming, trying to scream. He got off
A-2600-17T1 3 of me and I ran toward the front door. He pushed me into the love seat in the front room and the love seat slid into the toys about one foot. I then got up and tried to get out of the front door. He said do not call police, I will lose my job and it would be your fault. I was on front porch. He gave me my cell phone. I went in bathroom, locked door and called 911. Outside the door he kept whispering not to call the police or it would be my fault if he lost his job.
Shortly after this incident, G.Y. was arrested and charged with simple
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1), based on the allegation that he injured his wife
when he "put[ ] his hands around [her] throat causing red marks around her
throat and also knock[ed] a cordless telephone out of her hand causing an injury
to her right hand[.]" At that time, K.Y. was granted a domestic violence
temporary restraining order (TRO) against G.Y.
On July 15, 2014, a consent order with civil restraints was entered in the
divorce action between K.Y and G.Y. That consent order provided that K.Y.
would dismiss her TRO against G.Y., but the dismissal would not be deemed an
admission that G.Y. did not commit the alleged acts of domestic violence.
Thereafter, the TRO and the charges of simple assault against G.Y. were
dismissed.
In October 2014, the Township's police department began an internal
affairs investigation of the June 18, 2014 incident. As part of the investigation,
A-2600-17T1 4 a lieutenant conducted a recorded interview with K.Y on October 24, 2014, and
a recorded interview with G.Y. on November 24, 2014. On March 2, 2015, the
lieutenant submitted his internal affairs report. The report concluded that G.Y.'s
actions on June 18, 2014, constituted a "domestic violence incident" and that
G.Y. was not "truthful in answering [the] questions regarding [the] incident
during [the] interview on" November 24, 2014.
The Chief of Police received the report on August 12, 2015, and on August
25, 2015, notice of charges were served on G.Y. The notice included two
charges, both of which alleged misconduct under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. Charge
one alleged that G.Y. assaulted his wife during an altercation. That charge also
stated that G.Y. had received "several demeanor complaints involving women
in [his] disciplinary history," and had received "a total of thirteen (13) sustained
disciplinary charges since [he] w[as] hired with the Township of Hanover Police
Department on August 17, 1992." Charge two alleged that G.Y. gave untruthful
statements concerning the physical altercation with his wife during an internal
affairs investigation interview. The recommended penalty for both charges was
termination of employment.
G.Y. disputed the charges and requested an evidentiary hearing. Prior to
the hearing, G.Y. moved to dismiss the disciplinary charges under the "forty-
A-2600-17T1 5 five day rule" of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. A hearing officer heard oral argument
on the motion to dismiss and recommended that the motion be denied. The
Township adopted that recommendation.
The evidentiary hearing was conducted on September 23 and November
21, 2016. At the hearing, the Township presented testimony from five police
officers who had responded to the residence on June 18, 2014, and the lieutenant
who had conducted the internal affairs investigation. K.Y. also testified, but
when she could not remember the events of June 18, 2014, her written statement
concerning that evening was admitted into evidence and read into the record.
On March 9, 2017, the hearing officer, in a comprehensive thirty-eight-
page opinion, reviewed the testimony and evidence presented during the hearing
and determined that the "charges for misconduct as to both counts ha [d] been
sustained." The hearing officer recommended termination of G.Y.'s
employment. Shortly thereafter, the Township accepted and adopted the hearing
officer's report and determinations with one exception that is not relevant to th is
appeal. G.Y. was then terminated from his employment as a police officer.
On March 24, 2017, G.Y. filed a complaint in the Law Division seeking a
de novo review of the disciplinary charges and his termination in accordance
with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150. G.Y. also asserted a violation of the "forty-five day
A-2600-17T1 6 rule" established in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. In conducting its review, the trial
court allowed G.Y. to supplement the record with his own testimony.
Following two days of hearings, on January 2, 2018, the trial court entered
a judgment and written statement of reasons finding G.Y. had engaged in
"serious" misconduct warranting termination. Initially, the trial court ruled that
the forty-five day rule did not apply to the charges of misconduct, and that to
the extent that the rule was applicable to the remainder of the charges, those
charges were brought within the required time. The trial court then found that
the written statement by K.Y. was admissible as a recorded recollection under
Rule 803(c)(5). N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5). In admitting that written statement, the trial
court found that K.Y. could not recall the events of June 18, 2014, but she had
given a written statement that same evening, and at the evidentiary hearing she
testified that the written statement was drafted in her handwriting and she had
signed the statement. The trial court then found that K.Y.'s written statement
was "competent evidence" that was reliable and appropriate for the court to
consider in its de novo review.
The trial court evaluated G.Y.'s testimony and found that, when
considered on its own, it was sufficient to establish a predicate act of domestic
violence in the form of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). In that regard,
A-2600-17T1 7 the trial court found that G.Y. knew that K.Y. felt threatened, he knew that K.Y.
wanted to call the police, but he twice directly interfered with K.Y.'s ability to
call the police, and then refused to leave the home.
G.Y. now appeals the judgment entered by the trial court. The Township
cross-appeals from the trial court's ruling allowing G.Y. to supplement the
record and to testify before the trial court. We first address G.Y.'s appeal .
II.
On his appeal, G.Y. challenges the de novo review by the Law Division
and argues (1) the disciplinary charges were barred by the forty-five day rule;
(2) the court relied on inadmissible hearsay; (3) the finding of misconduct was
not supported by the evidence in the record; and (4) even if his conduct
warranted sanctions, termination of employment was inappropriate under the
doctrine of progressive discipline. We are not persuaded by any of these
arguments.
A. The Forty-Five Day Rule
The Township is a non-civil service jurisdiction. Therefore, the statutory
framework of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 to -151 governs disciplinary proceedings
brought against police officers. Ruroede v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 214
N.J. 338, 343 (2013). That framework has a "forty-five day rule" "for the filing
A-2600-17T1 8 of a complaint alleging a violation of the internal rules and regulations of a law
enforcement unit." Aristizibal v. City of Atlantic City, 380 N.J. Super. 405,
408-09 (Law Div. 2005); see N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147. In relevant part, the statute
provides:
A complaint charging a violation of the internal rules and regulations established for the conduct of a law enforcement unit shall be filed no later than the 45th day after the date on which the person filing the complaint obtained sufficient information to file the matter upon which the complaint is based. The 45-day time limit shall not apply if an investigation of a law enforcement officer for a violation of the internal rules or regulations of the law enforcement unit is included directly or indirectly within a concurrent investigation of that officer for a violation of the criminal laws of this State. The 45-day limit shall begin on the day after the disposition of the criminal investigation. The 45-day requirement of this paragraph for the filing of a complaint against an officer shall not apply to a filing of a complaint by a private individual.
A failure to comply with said provisions as to the service of the complaint and the time within which a complaint is to be filed shall require a dismissal of the complaint.
[N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147.]
The rule applies only to violations of internal rules and regulations; it does
not apply to charges of misconduct. McElwee v. Borough of Fieldsboro, 400
N.J. Super. 388, 394 (App. Div. 2008). Moreover, in calculating the forty-five-
A-2600-17T1 9 day timeframe, "it is not the happening of the event giving rise to discipline that
starts the clock for purposes of evaluating timeliness, but the receipt of
'sufficient information' by the one who is authorized to file the charge that is
significant." Roberts v. Div. of State Police, 191 N.J. 516, 524 (2007).
Here, we affirm the trial court for two reasons. First, as just noted, the
rule applies only to violations of internal rules and regulations; it does not apply
to charges of misconduct. Second, the violations of the departmental rules and
regulations were brought within the requisite time. The person authorized to
file the charges against G.Y. was the Township Chief of Police. The record
establishes that the Chief received the internal affairs investigation report on
August 12, 2015. Thirteen days later, on August 25, 2015, notice of the charges
were filed against G.Y. Consequently, the charges were filed within the forty-
five day timeframe.
B. The Findings of Misconduct
G.Y. argues that the trial court relied on inadmissible hearsay in finding
that he committed misconduct. Specifically, he challenges the court's decision
to admit and consider K.Y.'s written statement from June 18, 2014. G.Y.
contends that the statement is inadmissible because the court failed to consider
its trustworthiness. He also argues that, because K.Y.'s statement is
A-2600-17T1 10 inadmissible hearsay, the court's finding of misconduct violates the residuum
rule and should be overturned. G.Y. then argues that the trial court only relied
on his testimony in finding misconduct, but his testimony did not support a
finding of misconduct. We begin our analysis of these arguments by identifying
the standard of review under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 and our scope of review on
appeal.
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 permits police officers in non-civil service
municipalities to seek de novo review of disciplinary actions by the Law
Division of the Superior Court. Specifically, the statute provides:
Any member or officer of a police department or force in a municipality . . . , who has been tried and convicted upon any charge or charges, may obtain a review thereof by the Superior Court . . . . The court shall hear the cause de novo on the record below and may either affirm, reverse or modify such conviction.
[N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150.]
The statute further provides that "[e]ither party may supplement the record with
additional testimony subject to the rules of evidence." Ibid.
Permitting de novo review by the Law Division is designed "to provide
employees of non-civil service communities with an independent tribunal to
review their disciplinary actions." Ruroede, 214 N.J. at 357 (quoting In re
Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 578 (1990)). Thus, the Law Division "consider[s] the
A-2600-17T1 11 matter 'anew, afresh [and] for a second time.'" Ibid. (second alteration in
original) (quoting Phillips, 117 N.J. at 578). Accordingly, the court "makes its
own findings of fact." Ibid. (quoting Phillips, 117 N.J. at 578). While the court
"must give due deference to the conclusions drawn by the original tribuna l
regarding credibility, those initial findings are not controlling." Ibid. (quoting
Phillips, 117 N.J. at 579). Instead, the court "review[s] the record to determine
whether there is sufficient, competent evidence to prove the charges against [the
officer] by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 361.
Appellate courts play "a limited role in reviewing the de novo
proceeding." Phillips, 117 N.J. at 579. "[T]he court's 'function on appeal is not
to make new factual findings but simply to decide whether there was adequate
evidence before the [ ] Court to justify its finding of guilt.'" Ibid. (second
alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).
Accordingly, an appellate court should not disturb the de novo findings of the
trial court unless "the decision below was 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable'
or '[un]supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole[.]'"
Ibid. (first alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J.
571, 580 (1980)). An appellate court does not, however, defer to the trial court's
legal conclusions. Cosme v. Borough of E. Newark Twp. Comm., 304 N.J.
A-2600-17T1 12 Super. 191, 203 (App. Div. 1997) (first citing In re J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117
(1997); then citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140
N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Hearsay that is admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence is legally
competent evidence. See Ruroede, 214 N.J. at 361-62 (referring to hearsay
evidence properly admitted under Rule 803(b)(1) as "competent evidence").
Under Rule 803(c)(5), hearsay evidence that is a "recorded recollection" is
admissible. Rule 803(c)(5) defines a recorded recollection as:
A statement concerning a matter about which the witness is unable to testify fully and accurately because of insufficient present recollection if the statement is contained in a writing or other record which (A) was made at a time when the fact recorded actually occurred or was fresh in the memory of the witness, and (B) was made by the witness or under the witness' direction or by some other person for the purpose of recording the statement at the time it was made, and (C) the statement concerns a matter of which the witness had knowledge when it was made, unless the circumstances indicate that the statement is not trustworthy; provided that when the witness does not remember part or all of the contents of a writing, the portion the witness does not remember may be read into evidence but shall not be introduced as an exhibit over objection.
[N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5).]
We review a trial court's decision to exclude or admit evidence under the hearsay
rules for an abuse of discretion. Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.
A-2600-17T1 13 Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010) (citing Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J.
480, 492 (1999)).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding K.Y.'s signed,
written statement, dated June 18, 2014, admissible under Rule 803(c)(5). First,
K.Y. had a limited memory concerning the incident that occurred on June 18,
2014. Specifically, she testified that she recalled having "a physical incident"
with G.Y., and that because of the incident she had called the police, but she
could not "recollect details" of the event. Moreover, when asked whether she
recalled preparing a written statement regarding the events on June 18, 2014,
she answered: "I believe I did." Nonetheless, when she reviewed the document
to see if it would refresh her recollection, she explained that she recognized her
signature on the document, but the document itself did not help her recall details
of the incident.
Next, the statement was made at approximately 11:15 p.m. on the evening
of the incident. That is, the statement was made less than two-and-a-half hours
from the time of the alleged incident. Accordingly, the second requirement of
Rule 803(c)(5) is satisfied as the statement was made at a time when the facts
recorded were fresh in K.Y.'s memory.
A-2600-17T1 14 Third, the statement was made by K.Y. as evidenced by her testimony that
she believed she gave the police a statement on that date, and that she recognized
her signature on the document. Lastly, the statement concerns a matter of which
K.Y. had knowledge. K.Y. was personally involved in the incident.
G.Y. argues that the court's decision to admit the statement under Rule
803(c)(5) was an error because the court did not address the trustworthiness of
K.Y.'s statement. That argument is not persuasive. Rule 803(c)(5) allows courts
to bar a recorded statement when "the circumstances indicate that the statement
is not trustworthy[.]" N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5). Here, there was no indication of
untrustworthiness. In that regard, the trial court found that K.Y. had knowledge
about the incident when she made the statement. That finding satisfied the rule's
requirements. See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5)(C); see also Biunno, Weissband & Zegas,
Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, 1991 Supreme Court Committee Comment on
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5) (2018) ("The rule permits the exclusion of the recorded
statement if the circumstances indicate that the statement is untrustworthy.").
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting K.Y.'s
statement, it also did not violate the residuum rule. K.Y.'s statement, as a
recorded recollection, constituted legally competent evidence that supported the
finding of misconduct against G.Y. See Ruroede, 214 N.J. at 361-62 (finding
A-2600-17T1 15 hearsay evidence properly admitted under Rule 803(b)(1) is "competent
evidence").
Moreover, even if the statement is considered as hearsay, there was
sufficient other evidence to support the finding of misconduct. In an
administrative hearing, "[h]earsay may be employed to corroborate competent
proof, or competent proof may be supported or given added probative force by
hearsay testimony." Id. at 359 (quoting Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972)).
Nevertheless, "a fact finding or a legal determination cannot be based on hearsay
alone." Ibid. (quoting Weston, 60 N.J. at 51). Instead, a hearing officer's
decision must possess "a residuum of legal and competent evidence in the record
to support it." Ibid. (quoting Weston, 60 N.J. at 51). This "residuum rule" is
codified in the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(b),
and provides: "Notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, some
legally competent evidence must exist to support each ultimate finding of fact
to an extent sufficient to provide assurances of reliability and to avoid the fact
or appearance of arbitrariness."
Here, the record before the trial court included the testimony of five
officers who responded to the house on June 18, 2014, the testimony of the
lieutenant who conducted the internal affairs investigation, and the testimony of
A-2600-17T1 16 G.Y. That record supports the court's conclusion that harassment had been
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence based on G.Y.'s attempts to
prevent K.Y. from calling the police, his following of K.Y. through the house as
she attempted to call the police, and his act of hitting the phone out of K.Y.'s
hand. See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; Mann v. Mann, 270 N.J. Super. 269, 271 (App.
Div. 1993).
C. The Termination of Employment
G.Y. next argues that even if misconduct occurred, it did not warrant
termination of his employment. Instead, he contends that the court should have
imposed progressive discipline. We disagree.
On de novo review, a court may "alter a sanction imposed by an
administrative agency only 'when necessary to bring the agency's action into
conformity with its delegated authority. The [c]ourt has no power to act
independently as an administrative tribunal or to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency.'" In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007) (quoting In re Polk, 90
N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). "[W]hen reviewing administrative sanctions, 'the
test . . . is "whether such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in
light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."'" Id.
A-2600-17T1 17 at 28-29 (second alteration in original) (quoting Polk, 90 N.J. at 578); see also
In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007).
Appellate courts will uphold "dismissal of employees, without regard to
whether the employees have had substantial past disciplinary records, for
engaging in conduct that is unbecoming to the position." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at
34. In that regard, our Supreme Court has explained:
[P]rogressive discipline is not "a fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question" because "some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record." "Thus, progressive discipline has been bypassed when an employee engages in severe misconduct, especially when the employee's position involves public safety and the misconduct causes risk of harm to persons or property."
[In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 196-97 (2011) (citations omitted) (first quoting Carter, 191 N.J. at 484; then quoting Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 33).]
Police officers are held to a high standard of responsibility and conduct.
Twp. of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965).
"[A] police officer [cannot] complain that he or she is being held to an unfairly
high standard of conduct. Rather, 'it is one of the obligations he [or she]
undertakes upon voluntary entry into the public service.'" Phillips, 117 N.J. at
577 (quoting In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 142 (App. Div. 1960)). Indeed,
A-2600-17T1 18 a finding of misconduct against a police officer "need not be predicated upon
the violation of any particular rule or regulation, but may be based merely upon
violation of the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one
who stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally
correct." In re Tuch, 159 N.J. Super. 219, 224 (App. Div. 1978) (first citing
Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. at 140; then citing Asbury Park v. Civil Serv. Dep't.,
17 N.J. 419, 429 (1955)).
Here, G.Y.'s misconduct was sufficiently egregious and unbecoming to
his office to warrant removal even if he had no prior disciplinary history.
Moreover, G.Y. had thirteen sustained complaints over the course of his twenty-
four-year career. Consequently, the determination that G.Y.'s removal was
justified is supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record and was not
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
III.
On its cross-appeal, the Township challenges the trial court's decision to
allow G.Y. to supplement the record with his own testimony. The Township
initially consented to G.Y. testifying before the trial court. Nevertheless, it
asserts that G.Y.'s testimony "went well beyond the scope of what was intended
by the Legislature when it provided parties with the right to 'supplement the
A-2600-17T1 19 record' on appeal under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150." The Township argues that as
G.Y. did not testify at the disciplinary hearing, his testimony at the de novo
review did not add to "previously presented evidence, but instead presented an
entirely new facet to the case."
The Township's narrow interpretation of "supplementing the record" is not
supported by the language of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150, the relevant case law, or the
Legislature's goals in permitting de novo review of disciplinary proceedings for
police officers in non-civil service municipalities. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150
provides that on a de novo review by the Superior Court, "[e]ither party may
supplement the record with additional testimony subject to the rules of
evidence." The statute contains no language limiting the extent to which the
record may be supplemented.
Moreover, in Grasso v. Borough Council of Glassboro, 205 N.J. Super. 18
(App. Div. 1985), we broadly interpreted a party's right to supplement the record
on a de novo review under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150. See id. at 24-27. Specifically,
we found that "[t]here can be no question but that the source statute to N.J.S.A.
40A:14-150 was to afford a public employee not under civil service with a 'new
trial.'" Id. at 26. We went on to explain that the purpose of the 1981 Amendment
to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 was "to encourage a de novo trial on the record below
A-2600-17T1 20 but at the same time to permit additional testimony at the hearing in the same
manner that testimony is adduced on appeal to the Commission by a public
employee in a municipality governed by the Civil Service Act [N.J.S.A. 11A:1-
1 to 12-6]." Id. at 27. Notably, on a de novo review before the Commission, a
public employee may present "all relevant evidence and testimony[.]" Id. at 26
(citing In re Darcy, 114 N.J. Super. 454, 459 (App. Div. 1971)).
Here, the trial court permitted G.Y. to supplement the record with his own
testimony. In that testimony, G.Y. discussed the domestic dispute that occurred
on June 18, 2014. Thus, the testimony was relevant to the disciplinary charges
filed against him. Accordingly, G.Y.'s testimony appropriately supplemented
the record because it provided additional information on the incident underlying
the disciplinary charges.
Affirmed.
A-2600-17T1 21