Guzman Ramirez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 10, 2026
• Docket: 25-746
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALFREDO GUZMAN RAMIREZ, No. 25-746 Agency No. Petitioner, A089-270-000 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 6, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: LEE, KOH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Alfredo Guzman Ramirez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration

Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Guzman Ramirez’s application for cancellation of removal.

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Guzman Ramirez failed to show his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his

qualifying U.S. citizen child, R. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and

deny Guzman Ramirez’s petition for review.

“[T]he application of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard

to a given set of facts is reviewable as a question of law under [8 U.S.C.] §

1252(a)(2)(D).” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217 (2024). We review the

application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given

set of facts . . . for substantial evidence.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996,

1003 (9th Cir. 2025). To establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,”

an applicant must demonstrate a qualifying relative would suffer hardship that is

“out of the ordinary and exceedingly uncommon[;]” in other words, the hardship

“must deviate, in the extreme, from the norm.” Id. at 1006. “The agency must

compare the hardship in a given case to the hardship that results in the usual, ordinary

course when an alien is removed.” Id.

Guzman Ramirez argues that although the agency considered the evidence he

presented in support of the hardship claim, the agency erred in concluding Guzman

Ramirez’s evidence did not meet the standard for cancellation of removal. His

argument is unavailing. Guzman Ramirez testified that R. would remain in the

United States upon his father’s removal to Mexico, which the family has decided

will best support R.’s educational needs and safety due to generalized dangers

2 25-746 Guzman Ramirez perceives in Mexico (e.g., widespread “delinquency and

corruption”). The hardship claim thus rests on evidence presented by Guzman

Ramirez that R. would suffer some level of anxiety upon separation from his father

and financial stress if Guzman Ramirez’s wife becomes the family’s primary

provider in the United States.

After considering the evidence and testimony of the case in cumulative, the

agency properly concluded that the hardship R. may suffer by remaining in the

United States after Guzman Ramirez’s removal does not “deviate, in the extreme”

from hardship suffered by others in the same circumstances. See id. The IJ

concluded that R.’s asthma is not a “serious health issue[]” that qualifies as

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965,

966 (9th Cir. 2008), because Guzman Ramirez presented no medical evidence and

the asthma did not appear to affect R.’s “physical activity or enrollment [in

school].” Before the IJ, Guzman Ramirez also shared that R. has experienced

anxiety during immigration proceedings, and claimed removal “would be quite

stressful” to R. The IJ accepted as true Guzman Ramirez’s testimony that R. would

suffer the stress of family separation, but ultimately found R.’s anxiety did not

deviate beyond the ordinary stress of family separation and was further mitigated by

Guzman Ramirez’s ability to relocate to the border city of Tijuana, Mexico, where

R., who lives in Vista, California, could visit. As for potential financial stress, the

3 25-746 IJ noted that the generalized diminished economic opportunity the family may suffer

upon Guzman Ramirez’s removal to Mexico could not alone establish that R. would

experience exceptional and unusual hardship. See Matter of Andazola, 23 I. & N.

Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002) (“[I]t has long been settled that economic detriment alone

is insufficient to support even a finding of extreme hardship.”). Substantial evidence

therefore supported the agency’s decision to deny Guzman Ramirez’s application

for cancellation of removal.1

PETITON DENIED.2

1 Guzman Ramirez also briefly mentions that the IJ “should have continued the hearing to allow for an adjudication of the missing CAT application.” But he does not challenge the BIA’s determination that he waived the CAT claim before the IJ. 2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. See Dkt. 3.

4 25-746