2024 IL App (1st) 221186-U No. 1-22-1186
FIRST DIVISION June 24, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________
HASAN GUZALDERE, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 2019 L 1287 ) BENJAMIN PAUL DOCKERY, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellee. ) Bridget A. Mitchell, ) Judge Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
Held: We affirm the circuit court’s entry of judgment upon the jury’s verdict for defendant-appellee, where the record and brief are insufficient to assess plaintiff’s claims of error.
¶1 In this negligence action, plaintiff-appellant Hasan Guzeldere (plaintiff) appeals from the
circuit court’s entry of judgment upon the jury’s verdict for defendant Benjamin Paul Dockery.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND 1-22-1186
¶3 This is a personal injury action arising from an automobile collision involving three
automobiles. On February 6, 2019, plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint against
Dockery and James J. Ginnane.
¶4 Plaintiff alleged that on the afternoon of February 18, 2017, he was operating a car on Golf
Road in Mount Prospect, while Dockery and Ginnane were driving other vehicles. According to
the complaint, Dockery “drove his automobile into and collided with the rear of” the car driven by
Ginnane, causing Ginnane’s vehicle to collide with plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that both
defendant and Ginnane were guilty of negligently operating their vehicles. As a result of the
incident, plaintiff allegedly sustained serious injuries, incurred medical expenses, suffered pain
and mental anguish, and was deprived of earnings. Specifically, plaintiff’s brief indicates that his
right “shoulder cuff was torn out of its socket” and the right bicep was “torn away from the top of
[the] shoulder,” after which he underwent multiple surgeries and months of physical therapy.
¶5 In March 2019, plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss Ginnane from the lawsuit, without
prejudice. That order was granted, and the case proceeded against Dockery as the sole remaining
defendant.
¶6 In April 2019, Dockery filed his answer and denied allegations of negligence. The record
reflects that, between 2019 and 2021, plaintiff and Dockery engaged in written discovery and
depositions of lay and expert witnesses, including plaintiff’s biomechanical engineering expert,
Dr. Valnia Ngai.
¶7 The record reflects that a jury trial commenced on July 7, 2022 and concluded on July 11,
2022. Plaintiff’s brief reflects that he testified and also elicited testimony from Dr. Ngai and Dr.
Howard Freeberg, MD, the surgeon who “successfully reattached [plaintiff’s] bicep” to his
shoulder. The record and plaintiff’s brief indicate that Dockery testified and admitted negligence
-2- 1-22-1186
in causing the accident by failing to stop until it was too late, but that he denied the collision was
a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries and damages. Dockery’s counsel apparently argued that
plaintiff’s injuries were instead caused by his occupational history, including several years of
physical labor. 1 The record on appeal contains no transcripts or other report of trial proceedings,
so we cannot verify the content of any witness testimony, or the attorneys’ arguments to the jury. 2
¶8 The common law record shows that the jury received the following instruction
acknowledging Dockery’s negligence:
“The defendant, Benjamin Dockery, admits that he was negligent.
You need only decide whether that negligence was a proximate
cause of injuries to the plaintiff and, if so, what amount of money
will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for those
injuries.”
The jury was also instructed that plaintiff had the burden to prove that he was injured and that
“the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.”
¶9 On July 11, 2022, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for Dockery and against plaintiff.
On the same date, the trial court entered a judgment on the jury’s verdict.
¶ 10 On August 5, 2022, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. Plaintiff (acting pro se) also
filed a docketing statement reflecting he requested preparation of the appellate record by the circuit
1 Plaintiff’s brief asserts that Dockery’s counsel misstated his work history, and that his prior jobs had actually been “desk jobs” that did not require physical activity. 2 The record shows that plaintiff was represented by counsel from Ankin Law Office LLC in pre- trial discovery. It is not clear from the record whether plaintiff was represented by the same counsel at trial. -3- 1-22-1186
court, including any trial transcripts. However, it is not clear whether such transcripts were actually
delivered, or for that matter whether the trial proceedings were ever transcribed in the first place.
¶ 11 Plaintiff subsequently filed a common law record and a brief in our court using a pre-
printed form approved by our supreme court. Dockery did not file an appearance or brief in this
appeal. Accordingly, this court took the matter on plaintiff’s brief only.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 For the following reasons, we are compelled to affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 14 First, we note that plaintiff’s pro se brief (although prepared on a form approved by our
supreme court) does not comply with Supreme Court Rule 341 in certain respects. For example,
the statement of facts contains no citations to the record. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1,
2020) (A statement of facts “shall contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case,
stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the
pages of the record on appeal.”). Similarly, the “Argument” portion of plaintiff’s brief does not
include record citations, and several of his claims lack any citation to legal authorities. See Ill. S.
Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (argument “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and
the reasons therefore, with citation of the authorities and the pages of record relied on.”)
¶ 15 Plaintiff’s brief challenges the judgment on the jury’s defense verdict on multiple grounds.
First, he claims that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He also
asserts that defense counsel misled the jury and acted improperly in various respects. Plaintiff also
suggests that the trial judge did not adequately protect plaintiff (who is Muslim) from potential
jury bias on the basis of religion. We address these in turn.
¶ 16 In arguing that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, plaintiff
states that he “presented 2 expert witnesses and consistent medical records,” whereas defendant
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Dockery “admitted to negligence and did not provide expert testimony.” The plaintiff’s brief and
available record suggest that the case came down to a question of proximate causation. The jury
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2024 IL App (1st) 221186-U No. 1-22-1186
FIRST DIVISION June 24, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________
HASAN GUZALDERE, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 2019 L 1287 ) BENJAMIN PAUL DOCKERY, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellee. ) Bridget A. Mitchell, ) Judge Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
Held: We affirm the circuit court’s entry of judgment upon the jury’s verdict for defendant-appellee, where the record and brief are insufficient to assess plaintiff’s claims of error.
¶1 In this negligence action, plaintiff-appellant Hasan Guzeldere (plaintiff) appeals from the
circuit court’s entry of judgment upon the jury’s verdict for defendant Benjamin Paul Dockery.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND 1-22-1186
¶3 This is a personal injury action arising from an automobile collision involving three
automobiles. On February 6, 2019, plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint against
Dockery and James J. Ginnane.
¶4 Plaintiff alleged that on the afternoon of February 18, 2017, he was operating a car on Golf
Road in Mount Prospect, while Dockery and Ginnane were driving other vehicles. According to
the complaint, Dockery “drove his automobile into and collided with the rear of” the car driven by
Ginnane, causing Ginnane’s vehicle to collide with plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that both
defendant and Ginnane were guilty of negligently operating their vehicles. As a result of the
incident, plaintiff allegedly sustained serious injuries, incurred medical expenses, suffered pain
and mental anguish, and was deprived of earnings. Specifically, plaintiff’s brief indicates that his
right “shoulder cuff was torn out of its socket” and the right bicep was “torn away from the top of
[the] shoulder,” after which he underwent multiple surgeries and months of physical therapy.
¶5 In March 2019, plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss Ginnane from the lawsuit, without
prejudice. That order was granted, and the case proceeded against Dockery as the sole remaining
defendant.
¶6 In April 2019, Dockery filed his answer and denied allegations of negligence. The record
reflects that, between 2019 and 2021, plaintiff and Dockery engaged in written discovery and
depositions of lay and expert witnesses, including plaintiff’s biomechanical engineering expert,
Dr. Valnia Ngai.
¶7 The record reflects that a jury trial commenced on July 7, 2022 and concluded on July 11,
2022. Plaintiff’s brief reflects that he testified and also elicited testimony from Dr. Ngai and Dr.
Howard Freeberg, MD, the surgeon who “successfully reattached [plaintiff’s] bicep” to his
shoulder. The record and plaintiff’s brief indicate that Dockery testified and admitted negligence
-2- 1-22-1186
in causing the accident by failing to stop until it was too late, but that he denied the collision was
a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries and damages. Dockery’s counsel apparently argued that
plaintiff’s injuries were instead caused by his occupational history, including several years of
physical labor. 1 The record on appeal contains no transcripts or other report of trial proceedings,
so we cannot verify the content of any witness testimony, or the attorneys’ arguments to the jury. 2
¶8 The common law record shows that the jury received the following instruction
acknowledging Dockery’s negligence:
“The defendant, Benjamin Dockery, admits that he was negligent.
You need only decide whether that negligence was a proximate
cause of injuries to the plaintiff and, if so, what amount of money
will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for those
injuries.”
The jury was also instructed that plaintiff had the burden to prove that he was injured and that
“the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.”
¶9 On July 11, 2022, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for Dockery and against plaintiff.
On the same date, the trial court entered a judgment on the jury’s verdict.
¶ 10 On August 5, 2022, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. Plaintiff (acting pro se) also
filed a docketing statement reflecting he requested preparation of the appellate record by the circuit
1 Plaintiff’s brief asserts that Dockery’s counsel misstated his work history, and that his prior jobs had actually been “desk jobs” that did not require physical activity. 2 The record shows that plaintiff was represented by counsel from Ankin Law Office LLC in pre- trial discovery. It is not clear from the record whether plaintiff was represented by the same counsel at trial. -3- 1-22-1186
court, including any trial transcripts. However, it is not clear whether such transcripts were actually
delivered, or for that matter whether the trial proceedings were ever transcribed in the first place.
¶ 11 Plaintiff subsequently filed a common law record and a brief in our court using a pre-
printed form approved by our supreme court. Dockery did not file an appearance or brief in this
appeal. Accordingly, this court took the matter on plaintiff’s brief only.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 For the following reasons, we are compelled to affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 14 First, we note that plaintiff’s pro se brief (although prepared on a form approved by our
supreme court) does not comply with Supreme Court Rule 341 in certain respects. For example,
the statement of facts contains no citations to the record. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1,
2020) (A statement of facts “shall contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case,
stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the
pages of the record on appeal.”). Similarly, the “Argument” portion of plaintiff’s brief does not
include record citations, and several of his claims lack any citation to legal authorities. See Ill. S.
Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (argument “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and
the reasons therefore, with citation of the authorities and the pages of record relied on.”)
¶ 15 Plaintiff’s brief challenges the judgment on the jury’s defense verdict on multiple grounds.
First, he claims that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He also
asserts that defense counsel misled the jury and acted improperly in various respects. Plaintiff also
suggests that the trial judge did not adequately protect plaintiff (who is Muslim) from potential
jury bias on the basis of religion. We address these in turn.
¶ 16 In arguing that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, plaintiff
states that he “presented 2 expert witnesses and consistent medical records,” whereas defendant
-4- 1-22-1186
Dockery “admitted to negligence and did not provide expert testimony.” The plaintiff’s brief and
available record suggest that the case came down to a question of proximate causation. The jury
apparently found that this element of plaintiff’s case had not been proven.
¶ 17 Generally, “a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not
based upon any of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill.
2d 622, 633 (2005).
¶ 18 However, the record does not allow us to make this determination. “[T]o support a claim
of error on appeal the appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record.” Webster
v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001) (citing Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)).
Where an issue relates to the conduct of a hearing or proceeding, the issue is “not subject to review
absent a report or record of the proceeding. Instead, absent a record, ‘it [is] presumed that the order
entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.’ ” Id.
(quoting Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392). Doubts which arising from the incompleteness of the record
will be resolved against the appellant. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 157 (2005).
¶ 19 We recognize that the jury instructions included in the common law record corroborate
plaintiff’s assertions that Dockery (1) admitted negligence at trial but (2) argued to the jury that
there was no proximate cause. Nevertheless, without a record of the trial proceedings, we cannot
evaluate whether the jury’s verdict was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence
presented to it. Indeed, we must presume that there was a sufficient factual basis for the trial court
to enter judgment on the jury verdict for defendant. Thus, we must reject the claim of error that
the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
-5- 1-22-1186
¶ 20 We turn to plaintiff’s contentions that “defense counsel’s conduct was improper” in various
respects. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defense counsel “misled the jury” and misstated his
work history to falsely suggest his injuries were unrelated to the collision, improperly commented
that plaintiff was not married to the mother of his children, told the jury that plaintiff “had not done
[his] taxes for years 2017 & 2018,” “presented low quality pictures of the damages” to the vehicles
that did not properly reflect the actual damages, and “mocked” plaintiff’s testimony during a “loud
and theatrical closing argument.”
¶ 21 While we do not purport to condone the alleged conduct by defense counsel, the state of
the record precludes us from assessing whether there is merit to these claims. Without a report of
proceedings, we cannot ascertain the specific content of the defense counsel’s comments or
determine whether there was any resulting prejudice to plaintiff. Thus, we must reject any related
claim of error.
¶ 22 The remainder of plaintiff’s brief consists of claims that the trial court should have done
more to guard against “potential biases of the jury,” given his status as a Muslim and the “level of
Islamophobic prejudice in the United States.” Plaintiff says he “felt like an outsider” and suggests
the jury may have been biased against him. In support, he asserts that: (1) defendant was a well-
known Christian pastor; (2) there were non-Muslims in the jury; (3) the jury foreperson was a
retired “higher ranking U.S. military personnel” and “most U.S. military personnel have
experienced battle against Muslims” since September 11, 2001; and (4) there was a “Christian
Prayer Table” outside the Daley Center courthouse. Plaintiff also claims that certain jurors were
sleeping “in plain sight” of the judge during plaintiff’s testimony, which suggests that these “jurors
were biased and already made up their minds about the case.”
-6- 1-22-1186
¶ 23 Although plaintiff’s allegations of religious bias are serious and we do not take them
lightly, the record is insufficient to evaluate them. For example, we cannot tell whether any of the
jurors expressed any bias at any point, or whether either plaintiff’s or Dockery’s religion was ever
mentioned at trial. We also cannot ascertain whether any jurors were sleeping, or whether the trial
judge was made aware of it. Thus, we cannot find reversible error related to his claims of bias.
¶ 24 Moreover, even assuming certain facts are accurate (such as the presence of a “Christian
Prayer Table” outside the Daley Center courthouse), plaintiff does not cite any pertinent legal
authorities to argue that such circumstances deprived him of a fair trial. A reviewing court is
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited. Lopez v. Northwestern
Memorial Hospital, 375 Ill. App. 3d 637, 648 (2007). Points raised in a brief without supporting
legal authorities are forfeited. See Cholipski v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2014 IL App (1st) 132842,
¶ 36. Plaintiff does not cite any relevant legal authorities to support his claims of bias. 3
¶ 25 CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
3 Plaintiff cites two Florida criminal cases discussing claims that a defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to notify the trial judge of a sleeping juror. See Thompson v. State, 873 So. 2d 481 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District 2004); Judd v. State, 951 So. 2d 103 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District 2007). Those cases are clearly inapposite to this civil appeal.
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