GW Grundbesitz AG v. Gunn

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5

6 GW GRUNDBESITZ AG, Case No. 2:21-cv-02074-CDS-NJK 7 Plaintiff, Order 8 v. [Docket No. 33] 9 LEZLIE GUNN, et al., 10 Defendant(s). 11 Pending before the Court is Defendant Lezlie Gunn’s motion for protective order. Docket 12 No. 33. Plaintiff filed a response, Docket No. 35, and Defendant filed a reply, Docket. No. 36. 13 The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. 14 As noted by United States Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen, a magistrate judge is “not the 15 Maytag repairman of federal judges desperately hoping for something to do.” Mazzeo v. Gibbons, 16 2010 WL 3020021, at *1 (D. Nev. July 27, 2010). A pillar of federal litigation is that “[d]iscovery 17 is supposed to proceed with minimal involvement of the Court.” Cardoza v. Bloomin’ Brands, 18 Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1145 (D. Nev. 2015). Hence, discovery disputes should be presented 19 to the Court only as a last resort and only when the underlying dispute implicates truly significant 20 interests. Id. (quoting in re Convergent Techs. Security Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 21 1985)). A disagreement regarding scheduling depositions “is not the type of dispute that should 22 ordinarily require Court intervention.” Olesczuk v. Citizens One Home Loans, 2016 U.S. Dist. 23 Lexis 153342, at *5 (D. Nev. Nov. 4, 2016). 24 The instant motion practice boils down to a dispute regarding deposition scheduling. The 25 Court has been provided no good reason why this is an issue that cannot be resolved by counsel 26 without judicial oversight. Defendant has provided numerous dates when she would be available 27 for an in-person deposition. See Docket No. 36 at 6. The proffered dates would leave Plaintiff 28 1} sufficient time to propound additional discovery requests should it so desire. See Docket No. 35 2} at 11-12. Accordingly, the motion for protective order is DENIED without prejudice. 3 Counsel must engage in further conferral efforts by telephone, by video, or in person before 5:00 PM on September 8, 2022. The Court has every expectation that a compromise can be 5|| reached by counsel to resolve this dispute. In the unlikely event that is not the situation, a renewed 6|| motion for protective order must be filed by noon on September 9, 2022. Any response thereto 7|| must be filed by noon on September 12, 2022.! Any reply must be filed by noon on September 13, 2022. 9 To the extent renewed motion practice is filed, the Court reminds the parties that there is a 10] presumption that the loser will pay the expenses of the victor. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3). The Court will not hesitate to award such expenses if warranted by the rules. To the extent it does not appear 12|| that counsel engaged with sufficient cooperation at the meet-and-confer, the Court will also consider imposing sanctions. Local Rule IA 1-3(£)(3).” 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: September 6, 2022 ff PY 16 A fs : — —, Nancy J. Koppe 17 United States Magistrate Judge 18 19 20 21 22 ——_ ! The Court reminds counsel that any deadlines automatically generated by CMECF do not 24| alter the briefing schedule being set herein. Local Rule IC 3-1(d). 25 ? Counsel should not feel immunized from repercussions based on the belief that the other side is also being unreasonable. “Discovery is not designed to be a ‘tit-for-tat’ system.” Spurbeck v. Wyndham Destinations, Inc., 2021 WL 1080738, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 18, 2021). Each side has an independent responsibility to comply with its own obligations. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. The 27] Court may consider sanctions being imposed on both sides if the circumstances so warrant them. See Local Rule IA 11-8 (the Court has wide discretion to impose “any and all appropriate 28]| sanctions”).