Gwinn v. Heydon

192 P. 914, 112 Wash. 664, 1920 Wash. LEXIS 755
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 13, 1920
DocketNo. 15812
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 192 P. 914 (Gwinn v. Heydon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gwinn v. Heydon, 192 P. 914, 112 Wash. 664, 1920 Wash. LEXIS 755 (Wash. 1920).

Opinion

Bridges, J.

Appellant brought suit against respondents to recover a judgment of $3,550, being the amount of three promissory notes given by respondents to Blewett Harvester Company. The court denied appellant any relief and ordered the notes canceled. The suit was originally begun by Blewett Harvester Company. Later it was thrown into bankruptcy and the trustee was substituted as plaintiff.

The facts are substantially as follows: In 1917, respondents were extensive wheat growers, and the harvester company wished to sell them one of its combined harvesters for $3,550. Its representative informed respondents that it had such a machine on the farm of a neighbor some miles from respondents’ place, and that such machine was practically a new one, but needed some repairs. At the request of the company, respondents, on the 9th or 10th day of August, 1917, obtained the machine from the neighboring farm and brought it to their own place. On that day, or possibly the day following, at the request of the agent of the company, respondents gave to it their written order for a new combined harvester, to be shipped to them from Pendleton, Oregon. This order was to become a contract of purchase when accepted by the company at its home office. The order further provided that, upon the arrival of the machinery, respondents should give their three promissory notes, each to be dated August 10, 1917, one falling due on the date of its execution, another in one year, and the third in two years from date, and these notes were to be secured by a chattel mortgage on the machinery ordered. The order further provided that the title should remain in the company until settlement was made, that the combined harvester was warranted to be made of good material and would do good work under favorable conditions, and [666]*666that if, on six days’ trial, the machine failed to work satisfactorily, the purchaser should give written notice to the company at its-home office at Pendleton; Oregon, stating in what respects the machine failed in the warranties, and that thereafter the company should have a reasonable time in which to make the machine' do satisfactory work, and if it could not ultimately be made to work properly, the purchasers were to deliver it to the company at Pendleton and receive a new machine in its stead, upon like terms, or the return of any purchase price paid or notes given. The order further provided that a continued use of the machine for six days, without notice of defect, should be conclusive evidence that the warranties had been complied with; and that no warranties, representations or statements not contained in the order or contract should be binding on the company unless reduced to writing and approved by it at its head office. The order has written on it at this time an acceptance by the company, but the record fails to show when the acceptance was made, or that respondents were ever notified that the company had accepted it. The chattel mortgage provided for in the order was never given or requested to be given. Simultaneously with the giving of this order, respondents made, executed and delivered to the company their three promissory notes, which as to date and terms were as provided in the order.

It appears from the evidence that the company had previously sold this particular harvester to the neighbor from whom respondents obtained it, but he had refused to keep it because it would not do satisfactory work. It further appears that, at that time, the machine was very much out of repair. Eespondents appear to have known that the machine needed some minor repairs, but were not acquainted with the fact [667]*667that it had not given satisfactory service to the neighbor, or that it was not, generally speaking, in working condition. It was understood between the company and respondents that the company would be required to, and would, make certain necessary repairs in order to put the machine in condition for operation, and that the company would send to respondents’ place an expert for this purpose. This expert arrived at once and proceeded to make the necessary adjustments and repairs. He worked in this manner for two or three days before any attempt was made to put the harvester in the field. It was then taken to the field, where the expert continued to operate it for ten or twelve days. During all of this time the machine was working very unsatisfactorily, and the expert was quite constantly aligning and adjusting it and making repairs. Meanwhile the harvester was cutting and threshing grain in an unsatisfactory manner. After operating it for some ten days or more in this manner, the expert informed respondents that he could not make the harvester do reasonably good work, and that he did not believe any one else could, and directed that it be driven to the barn and surrendered to the company. At once thereafter, respondents notified the local agent of the company that the harvester was unsatisfactory and would not comply with the warranties, and that the work had ceased and the machine was at their place, where the company could obtain it. At about the same time the expert gave verbal notice to the home office of the company of the unsatisfactory work of the harvester. Very shortly thereafter this suit was brought. There is much dispute in the testimony as to whether the machine complied with the warranties of the contract. A careful reading of the record convinces us that it did not. Our conclusion in this regard is supported by the opinion of the trial judge.

[668]*668While-the facts are greatly in dispute, yet a careful reading of the record convinces us that the weight of the testimony substantiates the facts as we have outlined them.

We are satisfied that there was no consideration for the notes sued on. According to the order or contract, they were not to be given until there was a delivery of the machinery; and, in our opinion, there never was any delivery thereof to respondents. All the parties knew that the harvester was out of repair, and that it would require certain expert work to put it in reasonably suitable condition. For this purpose the company sent its agent and expert to respondents’ place. All the time the machine was there, this expert was working on it and trying to get it in condition for delivery; and he finally gave up the task and directed that the machine be taken to the barn and surrendered to the company. During all of this time the machine was in the possession of the harvester company through its agent and expert. The testimony clearly shows that the first note,, which, according to its terms, was due on the day it was given, was not to be paid until the harvester was made to work properly. An officer of the company testified that respondents were willing to get the machine, “but wanted to get a good chance' to try it out for a few days before he actually paid the note—before the note became due.” Plainly, it was not in the minds of the parties that the machine was to be considered as delivered in the condition it was when the notes were given, or until it had been repaired and put in shape to do reasonably satisfactory work. This is shown by the facts: That the contract itself does not at all fit the facts of the case; that the machine was not a new one, and was not to be shipped from the factory as the contract provided; that it [669]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ketel v. Hovick
287 P.2d 739 (Washington Supreme Court, 1955)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
192 P. 914, 112 Wash. 664, 1920 Wash. LEXIS 755, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gwinn-v-heydon-wash-1920.