310 Ga. 573 FINAL COPY
S20A1102. GUZMAN-PEREZ v. THE STATE.
MELTON, Chief Justice.
Following a jury trial, Appellant, Fernando Guzman-Perez,
was convicted of malice murder and concealing the death of another
in connection with the death of his wife, Yamilet Rodriguez.1 On
appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his murder conviction and that he was denied
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
1. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction because the
1 On January 6, 2016, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Appellant
for malice murder and concealing the death of another. At a jury trial from August 28-30, 2017, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and ten years concurrent for concealing the death of another. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on September 6, 2017, which he amended through new counsel on March 15, 2019. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion as amended on January 8, 2020. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. The appeal was docketed to the August 2020 term of this Court and was submitted for a decision on the briefs. evidence of his guilt was entirely circumstantial and did not rule out
a reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence. We disagree.
It is well settled that, when evaluating the sufficiency of
evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, “the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Citation and emphasis omitted.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.
S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “This Court
does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead,
evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, with
deference to the [factfinder’s] assessment of the weight and
credibility of the evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013).
Viewed in this light, the evidence presented at trial showed
that, prior to Rodriguez’s death, Appellant had been complaining to
his friends and co-workers that he was unsatisfied with the lack of
intimacy in his marriage. After midnight on Wednesday, October 7,
2 2015, Rodriguez, along with her neighbor and co-worker, Victor
Ruiz, returned home to their two-story apartment building after
finishing their workday. Appellant and Rodriguez lived in an
apartment on the top floor of the building, and Ruiz lived in an
apartment on the first floor next to the stairwell. Rodriguez and
Ruiz returned to their respective apartments, and Ruiz stayed up
for a couple of hours to watch television. He heard no noise in the
stairwell that he shared with Appellant and Rodriguez.
The next day, Appellant walked down to Ruiz’s apartment and
asked him if he had seen Rodriguez. Appellant remarked that she
might have left with another man. Ruiz told Appellant he had not
seen Rodriguez since they had returned home from work. Later that
same day, Appellant called Otoniel Garduno, the pastor of his
church, and asked for contact information for a new pediatrician.
During this conversation, Appellant made no mention of his wife’s
disappearance. On Sunday, October 11, Appellant took his and
Rodriguez’s children to church without their mother. When Pastor
Garduno inquired into her whereabouts, Appellant said that she had
3 left him and their children.
On the morning of October 12, the couple’s children,
Rodriguez’s sisters, and Pastor Garduno and his wife all gathered at
Appellant’s home and urged him to inform the police that Rodriguez
was missing. Appellant initially refused, claiming that he did not
want to get Rodriguez in trouble as she had prior charges of
abandonment of their children. Instead, Appellant led the group on
a search for Rodriguez, stopping at nearby jails, a motel near the
family home, and her place of work, but they failed to locate her or
obtain any new information as to her whereabouts. After this, the
group finally convinced Appellant to report that his wife was
missing.
When the police responded to Appellant’s missing person call
on the afternoon of October 12, Appellant informed officers that
Rodriguez had left a few days prior, after the couple had an
argument.
During the investigation into the missing person report,
Appellant consented to a search of the couple’s apartment. Officers
4 noted nothing out of the ordinary during their search. They asked
Appellant additional questions, and he told them, once again, that
Rodriguez left after an argument, this time mentioning that she had
taken a debit card and $1,700 with her.
Then, on Thursday, October 15, Appellant’s boss at Express Oil
Change was removing a stack of tires in a wooded area next to the
dumpsters behind the store, when he noticed a pungent smell
coming from an orange garbage bag behind the tires. He noted that
the bag did not come from the shop because they only used black
trash bags. He then called the police. Responding officers located
Rodriguez’s decomposing body inside the orange bag.
Dr. Carol Terry, the State’s medical examiner, performed the
autopsy of Rodriguez and testified at trial that her body was
wrapped in four separate garbage bags. The first layer contained
two garbage bags, one pulled up from the feet and one pulled down
from the head, with tape holding Rodriguez’s body in the fetal
position and wrapped tightly around her neck. Rodriguez’s body was
then placed into two additional garbage bags.
5 Dr. Terry found a single blunt force injury to the back of
Rodriguez’s neck, which, Dr. Terry opined, was not sufficient to have
caused Rodriguez’s death. Rodriguez’s body had signs of significant
decomposition including bloating, discoloration, and skin slippage.
And, due to the severe decomposition of the body, Dr. Terry could
not determine with any certainty the cause of death. However, given
the state in which Rodriguez’s body was found, Dr. Terry opined that
the manner of death was homicide.
Officers obtained a search warrant for the couple’s shared
residence, and, during this second search, they located orange trash
bags. A forensic analyst matched the bags used to conceal
Rodriguez’s body to the roll of garbage bags found in Appellant’s
home. Officers also found bloodstains in the trunk of Appellant’s
car, which were later matched to Rodriguez.
Appellant was taken into custody and brought to the
Lawrenceville Police Department for questioning. There, he told
officers that Rodriguez arrived home from work on October 7 and
that the couple showered together. Appellant wanted to have sex,
6 but Rodriguez refused. Appellant tried to make advances again
when the couple was in bed, and Rodriguez became annoyed.
Appellant told officers that Rodriguez got out of bed, changed
clothes, and left after the couple had an argument. Appellant stated
that he did not follow Rodriguez at that time.
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310 Ga. 573 FINAL COPY
S20A1102. GUZMAN-PEREZ v. THE STATE.
MELTON, Chief Justice.
Following a jury trial, Appellant, Fernando Guzman-Perez,
was convicted of malice murder and concealing the death of another
in connection with the death of his wife, Yamilet Rodriguez.1 On
appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his murder conviction and that he was denied
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
1. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction because the
1 On January 6, 2016, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Appellant
for malice murder and concealing the death of another. At a jury trial from August 28-30, 2017, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and ten years concurrent for concealing the death of another. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on September 6, 2017, which he amended through new counsel on March 15, 2019. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion as amended on January 8, 2020. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. The appeal was docketed to the August 2020 term of this Court and was submitted for a decision on the briefs. evidence of his guilt was entirely circumstantial and did not rule out
a reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence. We disagree.
It is well settled that, when evaluating the sufficiency of
evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, “the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Citation and emphasis omitted.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.
S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “This Court
does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead,
evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, with
deference to the [factfinder’s] assessment of the weight and
credibility of the evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013).
Viewed in this light, the evidence presented at trial showed
that, prior to Rodriguez’s death, Appellant had been complaining to
his friends and co-workers that he was unsatisfied with the lack of
intimacy in his marriage. After midnight on Wednesday, October 7,
2 2015, Rodriguez, along with her neighbor and co-worker, Victor
Ruiz, returned home to their two-story apartment building after
finishing their workday. Appellant and Rodriguez lived in an
apartment on the top floor of the building, and Ruiz lived in an
apartment on the first floor next to the stairwell. Rodriguez and
Ruiz returned to their respective apartments, and Ruiz stayed up
for a couple of hours to watch television. He heard no noise in the
stairwell that he shared with Appellant and Rodriguez.
The next day, Appellant walked down to Ruiz’s apartment and
asked him if he had seen Rodriguez. Appellant remarked that she
might have left with another man. Ruiz told Appellant he had not
seen Rodriguez since they had returned home from work. Later that
same day, Appellant called Otoniel Garduno, the pastor of his
church, and asked for contact information for a new pediatrician.
During this conversation, Appellant made no mention of his wife’s
disappearance. On Sunday, October 11, Appellant took his and
Rodriguez’s children to church without their mother. When Pastor
Garduno inquired into her whereabouts, Appellant said that she had
3 left him and their children.
On the morning of October 12, the couple’s children,
Rodriguez’s sisters, and Pastor Garduno and his wife all gathered at
Appellant’s home and urged him to inform the police that Rodriguez
was missing. Appellant initially refused, claiming that he did not
want to get Rodriguez in trouble as she had prior charges of
abandonment of their children. Instead, Appellant led the group on
a search for Rodriguez, stopping at nearby jails, a motel near the
family home, and her place of work, but they failed to locate her or
obtain any new information as to her whereabouts. After this, the
group finally convinced Appellant to report that his wife was
missing.
When the police responded to Appellant’s missing person call
on the afternoon of October 12, Appellant informed officers that
Rodriguez had left a few days prior, after the couple had an
argument.
During the investigation into the missing person report,
Appellant consented to a search of the couple’s apartment. Officers
4 noted nothing out of the ordinary during their search. They asked
Appellant additional questions, and he told them, once again, that
Rodriguez left after an argument, this time mentioning that she had
taken a debit card and $1,700 with her.
Then, on Thursday, October 15, Appellant’s boss at Express Oil
Change was removing a stack of tires in a wooded area next to the
dumpsters behind the store, when he noticed a pungent smell
coming from an orange garbage bag behind the tires. He noted that
the bag did not come from the shop because they only used black
trash bags. He then called the police. Responding officers located
Rodriguez’s decomposing body inside the orange bag.
Dr. Carol Terry, the State’s medical examiner, performed the
autopsy of Rodriguez and testified at trial that her body was
wrapped in four separate garbage bags. The first layer contained
two garbage bags, one pulled up from the feet and one pulled down
from the head, with tape holding Rodriguez’s body in the fetal
position and wrapped tightly around her neck. Rodriguez’s body was
then placed into two additional garbage bags.
5 Dr. Terry found a single blunt force injury to the back of
Rodriguez’s neck, which, Dr. Terry opined, was not sufficient to have
caused Rodriguez’s death. Rodriguez’s body had signs of significant
decomposition including bloating, discoloration, and skin slippage.
And, due to the severe decomposition of the body, Dr. Terry could
not determine with any certainty the cause of death. However, given
the state in which Rodriguez’s body was found, Dr. Terry opined that
the manner of death was homicide.
Officers obtained a search warrant for the couple’s shared
residence, and, during this second search, they located orange trash
bags. A forensic analyst matched the bags used to conceal
Rodriguez’s body to the roll of garbage bags found in Appellant’s
home. Officers also found bloodstains in the trunk of Appellant’s
car, which were later matched to Rodriguez.
Appellant was taken into custody and brought to the
Lawrenceville Police Department for questioning. There, he told
officers that Rodriguez arrived home from work on October 7 and
that the couple showered together. Appellant wanted to have sex,
6 but Rodriguez refused. Appellant tried to make advances again
when the couple was in bed, and Rodriguez became annoyed.
Appellant told officers that Rodriguez got out of bed, changed
clothes, and left after the couple had an argument. Appellant stated
that he did not follow Rodriguez at that time.
When officers confronted Appellant with the orange trash bags
and the victim’s body, his head dropped, and he began to cry.
Appellant then told police that he did chase after Rodriguez when
she left the apartment, and that when he tried to stop her at the top
of the staircase, she moved to avoid his grasp and fell down the
stairwell. Appellant said that he ran down the stairs and checked
Rodriguez for a pulse but was unable to find one. Appellant became
nervous that law enforcement would not believe what happened, so
he wrapped the victim’s body in garbage bags, drove to the Express
Oil Change, and left Rodriguez there.
Regarding Appellant’s claim that the evidence was
constitutionally insufficient to support his murder conviction, based
on the evidence presented at trial, the jury was authorized to find
7 Appellant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson,
443 U. S. at 319.2
Appellant further alleges that, because the State’s case was
based solely on circumstantial evidence, and because he presented a
“reasonable” hypothesis of his innocence as it pertained to the
murder charge that the State did not discredit, the evidence was
insufficient to support his murder conviction pursuant to OCGA §
24-14-6. “In cases like this one where convictions are based on
circumstantial evidence, the evidence must be ‘consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt’ and ‘exclude every other reasonable hypothesis
save that of the guilt of the accused.’” Collett v. State, 305 Ga. 853,
855 (1) (828 SE2d 362) (2019) (quoting OCGA § 24-14-6). Whether
2 Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence concerning
his conviction for concealing the death of another. Consistent with our customary practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the evidence sua sponte, and we conclude that the evidence as summarized above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of concealing the death of another. See Jackson, supra. But see Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 391-392 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (explaining that the Court will end its practice of considering sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the term of court that begins in December 2020).
8 the evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis is a
question for the factfinder. See id. “Not every hypothesis is
reasonable, and the evidence does not have to exclude every
conceivable inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only those that
are reasonable.” (Citation omitted.) Akhimie v. State, 297 Ga. 801,
804 (1) (777 SE2d 683) (2015). Where a rational fact finder is
authorized to find that the evidence ruled out all other reasonable
hypotheses, that finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless the
verdict is insupportable as a matter of law. Id.
Appellant claims that the State’s evidence did not exclude the
reasonable hypothesis that Rodriguez simply fell down the stairs
and that Appellant did not cause her death. We disagree. The
evidence at trial showed that Appellant had been complaining that
he was unsatisfied with the intimate relationship he had with his
wife prior to her death, and that Rodriguez died after a fight with
her husband about this very topic. Appellant consistently lied to
family, friends, law enforcement, and a religious leader as to his
wife’s whereabouts. Furthermore, he denied involvement in her
9 injuries and the concealing of her death until confronted with
physical evidence. Additionally, although Appellant told officers
that Rodriguez fell to her death from the top of their apartment
stairwell, the neighbor who lived next to the stairwell heard no
commotion or noises on the evening of Rodriguez’s death. Finally,
Appellant went to great lengths to hide his wife’s death, wrapping
her body in numerous garbage bags and hiding it behind a stack of
tires at his workplace.
Based on the foregoing, the jury was not required to find that
Appellant’s hypothesis that Rodriguez simply fell down the stairs
was a reasonable one. See Collett, 305 Ga. at 855-856 (1); Black v.
State, 296 Ga. 658 (1) (769 SE2d 898) (2015). Instead, the jury could
reasonably infer that Appellant concealed his wife’s death and then
lied to the police, his family, and a religious leader about his wife’s
disappearance for more than a week because he had committed the
murder. See Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656 (1) (a) (740 SE2d 590) (2013)
(criminal intent is a question for the factfinder, and can be inferred
from the defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the
10 commission of the crimes). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient
to support Appellant’s murder conviction.
2. Appellant claims that he received constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to
consult with and present expert witness testimony to rebut the
State’s medical expert. In order to establish that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant
must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. A strong presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of professional conduct.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 34
(4) (644 SE2d 837) (2007). “Typically, the decision whether to
present an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy that, if
reasonable, will not sustain a claim of ineffective assistance.”
Matthews v. State, 301 Ga. 286, 289 (2) (800 SE2d 533) (2017). And,
“[t]rial tactics and strategy . . . are almost never adequate grounds
for finding trial counsel ineffective unless they are so patently
11 unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) McNair v. State, 296 Ga. 181,
184 (2) (b) (766 SE2d 45) (2014).
At the motion for new trial hearing, Appellant presented the
testimony of Dr. Kris Sperry, an expert in forensic pathology, and
also called his trial counsel as a witness. Dr. Sperry opined that,
based upon his review of the evidence, the victim’s death could have
been caused by an accidental fall down the stairs. However, he could
not state with any certainty the cause of the victim’s death, and,
because of this, he would have listed the manner of death as
“undetermined” rather than “homicide.”
Trial counsel testified that he received and reviewed the State’s
discovery material, including the report from Dr. Terry. Counsel
considered whether to hire an expert in this case, but chose not to
because he felt he could get the medical evidence he needed through
a thorough cross-examination of the State’s expert. Regarding Dr.
Sperry’s motion for new trial testimony, trial counsel stated that, as
a matter of strategy, he would not have pursued the theory that the
12 victim’s death was an accident, explaining:
I didn’t — I still don’t see it now; I mean, quite frankly, I just don’t. I mean, the defense was — it always is “we didn’t do anything to her.” And I found if you give the jury, “Well if you don’t believe A, maybe it was B,” then that dilutes [theory A] as a defense . . . and so from that standpoint, I mean, the defense was always, “I didn’t touch her. I didn’t lay a hand on her. I certainly didn’t kill her.” And it maintained that way from start to finish.
Additionally, counsel felt that it would have been extremely difficult
to convince a jury that the victim’s death was an accident based on
the facts of the case, which included Appellant’s numerous
conflicting statements to witnesses and law enforcement and his
attempt to conceal the body.
Based on the foregoing, the record shows that trial counsel’s
decision not to hire an expert in forensic pathology was a matter of
reasonable trial strategy. As we have previously explained,
[i]nformed strategic decisions do not amount to inadequacy under Strickland. The fact that appellant and his present counsel now disagree with the difficult decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy made by trial counsel does not require a finding that appellant received representation amounting to ineffective assistance.
13 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164,
167-168 (6) (b) (656 SE2d 518) (2008). And, because Appellant
cannot show that his trial counsel acted deficiently, his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See Wright v. State, 291 Ga.
869, 870 (2) (734 SE2d 876) (2012) (“If an appellant fails to meet his
or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the
reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.”
(Citations omitted.)).
Judgment affirmed. Nahmias, P. J., and Boggs, Peterson, Bethel, Ellington, and McMillian, JJ., concur. Warren, J., not participating.
DECIDED DECEMBER 21, 2020. Murder. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Conner. Lynn M. Kleinrock, for appellant. Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Samuel R. d’Entremont, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mark S. Lindemann, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.